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ABSTRACT

Most previous research on the role of U.S. state policy in shaping unionization outcomes
has emphasized presence or absence of “right-to-work” laws as the key explanatory factor. This
dissertation emphasizes the role of state economic development programing in driving the
variation in unionization observed across the American states. It also revisits the role that foreign
direct investment plays in regard to union power.
I first discuss the variation in private sector unionization levels among the 50 states. I
then provide a literature review on two key types of economic development policy,
entrepreneurial and locational. I revisit previous scholarship on foreign investment, positing that
it has a positive association with unionization, contrary to the commonly-accepted view of many
scholars.
I then empirically test these hypotheses using two original models of unionization
outcomes measured at both macro and micro units of analysis. First, I present an error correction
model with time-series cross sectional data on state private union density from 1983-2004. Here
I find that “demand-generating” entrepreneurial development strategies exert a negative longterm impact on annual change in union density, while foreign direct investment exerts a positive
shock to it. Next I use logistic regression to test for the variables’ impact on individual-level
union election outcomes. Here I find that foreign firm nationality and entrepreneurial policy both
exert a positive impact on likelihood of unions to win certification elections. Neither presence of
a “right-to-work” statute or locational economic development strategies demonstrate significant
effect on the long-term decline of union density or on likelihood of union election wins.
Finally, I consider the impact of economic development and unionization on state income
inequality from 1983-2004 using an error-correction model. Private sector union density has a
negative independent association with inequality, and entrepreneurial policy increases inequality.
In the presence of higher levels of entrepreneurial activism, however, private union density
losses its significant impact in equalizing the income distribution. I close by discussing some
normative implications of the proliferation of economic development policies and conclude that
at present most run counter to labor movement goals and power, especially those using
entrepreneurial strategies.
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Introduction
This dissertation addresses the dynamics of unionization, usually considered as a
sociological and economic process, from a political framework. As a scholar of political science,
I contend that unionization in America is shaped first and foremost by political factors, namely
policies pursued by the individual states. Union strength continues to vary across the states even
in a day and age of waning union power overall. The underlying cause for this is federalism,
which gives states power to craft unique policies to promote their individual economies. The
varying economic policies enacted by states condition the ability of unions to organize and grow
within them. These policies are legislated and implemented by 50 unique state governments,
which differ in regard to partisanship and ideology. Specific economic policies are the factors
most directly influencing union outcomes, but federalism, partisanship, and ideology condition
which policies will be enacted.
Most policy-oriented research on variation in state unionization levels emphasizes the
role of labor relations policies in impacting the union organizing environment. The presence of
“right-to-work” laws are the most widely cited policy variable in examinations of state labor
union strength. While this dissertation does not intend to refute the argument that “right-to-work”
laws have historically affected state labor movements, it does argue that others policy factors
need to be explored to fully understand the cross-sectional variation in state unionization
outcomes in recent decades. Labor relations statutes can only go so far in explaining why private
sector union density levels vary across states and how state density levels have changed over
time.
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The primary contribution of this project is that it emphasizes a policy variable which has
been relatively untapped to study comparative differences in growth and decline of unionization
rates. I hypothesize that variations in economic development policies, which states enact to grow
their business and labor sectors, are likely to influence labor union strength across the states.
While scholars have considered these policies’ impacts on job growth, foreign investment
attraction, and other important economic factors, their relationship to unionization has been
under-examined. In keeping with custom, I will also discuss and consider variation in state labor
relations laws as a controlling variable in this study.
A secondary focus of my research will consider the role of the international economy in
shaping unionization outcomes. Sociology and economics perspectives highlight inward foreign
investment as a key determinant of changes in unionization levels. The amount of foreign direct
investment (FDI) has been analyzed frequently as a factor impacting state unionization.
However, the measure specifications of FDI range greatly, from those that account for FDI as a
stock variable (accumulated levels of assets) to those which measure it as a flow variable (new
quantities of inward investment in a given year). My examination considers FDI differently, as
the quantity of jobs attributable to inward investment as a percentage of the state labor force, a
measure that had been used with less frequency. Moreover, the nationality of individual firms
experiencing unionization attempts has also received limited attention as a determinant of labor
election outcomes. I examine foreign investment from both the “macro” perspective of FDI jobs
in the states and the “micro” perspective of individual firm nationality. This coupled approach based on multiple units of analysis - will present a fuller picture of how capital mobility impacts
unionization potential.
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To empirically analyze federalist variation and state levels of unionization, I offer a
dynamic time series analysis to account for changes in union density rates over a two decade
time period, from 1984 to 2004. This model emphasizes economic development policy as the
critical independent variable. I also conduct a cross-sectional analysis of individual firms
experiencing unionization attempts to uncover if foreign firms differ from American firms in
their likelihood to organize. This second model helps to better explore the role of foreign
investment in impacting new organizing.
Finally, I offer an examination of why unionization and economic development policy
matter to citizens’ economic prosperity by examining differences in income inequality across the
states. Unionization and economic development policy affect the distribution of income in the
state economies and impact equity. Moreover, I find that certain types of development programs
effectively disable unionization as a force in advancing the interests of the low-income workers.
An underlying theme of this research is the search for an economic development strategy
that is compatible, rather than at odds with unionization. In recent years, states such as Ohio,
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin have passed legislation that limits the power of unions to
compel dues from workers covered under union-negotiated contracts. Leaders passing these bills
cite promotion of economic development and business attraction as the main motivation. Most
southern business and political leaders have endorsed this view for decades.
Other states appear to retain a union-friendly approach in their labor relations policies,
which could also indicate that the economic development strategies these states enact will be
favorable to unions. The bigger question that this dissertation asks is if there is an economic
development strategy currently in use by state governments that actually includes and preserves
3

the role of unions in shaping economic outcomes. Is it possible that encouragement of economic
growth and job creation can run parallel to maintaining union-friendly policies, or is there simply
no room for unions in economic development strategies pursued by states?
The layout of this dissertation is as follows: In Chapter One, I will demonstrate that states
display regional variation in unionization rates, and I will review the literature contending that
“right-to-work” statutes account for this regional variation. In Chapter Two I will discuss
differences in two major state economic development policy orientations and posit their
relationship to varying unionization levels. In Chapter Three I will review literature regarding the
relationship of foreign investment to unionization outcomes and offer some statistical analysis to
tentatively refute the finding that foreign investment and firm nationality hinders unionization. In
Chapters 4 and 5 I will offer two multivariate regression models to test my hypotheses regarding
economic development, foreign investment, and unionization outcomes. Chapter 4 will present a
time series model, using “macro” state union density as the dependent variable. Chapter 5 will
present a cross sectional logit model, using union wins in individual election contests as the
dependent variable. Chapter 6 will utilize state union density along with economic development
orientation as independent variables to explain variation in income inequality. In the concluding
chapter, I will offer final thoughts on the compatibility of state economic development strategy
and union strength and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 1: Variation in State Unionization Levels
The story of unionization in the United States is clearly one of decline. Research
confirms an overwhelmingly consistent trend- union density rates have fallen markedly since the
late seventies, and most of this loss has occurred in the private sector (Mayer 2004, Farber 2005,
& 2001, Slaughter 2007, Hirsch and MacPherson et al. 2001). The dwindling of private sector
union membership is apparent from the state as well as national perspective. When analyzing the
twenty year change from 1984 to 2004, not a single state in the union gained in the percentage of
the private sector labor force organized, and all but four experienced a drop in the total number
of private sector workers who were union members (Gordon 2015).1 The overall conclusion to
be drawn by these numbers is that the strength of the American union movement, at both a
national and state level, has been substantially eroded.
Even though the decline in private sector union density is common to all states in recent
decades, noteworthy variations in the proportion of unionized state workforces remain. As of
2004, the last year in my study, a quarter of American states retained private sector union
densities of 10% or more, with a high of 16% in Hawaii. A larger group of states had private
sector union densities lower than 5% with North Carolina, the least unionized state, having less
than 2%. There is a strong regional association to the variation between the most and least
unionized states. Table 1 presents 2004 private sector union density data for all states
individually, as well as by regional grouping (Hirsch and Macpherson 2004, BLS 2004). States
in the Far West, Midwest, and Mideast (Middle Atlantic) tend to display the highest private
sector union rates, with regional averages reaching above 10%. The Southeast, Rocky
1

States that increased membership were Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, and Washington.
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Table 1. State and Regional Private Sector Union Density, 2004
Regional Grouping

Union Density (%)

Far West
Hawaii
Washington
Alaska
Nevada
California
Oregon
Regional Average

16.2
13.2
10.9
10.0
9.4
8.1
11.3

Great Lakes
Michigan
Illinois
Ohio
Wisconsin
Indiana
Regional Average

15.9
12.1
10.5
10.4
9.0
11.6

Mideast
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
Regional Average

15.1
11.6
9.7
7.7
6.0
10.0

Plains
Minnesota
Missouri
Iowa
Kansas
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Regional Average

11.1
10.9
7.2
6.1
5.0
4.1
2.9
6.8
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Table 1. Continued.
Regional Grouping

Union Density (%)

New England
Rhode Island
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Regional Average

8.8
7.7
7.3
5.9
4.8
4.2
6.5

Rocky Mountains
Montana
Wyoming
Colorado
Idaho
Utah
Regional Average

5.5
5.3
5.2
3.7
2.9
4.5

Southeast
West Virginia
Kentucky
Alabama
Tennessee
Louisiana
Georgia
Mississippi
Virginia
Arkansas
A
Florida

10.5
7.5
5.7
4.9
4.8
4.3
4.0
3.4
3.2
2.8
2.8
2.6
1.6
4.6

South Carolina
North Carolina
Regional Average

Southwest
Arizona
3.9
Oklahoma
3.5
New Mexico
3.4
Texas
2.7
Regional Average
3.4
Source: Hirsch and Macpherson 2001 and updates listed
at www.unionstats.com, and Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Mountains, and Southwest show the lowest rates regionally. The Plains states fall somewhere in
the middle, displaying substantial range in private sector unionization- between 11 and 3% - but
averaging at about 7% for the region. Interestingly the New England states, once renown for
their labor union strength, only averaged about 6% in private union density as of 2004. (New
England retains relatively high rates of overall union density due to the prevalence of public
sector unionization in these states.) It has been common for analysts to draw marked distinctions
between “strong labor” states, concentrated in the Northeast (and Midwest and West), and “weak
labor” states of the South and Rocky Mountain regions (Farber 2005). However, given the
waning power of industrial unions in the New England states, it is important to recognize that
most private sector unionization in the Northeast is now concentrated in the mid-Atlantic region.
This regional variation in unionization is a function of economic, demographic, and
political factors. Examining the composition of states’ industrial sectors and work forces help to
understand some of the differences in state level unionization. Regional variation in union
strength relates to “legacy effects” of industrial development patterns in the states. Historically,
union organizing has been most successful in industries such as transport, warehousing,
shipping, and durable goods manufacturing (Mayer 2004; Sanyal 1990), and these industries are
prevalent in the Pacific, Mid-west and Northeastern states. “Light” manufacturing such as textile
production, as well as agriculture and lower-skilled services, have proven to be less lucrative
organizing targets and were the major industries in the Southern states for much of the 20th
century (Mayer 2004). Thus, northern and western states featuring heavy manufacturing,
utilities, and transport employment as a higher proportion of their workforce experienced more
unionization in the successful years of the labor movement (1940’s-1970’s) than did southern
states with lower proportions.
8

The demographic characteristics of state labor forces are also likely related to union
membership levels. Black workers are more likely to be union members than white workers or
Hispanics, and men are slightly more likely to be union members than women, although the gap
between men and women has declined in recent decades (Mayer 2004). The higher proportions
of black and male workers in some state labor forces may exert an independent positive effect on
state union density, although other associated state-level variables, such as lack of union shop
protections, may obscure the demographic impacts of race and sex in the South.
Most political science research on unionization differences have focused on partisanship,
ideology, and policy variation across the states. American federalism promotes a diversification
of the state institutional environments in which labor unions operate. Each state elects its own
unique set of leaders empowered with discretion in policy areas that impact the political
economy, including labor relations. Partisanship of state legislatures and executive offices, along
with the ideological orientations of elected branches, are variables that condition the organizing
and bargaining capacity of unions. Comparative researchers, borrowing from themes in
sociological literature, stress the role of working class “power resources” as tools used by nonelites to enable routes of representation to political and economic decision making (Korpi 1983,
Hewitt 1977, Hicks and Swank 1984). The presence of ideologically left governments, to provide
a political voice to working people, and labor union movements, which coordinate their
participation in both market wage setting and policy-making favorable to their class interests, are
the key power resources (Kelly and Witko 2012, see also Radcliff and Saiz 1998).
The causal relationship between left governments and union strength is bi-directional.
Labor unions undergird the organization of left-leaning political parties, generate left candidates,
9

and secure left votes in the electorate. But the ideological orientation of governments also impact
the union “opportunity structure” because it impacts labor relations regulations and the amount
of public resources channeled to protect worker organizations (Kelly, Witko and Young 2013,
Stephens and Wallerstein 1991, Bronfenbrenner 2009). Even in the United States, where the
ideological spectrum is shifted right, the partisan composition of the Congress and the President
matters to union density outcomes (Dark 1999; Kelly, Witko, and Young 2013). At the state
level, where the Democrat Party is sometimes centrist or even conservative, the average
ideological scores of state legislators better explain variation in union density. Time series
regression analysis reveals a positive association between left state government power and state
unionization levels when combining private and public sectors (Kelly, Witko, and Young 2013).
While partisanship and ideology of governments is an underlying variable affecting
unionization, it is arguably labor, employment, and economic policies pursued by state
governments that offer the most direct causal link to the strength of state labor movements.
Policy differences provide clear evidence for the role of federalist variation in social outcomes.
Labor relations laws known as “right-to-work” statutes, which differ widely across the states, are
the classic policy variable utilized in the study of unionization (Farber 1984, Ellwood and Fine
1987, Moore 1998), and are determined at a state, rather than national level.
The legal foundations of union-management relations in the U.S. is based upon the
National Labor Relations Act, a Depression-era law that guaranteed American workers in the
private sector the fundamental rights to organize into unions and collectively bargain with their
employers. While the National Labor Relations Act retains supremacy across the country,
amendments passed in the late 1940’s give discretion to states in influencing the potency of
10

union organizing activities. The Taft-Hartley Act diluted the original NLRA organizing
protections by granting states the authority to pass “right-to-work” laws, establishing “open
shop” bargaining units (Taft Hartley Act 1947, 14(b)). Open shops allow workers covered under
union contracts to opt-out of union membership and dues deduction, thus eroding the revenueraising potential for labor organizations. This is in contrast to states operating with “union shops”
which give unions legal authority to mandate dues payment, post-hiring, for employees covered
under union-negotiated contracts.2 The discretion given to states in regard to mandating union
dues payment contributes to the regional variation in labor strength previously discussed. As of
2004, the last year of my study, about 22 states were open shop “right-to-work” states,
concentrated in the southeast, west Plains, and Rocky Mountain regions. The remainder of states,
including the District of Columbia, had union-shops and were located in the north-east, upper
mid-west, and Pacific Coast regions.
Variation in these differing labor regulatory systems impact labor union recruitment in
the private sector significantly. “Right-to-work” states consistently rank among the lowest in
terms of union density figures; for instance, in 2004 every one of the bottom 16 states in terms of
private sector union density levels, all under 7%, were right-to-work states (Mayer 2004, see also
Davis and Huston 1995). Union density levels are strongly associated with average wage levels,
with union shop states exhibiting higher per capita income levels than open shop states (Mishel
2000). Moreover, the upward pressure that unions place on wages has spill-over effects for all
employees. Even non-union workers in the private sector earn more in states with union shops,
A third type of bargaining unit, the “closed shop,” was prohibited under Taft-Hartley. The closed shop requires all
employees to be members of the certified union before hiring. Only pre-established union members would be
eligible to become employees in this arrangement. Some industrial relations professionals argue that the
construction industry still works under a closed shop system.
2
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whereas union to non-union wage differentials are greater in “right-to-work” systems (Farber
2005). Moreover, states with greater union density spend more on education per pupil, income
support supplements, and total government social program spending (Radcliff and Saiz 1998),
further magnifying the positive externalities generated from union activity in the wider economy.
Efforts to strip private sector workers of union rights tends to coincide with restrictions
on public employees’ union security guarantees as well, as recent examples in Indiana, Ohio, and
Wisconsin demonstrate (see Greenhouse 2011, Davey 2015). Federalism allows near-total
discretion to states in providing rights to state and municipal workers to join unions, to engage in
collective bargaining, and to strike (Supreme Court of the U.S., National League of Cities vs.
Usury, 1976). States vary significantly in the degree of protections they have legislated for their
public employees to engage in labor activities (Freeman and Valletta 1988, Farber 2005). States
with private sector “right-to-work” laws, namely those in the south, often correspond to the states
which lack strong public employee bargaining rights and union security guarantees in the public
sector (Farber 2005). While public sector unionization is outside the scope of this project, the
link between “right-to-work” policies and limited public employee labor protections reaffirms
the significant impact that federalist variation has in setting institutional constraints on unions.
While scholars heavily focus on “right-to-work” (RTW) statutes as a major determinant of state
union strength, there are limits to the degree to which this policy variable explains the erosion of
unionization in recent decades. Table 2 lists all states, in ascending order of private sector union
density in 2004, along with the state’s RTW status as of 2004, as well as the year that the RTW

12

Table 2. State Private Union Density and Right-to-Work Status
Density Change
Density Change
Private Density, 2004
RTW Status, 2004*
Year Enacted*
1984-04**
2004-05**
Hawaii
16.2
No
-5.1
0.7
Michigan
15.9
No
-9.2
-1.5
New York
15.1
No
-8.5
1.0
Washington
13.2
No
-6.6
-1.8
Illinois
12.1
No
-7.8
-0.3
New Jersey
11.6
No
-7.2
0.2
Minnesota
11.1
No
-6.4
-1.4
Alaska
10.9
No
-6.5
2.2
Missouri
10.9
No
-9.0
-1.1
Ohio
10.5
No
-10.5
0.3
West Virginia
10.5
No
-13.4
0.1
Wisconsin
10.4
No
-10.2
0.7
Nevada
10.0
Yes
1951
-11.2
2.0
Pennsylvania
9.7
No
-11.4
-1.2
California
9.4
No
-7.4
0.3
Indiana
9.0
No
-15.1
1.0
D.C.
8.8
No
-5.7
-1.8
Rhode Island
8.8
No
-5.1
-0.4
Oregon
8.1
No
-10.6
-0.4
Delaware
7.7
No
-5.8
-0.1
Massachusetts
7.7
No
-7.4
-0.3
Kentucky
7.5
No
-9.6
0.1
Connecticut
7.3
No
-6.3
0.3
Iowa
7.2
Yes
1947
-7.5
0.1
Kansas
6.1
Yes
1958
-4.3
-1.0
Maryland
6.0
No
-7.6
1.4
Maine
5.9
No
-7.2
-0.3
Alabama
5.7
Yes
1953
-8.0
0.3
Montana
5.5
No
-8.1
0.2
Wyoming
5.3
Yes
1963
-6.1
0.3
Colorado
5.2
No
-4.7
0.1
Nebraska
5.0
Yes
1947
-6.3
-0.5
Tennessee
4.9
Yes
1947
-6.2
-1.6
New Hampshire
4.8
No
-2.5
-0.8
Louisiana
4.8
Yes
1976
-4.0
0.0
Georgia
4.3
Yes
1947
-5.4
-0.6
Vermont
4.2
No
-2.2
0.9
North Dakota
4.1
Yes
1947
-3.9
-0.5
Mississippi
4.0
Yes
1954
-4.9
1.1
Arizona
3.9
Yes
1947
-3.3
0.0
Idaho
3.7
Yes
1985
-3.8
-0.4
Oklahoma
3.5
Yes
2001
-5.0
-0.6
Virginia
3.4
Yes
1947
-6.5
0.0
New Mexico
3.4
No
-4.8
0.0
Arkansas
3.2
Yes
1947
-5.9
-0.1
South Dakota
2.9
Yes
1947
-4.3
-0.2
Utah
2.9
Yes
1955
-6.3
-0.2
Florida
2.8
Yes
1943
-3.1
-0.3
Texas
2.7
Yes
1993
-3.5
0.4
South Carolina
2.6
Yes
1954
-0.9
-1.5
North Carolina
1.6
Yes
1947
-3.2
0.2
Sources: * National Right to Work Committee 2015. ** Colin Gordon. “Mappings of Union Membership”, www.unionstats.com
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law was enacted. It also lists the annual change in union density for 2004, as well as for the two
decades preceding 2004.
Clearly, the most unionized states tend to be those without open shop laws, which seems,
on first glance, to support the classic theory that “right-to-work” statutes explain state level
variation in union membership. However, when looking at the annual and 20-year change in
union density, in tandem with the year a state’s RTW statute was enacted, the relationship
appears less conclusive. Almost all states with RTW statutes passed them fifty to sixty years ago,
and only three states passed laws during the two decades of my study.3 Once the laws were
passed, they remained static for all states; in other words there has been no back-and-forth
fluctuation between union shop and open shop status upon enacting a RTW statute. Yet the
twenty year change for all states between 1984 and 2004 was one of decline. Thus, union density
changed for all states, but right-to-work status remained static for most states. Moreover,
regarding annual change in union density, states do show variation in recent years, with some
increasing and others decreasing. RTW status appears to have little relationship to this annual
change in states, as those which gained, as well as those which lost, are a “mixed bag” of open
shop and closed shop states.4 So while labor relations policy may relate to cross-sectional
variation between states, it lacks clear relevance when examining variation in over-time change.
It may be hypothesized that the impact of RTW laws are long-term, explaining union density
rates five to six decades after their passage, even though the argument for long-range impacts of

3

Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin passed RTW laws in more recent years outside my study

4

This lack of relationship can also be observed in more recent years with states that passed RTW laws after my
period of study. Michigan lost members since the passage of RTW. However, Indiana actually gained membership
in the year after enacting their RTW law. See Davey 2015.
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RTW laws on union strength have been refuted (Moore 1998, Farber 1984). Even if one accepts
this argument, it still does not adequately account for differences in recent years among states in
the annual change in private union density.
Tables of descriptive statistics can not properly analyze dynamic changes in variables
over time. One contribution of my later chapters will be the presentation of a time series
regression model which better captures historical change in union densities across the states. In
any case, the static nature of right-to-work laws in the years under study immediately motivates
the search for other variables which do change over time, which could better account for annual
union density change.
In addition to labor relations statutes, employment policies also vary across states and
may factor into unionization levels, at least indirectly. States design distinct employmentinsurance programs and worker safety programs (Hansen 2001). They operate their own
departments of labor and employment security agencies to enforce state-generated employment
laws, such as minimum wage provisions. While states are bound to guarantee most employees a
minimum wage as established by the federal government, states do retain discretion to set the
wage floor higher, if they choose. States in the south and Mountain West typically have no state
wage floor and thus only honor the minimum federal rate; compared to northeastern and West
Coast states which feature state minimum wages that best the federal rate (Department of Labor,
Wage and Hour Division, 2015). Minimum wage rates are usually thought of as an effect of
unionization. However, higher base level wages raise the “starting point” from which contract
wage bargaining begins, helping unions to achieve even higher wages for their members. This
enriches union dues revenues and union reputation among workers, which could in turn lead to
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higher unionization potential. States also have discretion in the administration of worker’s
compensation programs, including the frequency of denying claims, provision of resources for
monitoring fraud, and the determination of benefit levels (Lemov 1997). More pro-worker
provisions assist unions in their ability to win claims for their members affected by job-related
injuries. Union reputation and membership recruitment may be enhanced in states with highlevel worker compensation standards.
For scholars concerned with the impact of policy on state unionization, labor relations
and employment laws are “natural” factors to explore. They have a straight-forward relationship
to working conditions, wages, and protections for the labor force and clearly affect policy areas
that are central to labor unions. However, the limitations of labor relations policies to adequately
explain trends in unionization require policy-oriented scholars to cast a wider net in their
research. Policies that focus on “bigger picture” development of the state macro-economy are
likely to influence labor force dynamics and unionization capacity, but have received less
attention. Economic development policies, which provide government resources and planning to
cultivate state business and labor sectors, are a major area of interest in federalist studies in
recent decades. As will be discussed in the next chapter, projects to evaluate the intended
economic consequences of such policies- such as job growth and increased investment from
outside the state - have been prolific. Other scholars of federalism focus on assessing the
disadvantages that may have emerged from economic development policies, particularly their
negative impact on revenues for public-sector services. While scholars fairly frequently
acknowledge a general relationship between economic development and unionization in broader
discussions of income equality and jobs quality, there has been little examination of the causal
relationship that development policies may have on the labor movement.
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In reality, union movement vitality is determined by a complex interplay of political,
social, and economic factors. Policy-oriented scholars should not attempt to explain it as a
function of labor relations policies alone. Economic development policies have a wide reach on
the state macro-economy, which sets the overall conditions in which unions must organize. Some
of these conditions include: the prevailing array of industries in the state economy, the degree of
expansion of the state economy, and the specific terms and conditions of new jobs created. In
some cases, economic development policies may even directly address unions with the intent to
support or subvert them, as will be discussed.
The central research question of this dissertation – “What is the causal impact
of economic development policy on unionization outcomes in the states?” – is essentially
empirical in nature. However, allow me to offer an alternate framing of the question, which is
perhaps more normative in its approach: “Is there an economic development strategy that
actually aligns with the agenda of the union movement? Which states, if any, use development
strategies that are compatible with unions and their efforts to nurture economies of shared
wealth?” As I shall discuss in Chapter 2, a state government’s orientation to development, and its
perception of labor as a cost or an asset to business, may impact the overall favorability of the
state economy to labor union growth. This matters because the relationship between unionization
and economic development policy may have a significant impact on the equity of income
distribution in the state economy, as will be examined in Chapter 6.
Finally, since unionization is an economic, as well as a political phenomenon, it is also
necessary to re-consider how the internationalization of the economy impacts state labor
movements. Scholars have debated how the openness of a state’s economy, as determined by the
amount of foreign investment entering the state, impacts union strength for several decades.
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Chapter 3 offers a review of this literature and posits that in spite of the general assumption that
inward foreign investment impedes unionization, it might actually present opportunities for labor
unions. Moreover, consideration of inward foreign investment is critical to the greater discussion
of how economic development impacts unionization, as increased inward investment is a
primary objective of such policies.
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Chapter 2: Economic Development Strategy and Unionization Outcomes
Federalism enables distinct political economies to evolve across the 50 states (Eisinger
1990; Amberg 2010). Labor force dynamics, including unionization of the workforce, are
important aspects shaping state political economies. Public policies that impact the state labor
force can be grouped into three major types: labor-management relations policies, employment
protections, and economic development strategies. Labor-management relations policies, as
discussed in Chapter One, are the most thoroughly researched policy-factor impacting
unionization outcomes, with right-to-work laws commonly associated with lower rates of
unionization. As for employment regulations, the second related policy factor, their relationship
with unionization is an endogenous one. Unionization has positive externalities on state wage
rates and employment protections for the entire labor force –including non-union workers
(Radcliff and Saiz 1998). State policies establishing minimum wages, employer unemployment
taxes, strong safety and occupational standards and worker compensation protections are
products of union efforts to lobby policy-makers and support pro-worker candidates. However,
the presence of strong worker protection laws also has a feedback effect on unions in their ability
to service their own members. Union contract enforcement of wage and safety provisions is
much easier if a minimum level of worker protections is already backed by the full force of state
law.
Economic development is an area that has received less attention than labor and
employment regulations as a policy determinant of unionization and is critical to understanding
state variation in union outcomes. This chapter will first review the variation in economic
development policy approaches and compare two major types of strategies. Next, it will
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summarize the findings about the impacts of these strategies on state job growth, wage rates, and
availability of public funds. It will then discuss the Saiz economic development indices, the
primary metric available to measure economic development policy, which tracks the intensity of
states to engage in two major types of strategies. I will then posit possible impacts that the two
economic development approaches have on unionization outcomes and craft tentative hypotheses
for later testing. Lastly, this chapter will present a descriptive statistics comparison of three
example states as an illustration of the differences in policy and unionization levels between
states using the different types of economic development approaches.
I contend that economic development strategies to target and/or grow new business
investment exert an impact on unionization outcomes that is independent and distinct from the
impact of state labor relations policies. Admittedly, at some level investment and development
strategies are inter-related to state labor laws and employment programs. For example, state
efforts to keep unionization low through “right-to-work” laws have themselves been classified as
a definable economic development strategy by some scholars (Leicht and Jenkins 1994).
However, this dissertation concurs with scholarship that recognizes the distinction between
economic development policy and labor and employment policy and conceptualizes them
separately. The former utilizes positive incentives and resource provision to attract and/or grow
capital in the state economy, while the latter prioritizes regulation of business actions that
specifically target unions and employees (Eisinger 1988). Labor and employment policies
directly enforce union and/or worker protections, and given this, it is no wonder that they have
received much attention as factors impacting unionization outcomes. However, economic
development policy as an independent influence on unionization capacity is also worthy of
attention.
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First of all, economic development policy cultivates the firm and industry mix operating
in the state, which in turn determines the environment within which labor unions organize and
bargain. For example, one state might offer an investment incentive to lure durable goods
manufacturing industries such as those in the automotive sector, while another state’s incentive
package could target lower-skilled manufacturing and service-sector businesses, while still
another state program could promote start-up funding for emerging information tech businesses.
The industry sectors nurtured under these approaches vary greatly, and unions may have more or
less organizing potential in one industry versus another. The employment market’s shift away
from durable goods manufacturing to service sectors in recent decades, especially to lowerpaying ones in the retail, food, and hospitality industries, is noted as a factor confounding unions
in their efforts to maintain membership and achieve growth (Farber and Kruger 1992 in
Acemoglu et al 2001).
Another way that economic development policy could affect unionization is that it could
attract and/or provide incentives to firms contingent on the degree of collaboration or
combativeness that firms are willing to display toward unions. Investment incentives could be
awarded by state programs with the stipulation that recipient businesses remain “union free”; or
alternatively, incentives could be designated for firms with a history of collaborative, noncombative union relations. It is difficult to statistically substantiate this, as the details of
bargaining are notoriously kept “sub rosa” in most deals that state officials strike with investors
(Mattera et.al. 2010)5. However, some qualitative research shows that conditioning of incentives
For example, I submitted Open Records requests to three states’ economic development programs during the
course of research for this project. Officials from two states, South Carolina and Tennessee, maintained that much
of the records detailing the recipients of incentives could not be released, because the information was “proprietary.”
Eventually, the state of SC provided some requested information. Tennessee did not provide any requested data.
5
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packages based on how firms approach union relations does happen. Table 3, taken from a
report conducted by the corporate-subsidy watchdog group Good Jobs First, displays a number
of economic development programs in 2011 that included requirements specifically addressing
unions and labor relations. For instance, some programs require that unions be given proper
notice and participation in the implementation of skills and training programs, such as
California’s Employment Training Panel, Kentucky’s Bluegrass State Skills Corporation, and
New Hampshire’s Job Training fund. Most of the remaining identified requirements deny tax
credits to companies that relocate as a means of nullifying existing collective bargaining
agreements or use incentives in other ways that attempt to weaken unions (West Virginia
Governors Guaranteed Workforce Program and the Missouri Rebuilding Communities program,
for example). It is important to note that these specific references to unions are not the norm in
economic development programs surveyed. Moreover, the characteristics of the programs
documented in this table do not imply that all of the state’s other development programs will be
union-friendly. For example, it is conceivable that while California provides favorable treatment
to unions in its Employment Panel program its other corporate subsidy programs contain
provisions that attract businesses which are less amenable to union participation. Still, the
degree to which the highlighted program requirements relate to a unified union-friendly strategy
has implications on the strength of the labor movement in the overall state economy.
The before mentioned cases highlight ways that some economic development programs
attempt to safeguard the status of unions. In contrast, the unionization attempt during
Volkswagen’s (VW) construction of a new automotive factory in Chattanooga, TN is a recent
example of how a state government used incentives to discourage companies from allowing
union participation in their operations. Law-makers from Tennessee, including U.S. Senator Bob
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Table 3. State Economic Development Program with Labor Relations Provisions

State

Program

Labor Relations Provisions

CA

Employment Training Panel

CO

Enterprise Zone Program

DC
IL

New E-Conomy Transformation Act of
2000 (NET 2000)
Film Productions Services Tax Credit

KY

Bluegrass State Skills Corporation

MI
MN

Michigan Economic Growth Authority
(MEGA) Tax Credits
Job Skills Partnership Program

MO

New Jobs Training

MO

Rebuilding Communities

NH

Job Training Fund

WA

New Jobs in Rural Counties and CEZ
Tax Credit
Governor’s Guaranteed Work Force
Program

Prior to presenting a funding application, the
employer needs to notify appropriate collective
bargaining units.
Labor agreements must be maintained when a
company is approved for participation.
Qualified employees cannot include those employed
as the result of a strike or lockout.
Rules state that “if any of the provisions in this section
conflict with any existing collective bargaining
agreements, the terms and conditions of those
collective bargaining agreements shall control.”
A company has to notify a union, if there is one, about
an application for assistance, and an employer cannot
ask a job applicant about his/her union affiliation or
sentiment toward organized labor; it is also prohibited
to deny a job based on an applicant’s affiliation with a
union.
The state may not discriminate against a company on
the basis of its collective bargaining status.
The program must be consistent with existing
collective bargaining agreements covering health and
human services workers.
If there is a bargaining unit in a facility, the employer
has to formally request the bargaining agent for
written comments on the proposed training program.
If a recipient company’s relocation violates or
terminates a collective bargaining agreement at its
previous location, the company is not eligible the tax
credit.
The committee that reviews applications must include
a member representing labor.
No recipient may use tax credits approved under this
program to decertify a union.
Funds may not be awarded or reimbursed to any
business or industry for the training, retraining or
upgrading of skills of potential employee with the
purpose of replacing or supplanting employees
engaged in an authorized work stoppage.

WV

Table taken from Mattera, Philip, Thomas Cafcas, Leigh McIlvaine, Andrew Seifter, and Kasia Tarczynska. December
2011. "Money for Something: Job Creation and Job Quality Standards in State Economic Development Subsidy
Programs". Good Jobs First. pg. 22. Accessed on line at www.goodjobsfirst.org. Used by permission of the author.
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Corker, openly threatened the German firm, stating that its incentives package could be reduced
according to whether or not the United Auto Workers successfully organized the facility during
the May 2014 union recognition election (Pare 2014). Tennessee press uncovered that Governor
Bill Haslam, while not publically vocal about the organizing attempt, conditioned the provision
of a $300 million incentive package to VW on the facility remaining union-free in insider
communications (Williams 2014). Democratic State House representative Mike Turner described
the Haslam administration’s efforts to influence VW’s labor relations position candidly: “They
put a gun to their head and said, 'Look, this is what we are going to give you if you do it our way,
and we are going to jerk it away if you don't.’” (Quoted in Williams 2014). Moreover, Governor
Haslam has since called for a second secret-ballot union election, in an attempt to block VW’s
recent promise to voluntary recognize the UAW union as a representative of the workers through
an alternative card-check agreement (Schelzig 2014).
Such examples suggest that economic development policies are a means for states to
foster a political economy that is more or less favorable to macro-level union density growth, as
well as a tool to roadblock specific unionization attempts at the micro-level, even when a
corporation may originally be tolerant to a union presence. The following sections detail major
differences among states’ economic development strategies and begin a discussion of how
variation in development policies could have differential impacts on union organizing and labor
movement strength.
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Entrepreneurial and Locational Economic Development Strategies
Economic development strategies have been classified in different ways. The
classification scheme most corroborated by research is the distinction between entrepreneurial
and locational development strategies, as named by American States scholar Martin Saiz. His
grouping is based closely around the comparison of “supply” and “demand” side strategies first
identified by Peter Eisinger in his important work The Entrepreneurial State (Saiz 2001a,
Eisinger 1988, Gray and Hanson 2012; see Jenkins et. al. 2006 and Langer 2001 for alternative
economic development classifications). This project uses the Eisinger/Saiz categories as the basis
for examining federalist variation in state economic development policies.
The entrepreneurial development orientation, utilized increasingly throughout the past
two decades, utilizes state actors to buoy the competitiveness of existing business sectors through
modernization measures and development of supportive relationships between work force
training and finance entities. It also targets new industries for growth in emerging sectors if key
supply-side inputs are locally available for exploitation. The major goal of the entrepreneurial
strategy is to encourage business creation and wealth generation throughout communities based
on core capacities that are already present in the state economy (Anderson 1993). Its prioritizes
high-technology and research innovation to create a more “value-added” business environment
for the state economy, one that optimizes consumer and commercial demand in contrast to other
strategies which prioritize lowering input factor costs for business (Eisinger 1988). Development
of an advanced and educated workforce capable of supplying high-skill labor to preferred
industry sectors is a major objective of the entrepreneurial strategy.

25

The state-level executive branch plays a particularly important “trustee” role in
entrepreneurial economic development (Saiz 2001b, Hart 2007). Governors act as direct
ambassadors between business enterprises and the higher education system to ensure that
business labor needs are met. For example, Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam’s recently enacted
Tennessee Promise program, which provides all graduating high school seniors in the state two
free years of community college, was the result of direct consultation between the executive
branch and the Tennessee business community. In a series of “round tables” called by Haslam,
Tennessee business leaders cited lack of skilled labor as a number one impediment to expansion
and growth. (Office of Bill Haslam 2011). The Tennessee Promise program was instituted to fill
this gap in quality labor in emerging industrial sectors. Local governments also have a role to
play in this strategy by partnering with state governments to support workforce development and
entrepreneurial mercantilism programs. Such initiatives provide loans, education and training,
information, and recruitment to develop workers and new business at the community level
(Clarke and Gaile 1997). With the entrepreneurial approach the labor force is viewed as a core
asset. A highly skilled labor force is regarded as a tool to increase and attract foreign direct and
inter-state investment. Studies confirm that many foreign firms prefer to relocate to areas where
laborers demand higher compensation in order to attract better skilled employees (Kucera 2002).
Still, it is important to understand that with the entrepreneurial orientation the primary
motive for building a quality work force is to nurture the creation and expansion of industries
from within the state (State Science and Technology Institute 2014). Entrepreneurial strategies,
while likely increasing the attractiveness of the state to outside investors, prioritize the
modernization of existing industries, the incubation of new businesses, and promotion of markets
for their products (Saiz 2001b.) One of the key tools entrepreneurial programs use to cultivate a
26

“value-added” business sector is the establishment of public-private entities to raise venture
capital from the private sector and to leverage it with public funds.
For instance, in the mid –nineties, the state of Missouri created the Missouri Technology
Corporation – whose board is appointed directly by the Governor and legislative heads - as a
public-private partnership to promote growth of emerging bio-science companies in the
agricultural sector. (Missouri Technology Corporation 2015). The MTC oversees loan programs
for four separate seed and venture capital funds, including the High-Tech Industrial Expansion
Program. Consider some of the published objectives of this program related to workforce and
employment dynamics:



“ Create a successful research or intellectual property licensing relationship
with a Missouri-based university … or establish an internship program to
provide career opportunities for high school and/or college students; and
Create and retain sustainable high-paying, private sector jobs.” (Italics mine)

Both Missouri-based companies or companies wishing to create new enterprises in Missouri are
eligible, but the intent is to develop businesses that are not yet commercially viable, instead of
luring up-and-running businesses from elsewhere (Missouri Technology Corporation 2014). It is
also clear that development of a well-paid workforce is a priority of this public-private program.

The emphasis on forming partnerships between higher education, private businesses, and
bureaucratic agencies to promote economic development programs indicates that the
governmental role in the private sector economy is likely to be quite substantial in states
pursuing entrepreneurial strategies. Such policies require an extended period of time to yield
tangible benefits and gains. Elected officials will be less able to claim immediate successes from
these policies in a time frame that is politically useful to them (Hart 2007, Brace 1993).
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Moreover, such policies demand more in terms of coordination and information acquisition, as
well as possible risk. Thus, there are impediments to adopting these approaches, and other
strategies to development are probably easier and more politically feasible to implement (Brace
2002).
An alternative economic development orientation is the locational approach. Such
strategies aim to ensure lower costs on the factors of production – land, capital, and labor – to
enhance attractiveness. Maintaining low wages and payroll taxes, as well as subsidizing asset,
land and financing costs to companies establishing operations in the state is part of this economic
development strategy. There is a wide range of policy tools utilized in locational recruitment
programs; in fact, incentives for business cost reduction are the most common characteristic of
economic development programs throughout the states (Saiz 2001a). Direct provision of grants,
loans, and financing incentives such as loan guarantees and revenue bonds are often utilized by
state government to subsidize capital investment costs. Property tax abatement, land grants, and
subsidized land-lease deals can be offered to defray real property factor costs to expanding
businesses. Financing for generalized infrastructure improvements in hopes to create a more
attractive investment environment is also a means of limiting production costs for new
businesses (Saiz 2001a, Dubnick and Holt 1985). Indirect methods of subsidization reduce
businesses labor costs, such as tax credits and exemptions on payroll contributions for workers
employed in newly-created jobs (Brace 2002).
It is important to note that many of these same policy instruments are used in
entrepreneurial approaches, but to different ends. The presence or absence of a particular policy
instrument such as tax credits or direct financing is not the defining feature used to classify an
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approach as “locational” versus “entrepreneurial.” The Eisinger and Saiz classification is based
upon “attributes” of programs, rather than policy instruments utilized, per se (Saiz 2001a). Thus
in addition to the low-factor-cost aspect of locational development, the level of discretion and
involvement allowed to government officials in direct decision making is also critical.
Locational approaches are designed to limit the amount of government planning and
“intrusion” into the operation of the market. Even as the government takes on the role of a
provider of positive incentives to businesses, it is also expected to offer these resources with a
“few-strings-attached” attitude. While governmental entities using locational approaches are
active in cultivating an easy business environment for potential investors, they are generally
more restrained in making direct decisions that would strategically alter the discretion of privatesector actors in the economy. Incentives that are a part of a locational strategy are designed to
maintain low operation costs for businesses, through use of passive administrative tools such as
tax exemptions, which limit government involvement in actual business operations (Saiz 2001a).
Moreover, locational incentives are generally not targeted to specific business sectors (Saiz
2001a, Eisinger 1988, Fosler 1988). In the locational strategy, governments refrain from directly
engineering the mix of businesses that operates in the state economy, leaving that to market
forces.
Development programs often offer a combination of policy tools, but again, it is the
attributes related to how these tools are used which indicates the orientation of the state toward
entrepreneurial or locational development. The Directory of Incentives for Business Investment
and Development in the United States, a comprehensive catalog that has been published
periodically from 1983 to 2006, is the most reputable data source for economic development
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program descriptions used in the subfield of state policy research (Saiz 2001, Gray and Hanson
2012). The latest edition of the directory, published by the research consulting firm Friedman
and Associates, provides qualitative summaries for thousands of state-level incentives programs,
allowing researchers to link policy tools used by these programs to stated purposes of these tools.
For example, the South Carolina Jobs Economic Development Authority offers industrial
revenue bonds (IRBs) for the acquisition of land and other assets related to the construction of
new buildings for manufacturing industries (Friedman and Associates 2006). IRBs are issued by
public-sector entities such as state or local governments on behalf of private corporations, for the
purpose of lowering the interest that must be paid out as income to the bond-holders. Interest
income received by investors in publically issued bonds is exempt from taxes by the federal and
state governments, whereas privately-issued bond income is not exempt from taxes. Thus,
issuing bonds through a government is a way for businesses to lower the amount of interestincome that must be paid out to bond-holders over the life of the bond. Critics of IRBs describe
them as “essentially private transactions laundered through a public entity” to subsidize the costs
of investor returns on the bonds (Good Jobs First 2014.) South Carolina’s IRB program has
multiple attributes of locational development strategies. The issuance of the bonds clearly serves
to lower capital acquisition costs for businesses to locate in the state. Moreover, there is no
targeting of specific manufacturing industries noted in the program description for the bonds, nor
are there any job-creation quotas or other substantial requirements listed (Friedman and
Associates 2006). In theory, any large manufacturing-based business wishing to expand
operations into the state could apply for this bond assistance and be eligible to receive it.
Moreover, the program suggests minimal involvement from the state in the actual working
operations of the business.
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Compare this to the Missouri Small Business Incubator Program, which also offers direct
financing to lower the cost of business investment. However, its funds are targeted specifically to
“incubator” organizations that promote small businesses in their initial start-up phases. Clearly,
the use of funds is designed to encourage the creation of new businesses within the community,
not simply to lower operation costs for existing, fully-operational enterprises. Moreover, the
Incubator Program offers a credit to taxpayers who contribute to the fund. However, in this case
the tax credit is not being used to lower a business payroll cost, as is often the case in locational
incentive packages; rather it is an incentive to motivate businesses and individuals to contribute
to a government-run fund. Additionally, the incubator sites receiving funds have to be approved
by the state administrators as a part of the program (Friedman and Associates 2006). There is a
much larger involvement of the government in the direct provision of this program and in
determining the eligibility of recipients.
Moreover, the goal of this program and others like it is to create the financing instrument
for clusters of start-up businesses, operating collectively through the incubator organization. Left
alone on the private market such enterprises would likely not even form, but the “protective
business environment” offered by the state-sponsored incubator gives them a chance to emerge
and grow (Friedman and Associates 2006). The program attempts to transcend market forces and
offer new entrepreneurs a shot at survival, even if during the initial years of operation there is
little profit to be made. The higher level of involvement of the government in the direct operation
of a funding source, which is targeted specifically to start-up businesses, demonstrates core
attributes of entrepreneurial programming.
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Table 4 offers a summary of selected economic development programs operating during
year 2006, providing additional examples of entrepreneurial and locational attributes. In some
programs both classes of strategy-related attributes are discernible, illustrating the mix of
approaches that can be present in each state’s economic development program.
In addition to corporate subsidies and funding tools, states also operate programs with
more generalized objectives such as initial location, advertising, and communication with
businesses and customers outside the state. While such activities are not officially tracked as
“incentives” programs, they are important to states’ overall economic development strategies.
Since they are often created to persuade existing businesses to invest in the state, these activities
are typically associated with locational development. A primary example of state investment
marketing is the location of branch offices abroad. States operated over 240 trade offices in over
30 different countries, while spending almost $200 million on international marketing and
recruitment efforts, NOT including incentives packages, according to some research (Conlan,
Dudley, and Clark 2004). South Carolina operates offices in China, Germany, and Japan to
encourage “mutually positive relationships between the state and foreign countries,” contributing
to an impressive 1,200 foreign subsidiary locations in the state (SC Department of Commerce
2014). Governors play a leading role in marketing for foreign investment by conducting field
visits and leading regional delegations to foreign trade partners, such as Tennessee Gov.
Haslam’s 2012 visit to Tokyo for its annual meeting of the Japan-U.S. Southeast Association
trade group (Nashville Chamber of Commerce 2012). Governors have also been active in hosting
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Table 4. Attributes of Selected Economic Development Programs, 2006

Program

State

Program Description

Analysis of Attributes

Community Bank Tax
Credit

Missouri

State tax credits provided to contributors and
investors of a community bank.

Entrepreneurial:
Incentive targeted to grow a “value added” sector – banking.
Investment eligible for credit must be made to a bank “created for a public purpose.”; bank
investments purpose is to create/ expand new small businesses.
Stated program purpose is to create investment in distressed areas that would otherwise not receive
conventional funding on the private market.

Locational:
Tax credit tool is administratively passive.
Banks themselves are allowed to determine terms, rates, collateralization, etc. of loans to eligible
projects.
Customized Training
Program

Missouri

Job training program administered directly by
state agencies to upgrade workers skills or train
new workers when a facility modernizes
production processes.

Entrepreneurial:
Customized employee training to enable modernization of facility or recruitment and training of
employees in new jobs created by industry investment in new processes.

Locational:
Not specified to any particular industry sector or geographic location.
Ethanol Producer
Incentives

Missouri

Production-based grant to producers of ethanol.

Entrepreneurial:
Targeted grant to encourage production in an emerging industry.
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Table 4. Continued.
Program

State

Program Description

Analysis of Attributes

Local Industrial
Development Bonds

Missouri

Municipalities and counties are allowed to issue
state tax exempt general obligation or revenue
bonds to finance industrial development projects.

Locational:
Non-targeted program is eligible to any manufacturing plant or warehouse approved by local
government.
Passively administered IRBs, not subject to public referendum.
Advantages the enterprise via cost reduction of financing.

Missouri Technology
Corporation

Missouri

Creation of public-private corporation to operate
loan programs for four separate seed and venture
capital funds, including the High-Tech Industrial
Expansion Program.

Entrepreneurial:
Program created by the MO General Assembly as a public-private enterprise.
Targets emerging bio-tech industry.
Provides funding for initial start-up of businesses which pose higher risk and would struggle to
obtain funding on conventional private market.
Operates incubators for emerging tech industries.

Jobs-Economic
Development Authority
Bond Program

South
Carolina

Provides Industrial Revenue Bonds to
manufacturing entities to acquire land and
equipment and to construct buildings.

Locational:
Program is non-targeted to include manufacturing, as well as healthcare, Educational, and solid
waste disposal sectors.
Passively-administered tax-exempt bond program..
Advantages the enterprise via cost reduction of financing.
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Table 4. Continued.
Program

State

Program Description

Analysis of Attributes

Air Carrier Hub
Exemption

South
Carolina

Exempts aircraft and other personal property of
an air carrier operating a hub terminal facility in
South Carolina from property taxation.

Locational:
Passively administered tax exemption.
Advantages the enterprise via capital-asset factor cost reduction.

Entrepreneurial:
Targeted incentive specific to air-transport industry sector.
Big Fee

South
Carolina

Allows preferential local tax rates for firms that
invest in South Carolina through negotiation of a
Fee-in-lou –of-property- tax agreement. Reduces
assessment ratio and millage rate of firm
property as compared to rates assessed on other
businesses.

Locational:
Passively administered tax abatement.
Advantages the enterprise via capital and land factor cost reduction.
Not targeted to large firms in any sector.

Construction Contracts
with Manufacturers

South
Carolina

Generally, construction contractors must pay
sales tax on purchases. This incentive provides
construction contractors of manufacturing
companies tax-free purchases of parts that are
used as components of manufacturing machinery.

Locational:
Passively administered sales tax exemption on purchases.
Advantages both the construction contractor and the manufacturer who contracts with them via
capital asset factor cost reduction.
Not targeted to specific sectors of manufacturing industry. Actually extends incentives beyond
eligible manufacturing firms, to also include construction contractors of these firms.

Community Development
Corporation Investment
Credit

South
Carolina

Provision of tax credit on SC income tax, band
tax, or insurance premiums tax to businesses
investing in a community development
corporation, a non-profit entity that is devoted to
development of small businesses and residential
properties in low-income areas.

Entrepreneurial:
Leverages private funds to grow capital in community development corporations to promote small
business creation and growth.
Targeted to low-income areas.
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Table 4. Continued.
Program

State

Program Description

Analysis of Attributes

Small Business Energy
Loan Program

Tennessee

Provides low-interest loans to small businesses to
install energy-efficiency improvements in
existing operations.

Entrepreneurial:
Targeted to small business sector.
Purpose is modernization of existing small businesses to make them more productive and lower
energy demand.

Telecommunications
Assistance Program for
Small and Minority
Owned Businesses

Tennessee

Provides loan guarantees for small businesses
and minority/women-owned businesses in the
telecommunications sector.

Entrepreneurial:
Incentive targeted to a “value added” sector - telecommunications.
Incentive targeted to small business sector, and to women and people of color in particular.

Data Source: Friedman and Associates 2006. “Analysis of Attributes” column is my own analysis, based on coded attributes described in Saiz 2001a.
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conferences in-state and establishing state global competitiveness agencies as cabinet level
positions (National Governors Association 2002) to encourage foreign direct investment.

However, state economic development marketing efforts are not only important for
encouraging inward investment. Foreign trade offices are just as active in “demand side”
messaging, working to connect customers and consumers in out-of-state markets to services and
products manufactured within the state. Prospecting for export markets is likely to benefit
emerging, home-grown industries even more than re-located enterprises, which may have a
customer-base pre-established; thus marketing research programs are also compatible with
entrepreneurial development. South Carolina’s Department of Commerce advertises an “export
team” on its website ready-and-willing to mine for customer markets in foreign countries.
Assistance is provided in organizing trade-related training seminars and providing trade
counseling, market research on export potential and logistics, and coordination of international
trade missions to conduct sales meetings (SC Department of Commerce 2014). These general
day-to-day operations which enhance demand for in-state products are not offered as incentives
direct to companies, but they serve as important support activities for both entrepreneurial and
locational strategies of economic development, nonetheless.

Impacts of Economic Development Programs on State Economies
Given the enormous value of many corporate investment incentives packages, and the
ever-pressing need for states to nurture dynamic and competitive economies in a global age, the
research agenda to evaluate the tangible impacts of economic development programming has
been prolific. Locational development programs have tended to receive more attention than
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entrepreneurial ones, as the latter entail long-term strategies that are more complex to assess
(Hart 2008). There is conflicting evidence regarding the effectiveness of either strategy in
building stronger economies, but a more or less common conclusion is that locational approaches
have resulted in significant disadvantages overall, even if they have yielded benefits for some
communities.
It is important to understand the scope of economic development programs in terms of
monetary value. Previous scholarly research estimated the value of total state and local economic
development expenditures at around $50 billion a year (Peters and Fisher 2004, Thomas 2000).
A more recent investigation by the New York Times found that in aggregate states award $80.4
billion in incentives each year, through at least 1,800 different programs (Story 2012). In reality
the figure is probably much higher, as few states have strong legal requirements to provide
public disclosure of the value of incentive packages, and even those that do probably underreport the real cost of economic development programming (Mattera et al 2010). According to
the New York Times project, Texas heads the list offering an estimated $19.1 billion a year in
subsidies, amounting to over $700 per capita. Michigan, California, New York, and
Pennsylvania each provide over $4 billion a year. Other states, such as Oklahoma, Nebraska,
Vermont, and Alaska offer less in total incentives, but at a per capita basis the give-away is
substantial (between $580 to $990 per citizen). The state of Tennessee is estimated to award
almost $2 billion a year in incentives, or $249 per capita. These examples are illustrative of a
four-decade trend of states adopting increasing numbers of tax incentive programs to aid inward
investment. By the beginning of the 1990’s four in five states had instituted some sort of
incentive package program, whereas in 1969 only about 20 to 30 percent had such programs in
place (Brace 2002). While locational tax incentive programs are common and continue to grow,
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entrepreneurial programs actually gained more momentum during the eighties and nineties,
although in the past decades states have tended to shift emphasis once again to locational
programs (Saiz and Clarke in Gray and Hanson 2012).
A number of high-profile incentives packages provide provocative examples of states’
fascination with corporate subsidizing, many of them offered to bring automotive facilities to the
southeast United States. South Carolina gave Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) $130
million in incentives to locate in Greenville in the early 1990’s, and agreed to lease land to the
company for $1 a year (Brace 2002). Alabama lavished Mercedes Benz with an estimated $325
million, even though much of the subsidy provision was controversial and arguably unethical
(Brace 2002, Donahue 1997). Volkswagen was lured to Chattanooga in 2008 by over $550
million in incentives from federal, state, and local sources combined, which equated to about
$200,000 for each job created (Flessner 2014). South Carolina offered $900 million in
incentives to Boeing in a failed attempt to entice the aircraft manufacturer to Charleston in 2003.
While the recruitment effort was not successful, the state was prepared to shell out $1.25 in
direct financing and future tax breaks for every $1 Boeing invested in the project (Stech and
Slade 2010).
The rationale for these generous offers is that the potential for job growth, rising incomes,
and the multiplier effect of business investment on the greater community justify the loss of tax
revenues. However, the evidence that incentives programs have resulted in better economic
outcomes is conflicting. First, there is the jobs debate. It is no surprise that politicians responsible
for sealing investment deals are happy to boast about the number of new jobs created by highprofile relocations (Hart 2007). Governor Haslam, for example, regularly takes credit for job
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growth on the state’s Economic and Community Development newsroom website, releasing
stories about new facilities expanding or re-locating to Tennessee (State of Tennessee Newsroom
and Media Center 2014). Major plant expansions certainly make a mark on local economies
fortunate enough to benefit from them. The 2008 VW deal included the promise of 2,000 new
jobs to Chattanooga, and a follow-up report revealed that VW actually hired 2,500 since the deal
closed, while announcing plans to expand hiring in the future (Flessner 2014). It is clear that job
growth is a real advantage of corporate subsidy packages when assessing investment deals on a
case by case basis.
However, academic researchers question the impact that such development policies have
on the long-term trajectory of the state economy. According to Susan Hansen’s in-depth
examination of “low-cost” development approaches in the age of globalization, such strategies
actually had a significant negative effect on average income in states from 1970-95. Moreover,
they largely failed to increase foreign direct investment and only decreased unemployment
marginally (Hansen 2006, 2001). While incentives packages may lure facilities and create jobs,
there is usually no guarantee that such jobs will be high-paying or that they will include benefits.
Many researchers emphasize that the quality of jobs created, the productivity of new jobs and
innovation processes (Hall 2007), and overall raises in per capita income (Atkinson and Andes
2010) are more meaningful indicators to evaluate the impact of locational incentives programs. If
incentives packages actually contribute to “lower-end” employment and declining household
income, the effectiveness of these policies, even if yielding job growth, is doubtful. Multiple
studies suggest that tax incentives do little to create quality employment or efficient expansion of
the labor force (Lynch 2004, Atkinson and Andes 2010, Christopherson and Rightor 2010).
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In fact, many costly locational projects have failed to deliver sustained net growth in
employment at all. In 2009 General Motors issued a list of sites set for closing due to its looming
bankruptcy proceedings. According to a New York Times investigative report, 50 of those
facilities were in jurisdictions where General Motors had received state and local incentives to
locate or maintain existing facilities. The state of Wisconsin offered GM $150 million in tax
breaks to continue operations in Janesville in 2009, but the company closed the facility. The
town of Moraine, Ohio lost a GM factory in 2008, after giving GM incentives in 1997 to expand
operations. At the time, local officials had been warned by company officials that locations in
Louisiana and New Jersey were also being considered. It was later discovered that GM had never
even been in active communication with leaders in either location (Story 2012). Concerns over
the security and duration of jobs created as a result of incentives deals has prompted outcries for
greater accountability measures to ensure employment targets be met (Office of the New York
State Comptroller 2006, National Governors Association 2002). Surveys of municipal leaders
reveal increasing use of “clawback” agreements in incentive packages, which provide some
compensation to communities when job growth does not occur as projected or when a recipient
company exits the community after only a short period of generating local employment
opportunities (Bartik 2004).
Another disadvantage to luring investment through locational strategies is that even if
jobs are generated through such deals, the trade-off in lost revenues for public services exacts
substantial costs on state economies. In Texas and Kansas the “low-cost path” of development
contributed to a troubling erosion of public funds for education and social programs, even as
companies were rewarded with generous exemptions from corporate taxes (Burkdull and Truman
1999, Story 2012). Business locations may entail wide social costs as a result of environmental
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degradation, population growth, public school overcrowding, and even public health concerns.
Intel, for example, won a sizable incentives package from the state of New Mexico to locate a
facility in Rio Rancho, but pollution from the plant was soon found to be a contributor to skin
disorders among residents (Friedman 1996). The concentration of subsidies to large corporations
may disadvantage smaller businesses which rely on state spending for maintenance of roads,
infrastructure, and public education to ensure productivity and quality employees (Brace 2002).
Corporate subsidizing arguably harms the business community at a collective level because it
causes public entities to misallocate total resources available that can encourage “bigger picture”
economic growth (Burstein and Rolnick 1995).
The loss of public revenues and resources exacerbated by locational development
approaches has been challenged by taxpayers in at least one state. Concerned citizens in Ohio
argued that the state and the City of Toledo violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution by
granting DaimlerChrysler incentives to expand operations at the beginning of the 21st century.
The company had received a franchise tax credit from the state for the purchase of machinery, as
well as a property tax waiver from the City on land acquisitions. The citizens argued they had
standing to contest the subsidy package because they would sustain injury due to the loss of
revenues to fund vital public services. In DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno (2005) the Supreme Court
ultimately ruled that taxpayers have no legal standing to litigate state or local tax exemptions to
corporations because they sustained only a generalized, rather than particularized injury
(Denning 2005). This decision is a significant impediment for citizens in challenging the logic
and equity of the practice of granting corporate subsidies. The high court’s ruling essentially
precludes possibility of the federal government intervening on this issue, even though it is clearly
germane to inter-state commerce.
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It is the competitive dynamic that federalism cultivates among the states that drives up
the cost of the incentives give-away game (Hart 2007). While tax costs may not be of primary
concern for firms when initially targeting relocation sites, if there are multiple appropriate sites
available for investment, state incentives packages can contribute to firms’ ultimate re-location
decisions. Companies know that many state leaders operate as if they are trapped in a prisoner’s
dilemma, focused on the interests of their state individually, without careful consideration of the
collective inter-state costs of “bidding wars” (Brace 2002). It is strategically in a company’s
interests to dangle the possibility of incentives offers from neighboring states to optimize their
bargaining position in another (Donahue 1997 in Gray and Hanson 2012). Pitting states against
each other has created an unfortunate “race to the bottom” in some regions of the country, one in
which rival states are not only willing to sacrifice tax revenues for needed public services, but
are also compelled to slash existing labor and environmental regulations in order to maintain a
“business-friendly” climate . The adoption of locational incentive policies by neighboring states
is a significant determinant of whether a state pursues “low cost” strategies to economic
development (Siaz 2001b), and interstate competition for investment has contributed to the
diffusion of policies which reduce labor wages and company employment costs (Hansen 2006).
Concerns over the depression of worker protections and environmental standards in neighboring
jurisdictions of states pursuing locational development strategies has led to calls for reform (Frey
1999, Chapter 4). Coalitions of academics and policy practitioners (Pierce 1995), including the
National Governors Association (Brace 2002), have united to discourage the “predatory
competition” implicit in the locational approach. Nevertheless, corporate subsidy provision as an
economic development tool still features heavily in many states’ programs, in spite of questions
about its success.
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Given the rising doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of locational “smokestack
chasing” programs, entrepreneurial development approaches emerged in the eighties as an
alternative (Brace 2002). However, the ability to directly evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
entrepreneurial development programming is limited, since its policy instruments, such as
greater public-private collaboration, are not always tracked directly in state budgets (Hart 2007).
The impact of entrepreneurial programs has been found to have positive influences on
productivity (Yilmaz and Dinc 2002), equitable income distribution (Langer 2001), and
manufacturing employment (Saiz 2001b) in some larger N examinations. Case studies specific to
individual economic sectors provide some favorable evaluation as well. For instance, tax credits
in research and development to promote innovation enhancements generated an equal amount of
private sector investment according to one case study (Wu 2005). Moreover, a California Small
Business Loan Guarantee Program experienced positive employment growth for recipient firms,
and was an overall fiscal gain for the state government (Bradshaw 2002). However, the targeted
use of incentives to buoy the “value added” film and television industries has been quite costly to
states without producing convincing returns (Christopherson and Rightor 2010). Even in the
“successful” examples of entrepreneurial development a critical missing element is a finding of
net gains in state employment or reduced unemployment. While entrepreneurial development
may help to produce better quality jobs, there is less evidence to show that the overall labor force
benefits from greater employment opportunities with this approach.
Evaluation of the impact of development strategies is typically centered on job creation
and erosion of public revenues, but the effect that economic development orientation has on
unionization has received only scant attention. Susan Hansen provides a rare examination of this
subject, finding that pursuit of “low-wage” strategies did negatively impact unionization rates
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from 1975-1995 (Hansen 2006). This research project has not identified an already existing
examination that directly assesses the impact of entrepreneurial development strategies on labor
unionization. A contribution of this dissertation is that it examines both development strategytypes side-by-side to uncover the unique influence, if any, they have on unionization.
One clarification is necessary regarding my consideration of locational development
policies and unionization. Researchers sometimes conflate locational, supply-side approaches to
development with presence of “right-to-work” laws, by definition (Grant et. al. 1995, for
example). Again, I underscore that economic development policy tools are more accurately
conceptualized as separate from labor regulations. States may offer generous incentives to lower
labor costs for businesses, while still allowing union shops. (The state of Michigan, prior to
2010, is an example.) This study directly tests the impact of development approaches -as defined
by the attributes of economic policy instruments offered by state programs- on union density
rates, instead of defining “right-to-work” status as an element of the locational strategy. “Rightto-work” laws will be examined as a separate controlling factor in my upcoming statistical
analysis.

Measuring Types of Economic Development Strategy
Empirical research into the impact of development policy on unionization outcomes
requires the utilization of a proper measure which can capture the differences between the states
in their propensity to use each approach. States generally do not embrace only one type of
economic development strategy; in fact most states use locational incentives alongside the more
“demand generating” initiatives to encourage entrepreneurism (Saiz 2001a), sometimes within
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the same program. States also differ in the amount of economic development activism displayed
using either locational or entrepreneurial programs (Langer 2001). Given that states employ a
mix of approaches with varying degree of intensity, a straight-forward qualitative classification
of state programs into mutually exclusive nominal categories is not appropriate.
Policy researchers have utilized various quantitative measures to gauge the differences in
state programs relative to the major economic development orientations, usually basing them at
least in part on Eisinger’s “supply side” and “demand side” distinction (Gray and Lowery 1990,
Hansen and Berkman 1990, for instance). Jenkins and Leich coded programs into separate
interval indices denoting labor regulation, industrial recruitment (locational), and entrepreneurial
approaches in their 1994 study. However, their measures are limited to earlier decades (1971-90)
and have been criticized for their inability to accurately track historical shifts in state
development policy approaches (Grant et. al 1995). Researcher Laura Langer adopted the
Eisinger conceptual classifications, creating ratio measures to test the impact of overall economic
policy activism, supply-side policies, demand-side policies, and mixed approaches on income
inequality (Langer 2001). However, Langer included only 16 of the most visible and frequentlyused incentive tools as cataloged in the Directory of Business Incentives (National Association of
State Development Agencies 1998) guide to construct her measures.
Martin Saiz has provided the most empirically supported quantitative measure of state
economic development orientation with his construction of two separate indices tracking
entrepreneurial and locational development utilization (2001a). Like Langer, he used the
NASDA guide to assess attributes of state programs, but he coded all incentives programs listed
in the catalog according to a fuller range of related program attributes to create his interval-data
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indices of locational and entrepreneurial approaches. The separate indices allow researchers to
consider the activism of states in regard to both entrepreneurial policy and locational policy in
the same model, as the measure is not constructed to categorize the state according to one or the
another strategy. Saiz also subjected his indices to a confirmatory factor analysis, demonstrating
support for the definition of these development types as unique, discrete concepts. Since the Saiz
measures are interval level and do change longitudinally over time, they are able to be analyzed
in multivariate regression and time-series models.
Even though the Saiz indices have methodological advantages and have been subjected to
rigorous statistical standards, they do have some limitations. First of all, Saiz was only able to
update his indices in years when the NASDA guide was published, which was approximately
every 4 years, so the indices updates are sporadic. Interpolation for missing years is necessary to
deploy the measures in annual time-series analysis. Moreover, Saiz’ attribute-based coding of
locational approaches is not always able to account for important variations in corporate subsidy
programs. Some, though not all, locational tax credits for job creation do require quality
standards, such as pay over an area minimum wage and provision of health benefits (Mattera et.
al, 2011). All tax credit job creation programs that are not targeted to specific industries are
coded as locational in the Saiz typology (Saiz 2001a), even though the higher job standards
required in some state programs do not conform strictly to a “low” factor-cost objective. Thus,
some nuances of locational development programming escape consideration in the Saiz indices.
Despite these limitations, the indices are the most comprehensive source of historical data
available for measuring different economic development policy types used by the states.
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Table 5 shows the 2006 Saiz indices tables for each development approach. States that
are high in one development orientation tend to score lower on the other, but this is not absolute.
The state of Tennessee, for instance, scores a little above average on both indices, while the state
of Wyoming shows low levels and the state of Nevada shows high levels on both measures.
Moreover, this table displays results for only two of the years available due to limited space.
Looking across all years available, the state indices readings do change over time, demonstrating
the dynamic temporal nature of the data.

Predicting the Impact of Economic Development Strategy on Unionization
Given the unique means that entrepreneurial and locational strategies use to accomplish
economic development, it is sensible to predict that their intensity of use could impact
unionization levels differently. The two orientations regard labor in very different ways, with the
locational approach viewing it as an input cost which must be minimized, while the
entrepreneurial approach considers it as an asset which can add value to business. Additionally,
the entrepreneurial approach prioritizes overall wealth generation to cultivate more consumer
activity; and well-paid laborers contribute more to consumer demand than less affluent ones. The
“bread and butter” function of unions is to elevate the wage and salary rates of workers, and
union jobs pay significantly higher rates than non-union ones in the same sector, especially when
considering benefits provisions (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014, Bryson 2014). Since labor
wage rates feature so prominently in both economic development approaches, as well as being a
critical issue to organized labor, the adoption and use of development approaches is likely
associated with declines or increases in unionization.
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Table 5. State Economic Development Strategy Indexes, 2006 & 2002

Locational Index
State
South Carolina
Idaho
Oklahoma
Kentucky
Arizona
Nevada
Hawaii
Connecticut
Maine
Rhode Island
Montana
North Dakota
Arkansas
Georgia
Kansas
North Carolina
Nebraska
Colorado
Mississippi
New Mexico
Louisiana
West Virginia
Tennessee
Alabama
Delaware
US Mean
Virginia
New York
Ohio
Michigan
California
Florida
Texas
Washington
Iowa
Vermont
Massachusetts
Alaska
Oregon
Missouri
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Indiana
Utah
New Hampshire
Illinois
New Jersey
Wisconsin
South Dakota
Minnesota

Entrepreneurial Index
2006
2.28
2.08
1.87
1.86
1.8
1.75
1.73
1.69
1.68
1.68
1.67
1.63
1.62
1.61
1.6
1.58
1.57
1.56
1.56
1.56
1.55
1.48
1.47
1.43
1.35
1.34
1.33
1.32
1.32
1.3
1.19
1.14
1.13
1.13
1.1
1.08
1.07
1.05
1.05
1.03
1
0.98
0.96
0.9
0.9
0.82
0.8
0.79
0.77
0.67
0.64

2002
2.31
1.57
1.71
1.96
1.2
1.75
1.67
1.58
1.68
1.55
1.67
0.95
1.56
2
1.52
1.5
1.79
1.4
1.37
1.4
1.71
1.35
1.47
1.36
1.53
1.32
1.41
1.28
1.24
1.09
1.12
1.09
1.3
1.13
1.05
1.25
1.07
1.16
1.1
1.03
1
1
1
0.85
0.9
0.82
0.76
0.76
0.77
1.45
0.89

State
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Nevada
New Jersey
Florida
Minnesota
Wisconsin
North Dakota
Massachusetts
New York
West Virginia
Missouri
Maryland
Washington
Pennsylvania
Illinois
South Dakota
Utah
Iowa
Texas
Virginia
Indiana
Tennessee
US Mean
Louisiana
Oregon
Montana
Vermont
Connecticut
Ohio
Oklahoma
California
Alaska
Arkansas
Alabama
New Mexico
Delaware
Michigan
Kentucky
Hawaii
North Carolina
Mississippi
Wyoming
Rhode Island
Arizona
Georgia
Kansas
Maine
Idaho
South Carolina
Colorado

2006
3
3
2.63
2.59
2.38
2.29
2.26
2.21
2.2
2.2
2.14
2.13
2.12
2.09
2.04
2
2
2
1.95
1.93
1.93
1.83
1.8
1.78
1.75
1.74
1.67
1.67
1.66
1.65
1.65
1.63
1.6
1.57
1.52
1.52
1.5
1.5
1.48
1.4
1.37
1.26
1.25
1.21
1.2
1.19
1.19
1.18
1.15
1.03
0.67

2002
1.14
3
1.5
2.47
2.35
2.22
2.21
2.55
2.2
2.15
1.94
2.06
1.92
2
1.77
2.04
1.36
2
1.75
1.85
1.91
1.79
1.8
1.71
1.74
1.7
1.6
1.67
1.53
1.62
1.57
1.53
1.63
1.76
1.52
1.52
1.67
1.55
1.48
1.4
1.7
1.15
1.33
1.28
1.2
1.32
1.68
1.18
1.71
0.69
0.9

Source: Data taken from tables published in Gray and Hanson 2012, 2008. See Saiz 2001.
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Locational policies could challenge labor unions in their efforts to raise wages and as a
result could place downward pressure on unionization rates. First of all, locational policies may
be more likely to attract the particular businesses that desire low-cost employees, given the
factor-cost reduction emphasis of corporate subsidy packages. Such firms, according to the
“conventional wisdom” of many advocates of foreign direct investment, would actively resist
and avoid unionization fearing the upward pressure unions place on labor costs (Leahy and
Montagna 2001); and this could challenge unions in their success to win new members. These
firms may also be more adamant in their attempts to challenge union representation where it
already exists, seeking to layoff union workers and replace them with non-union labor, and may
be combative with unions in wage negotiations (Bronfenbrenner 2000). In this scenario, union
membership levels could drop due to the perceived ineffectiveness of unions to win wage gains
and provide job securities for workers.
Also consider another argument made by economists contending that increased business
competition impedes labor unions attempts to raise wages. Locational approaches aim to increase
the number of enterprises in existing, established industry sectors by luring investment into the
state from elsewhere. Domestic firms would face increased competition from relocated firms in
the state market and may experience tighter profit margins as a result. This could lead to less
surplus available to pass on as wage increases, limiting “rent-seeking” opportunities for unions to
redirect profits to labor (Acemoglu, Aghion, Machin and Violante 2001, referenced in Acemoglu
et. al. 2001 explores this). Still, one must also keep in mind the role of competition from the
labor perspective. Increased entry of firms into the state economy may also intensify companies’
demand for labor, pressuring firms to pay premium wages to attract or maintain workers who
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could find job opportunities more plentiful. Thus, one could also argue that unions would benefit
from an increase in “rent-seeking” opportunities due to heightened competition.
Another way to think about the impact of locational development strategies on
unionization is to consider how they could increase the demand for unionization among workers.
Well-paid workers could find there is little to gain from unionization membership, but as wages
slip and benefits are cut workers may become more motivated to collective action to resist these
losses. Low-wage strategies of development may be a crucial catalyst to encourage greater union
activism and organizing campaigns. Some historical analysis supports the argument that in
circumstances of low job security and wage cuts unionization activity actually increases
(Gregory 2009).
However, the single direct examination of locational incentives policies and unionization
that I have identified indicates a negative impact on union membership rates (Hanson 2006).
Given this, and the likelihood that locational strategies attract non-union businesses, I offer this
general working hypothesis:
Higher levels of locational policy orientation will have a negative impact on state
unionization levels.
As with locational development, one can posit a variety of causal links between
entrepreneurial policy and unionization. Given the lack of extant research examining this
relationship, hypothesis generation is rather speculative. A simplistic model would emphasize
the “quality jobs” focus apparent in much entrepreneurial development programming and its
possible association with higher levels of unionization. Since in the entrepreneurial orientation
firms are encouraged to view labor as an asset rather than a cost, there may be greater
willingness to pay higher wages. This could lead to increased collaboration and goal congruity
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between firms and unions, and less hostility toward collective bargaining and union organizing in
economies promoting entrepreneurial policy tools. This in turn could enhance unions in their
ability to secure wage gains and entice more workers to join. Noteworthy examples from the
practitioner literature demonstrate engagement between entrepreneurial innovation projects and
unions. The Apollo Alliance, for example, is a “third-way” consortium of skilled trade labor
unions and “green” manufacturing companies that collaborate to advance industrial growth
through a “high wage, union jobs” model (BlueGreen Alliance 2014). Tailored job training and
apprenticeship programs, classified as entrepreneurial policy tools by definition, tend to utilize
unions as providers of professional and skills development (see table at chapter’s opening).
Anecdotal evidence from the state of Wisconsin demonstrated the use of entrepreneurial policies
in numerous highly regarded initiatives, such as the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership
and the Milwaukee Jobs Initiative, in producing jobs in union-friendly businesses (Center for
Wisconsin Strategy 2011). “Freelancers” in the software development, financial advising, and
artistic trades have developed innovative approaches to securing job opportunities through an
“entrepreneurial union” model, which has united 115,000 white-collar workers across all 50
states (Wilkinson 2009). In these examples entrepreneurialism and unionization appear to walk
hand-in-hand.
But an alternative argument is that high-wage development actually reduces demand for
unionization among workers, namely because the willingness of firms to provide generous
salaries could obviate the perceived need for union activism. This interpretation regards
entrepreneurial development policy as a substitute for labor wage bargaining (Kaufman 2004).
An additional, somewhat more complex theory, casts further doubt on the assumption that
entrepreneurial development strategies are compatible with heightened union opportunity. The
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“skills-biased technical change” premise contends that higher-skilled, higher-educated workers
have increased their wage earnings at the expense of earnings by lower-skilled labors (Acemoglu
2002). Some prominent political economists contend that skills-biased change impacts
unionization as well, by undermining the solidarity between skilled and unskilled workers. Union
wage bargaining generally has the effect of compressing the wage earnings spectrum between
the highest and lowest paid workers. In the innovation economy promoted by entrepreneurial
development, highly skilled workers may find the cost of wage compression higher than the socalled “outside option” of working non-union (Acemoglu et al 2001). A technically advanced
worker may see no need to join a union to safeguard pay increases as the value of their skills on
the market affords them wage gains beyond what union bargaining provides. The information
technology and finance sectors, which entrepreneurial strategies often seek to promote,
historically show some of the lower rates of unionization (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012)
Additionally, the mindset of workers in “knowledge economy” sectors may be less amenable to
collective identity-building that aids unionization. Such employees tend to be more assertive and
individualistic in their approach to wage bargaining, even to the point of demanding premium
wages above those made by their high-skilled peers (Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002). The
opportunism displayed by many “quality job” employees may run counter to union growth.
I will start by advancing the more simplistic interpretation of entrepreneurialism in my
hypothesis testing; that is, that the higher-paying jobs promoted by this approach will present
opportunities for greater unionization. This is in contrast to the alternate skill-biased technical
change theory, which suggests that entrepreneurialism could impact unions negatively.
Higher levels of entrepreneurial policy orientation will have a positive impact on state
unionization levels.
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Table 6 offers descriptive statistics of union elections outcomes and union density rates
from three states based on data from the National Labor Relations Board for selected years.
Missouri provides an example of a state that scores high on the use of entrepreneurial programs
and low on the use of locational programs. In South Carolina the opposite is the case, as the state
relies heavily on locational development and less on entrepreneurial development. Tennessee
provides an example of a more balanced approach, using slightly above average amounts of both
types of policies. The table shows that in Missouri unions conducted more elections, attempted to
organize more workers, and actually organized more members than in either South Carolina or
Tennessee. South Carolina experienced only 21 union elections, and contributed only 957 new
members due to organizing activities, even though the actual win rate of union elections among
those attempted was the highest of the three states. In Tennessee, numbers for both union
organizing effort and actual new members fall between those of the other two states. Macro
union density numbers are also supplied for the three states, tracking the percentage of the total
state workforce that is unionized. A similar pattern appears. Missouri has the highest union
density, followed by Tennessee, and South Carolina is last.
These descriptive statistics are an early indication that entrepreneurial development
policies may encourage greater levels of union organizing and membership growth. In the
chapters that follow, I will discuss the role of foreign direct investment as an additional critical
variable which could impact unionization, followed by two multivariate regression models that
statistically analyze the relationship of economic development strategies and labor organizing
outcomes while controlling for other important factors. I proceed by predicting that high use of
the locational approach erodes union membership levels and likelihood of union organizing
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Table 6. NLRB Union Election Outcomes for Selected States (2005, 2007, 2009)
Missouri
(Entrepreneurial Focus)

South Carolina
(Locational Focus)

Tennessee
(Dual Focus)

57% of 147 elections

71% of 21 elections

56% of 48 elections

Employees eligible to vote
for unionization

8808

1209

3492

New members unionized

6088

957

2633

10.8%

3.6%

5.5%

Union win rate

Union density *

Data from NLRB Election Reports, https://www.nlrb.gov/election-reports except where otherwise noted.
* Hirsch, Macpherson, et. al, www.unionfacts.com. Average of annual union density percentages for 2005-2009.
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victories, while high engagement of entrepreneurial programs lead to less union membership
decline or even membership growth and enhanced likelihood of union election wins.
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Chapter 3: Foreign Direct Investment and Variation in State Unionization
The most important independent variable in this study is economic development policy
strategy. However, a proper examination of the state economic development environment and
unionization outcomes must also consider the role of inward foreign investment as a critical
secondary factor. First of all, foreign investment is a popular variable-of-interest in much of the
extant research on unionization. The “conventional wisdom” held among many global economy
policy-makers for a number of years was that increased openness of domestic economies to the
global market would accelerate the decline of the labor movement during the late 20th century,
because international investors want to avoid setting up operations where unions are strong (See
Rodrik 1996, Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman 1992, Culem 1988 (in Kucera 2001). This
view has also been greatly challenged (Thelen 2001, Leahy & Montagna 2000, Oman 2000;
Kucera 2001). I re-visit the question of whether or not inward investment causes declining
unionization in this chapter and offer original evidence for why this argument is suspect.
Another reason for the examination of foreign investment is that it is directly related to economic
development policy, as increasing investment is an explicit goal of most economic development
programs. There may be some important interactive effects revealed when considering how
development policy in tandem with foreign investment influences unionization. At a minimum,
the impact of foreign investment must be included as an important control variable in models
attempting to account for the effect of economic development policy on unionization.
Inward foreign investment is a product of economic development activity. This is apparent
when considering locational strategies, as the goal of this policy approach is to lure existing
investment to relocate/expand into the state from elsewhere. It is expected that most locational
programs are likely to prioritize direct marketing and recruitment of foreign investment into a
57

state. However, entrepreneurial development is probably just as likely to be a recruitment vehicle
for foreign investment, even if the causality is not as direct. Entrepreneurial strategies seek to
grow a “wealth economy” through nurturing new development in the human resource and
industry sectors in which a state enjoys a comparative advantage. An affluent state economy
could lure foreign investors for both demand and supply-side reasons, as will be discussed in this
chapter. This project does not attempt to differentiate which of the individual development
approaches is ultimately more successful in luring foreign investment. However, it does
acknowledge the importance of considering foreign direct investment as a factor impacting
unionization outcomes in the state, given its critical piece in the development of the state
economy and its relationship to economic development policy.

Trends in Inward Foreign Direct Investment
First, it is useful to define foreign direct investment (FDI) as it is used in this dissertation.
My project utilizes the definition provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the most
widely-used source of FDI data in the United States. It regards FDI as “an investment in which a
resident of one country obtains a lasting interest in, and a degree of influence over the
management of, a business enterprise in another country.” The BEA definition includes newly
created and expanded business operations of foreign enterprises (greenfield investment), as well
as those they gain through mergers and acquisitions (BEA 2008a, in US Department of
Commerce 2008.) I contend that merger/acquisition FDI is valid for inclusion in my analysis
because the ownership transfer of an existing business is often a factor that unions consider in
evaluating organizing targets, and some evidence shows it is related to pro-union organizing
outcomes (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey 2004).
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Inward foreign direct investment has increased over the past decades, and in recent years
in particular. Figure 1 provides numbers for balance of payment and direct investment position
for years 2003 to 2011 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014). This measure examines the
financial transactions and income flows between foreign parent firms and their affiliate sites
located in the U.S. (BEA 2008b). The graph indicates that even through the recent years of
economic recession the amount of financial transactions between overseas parent firms and their
U.S. subsidiaries continued to increase.
Figure 2 provides foreign investment data related to the actual operations of U.S.-hosted
affiliates, rather than intra-firm financial transactions between parents and their subsidiaries. One
of the most important metrics tracked related to FDI business operations is the number of
persons employed by foreign-owned firms. The table indicates that in the U.S. between 5 and 6
million workers were employed by foreign-headquartered firms each year from 2007 to 2011.
This represented about 4.5% of the national private sector workforce for years 2007- 2008 (U. S.
Department of Commerce International Trade Admin 2008). The employment base of foreignowned firms in the United States rebounded upward between 2009 and 2011, after dropping
from 2008. The employment aspect of foreign investment is particularly important to this
project, because union success and vitality is most often tracked as a function of the size of
membership, and employed workers are potential union members. Of course, creation of jobs is
also a highly emphasized goal of economic development policy and is cited by state elected
officials as a motivator for prioritizing the creation of development strategies, as discussed in the
previous chapter.
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Figure 1. Total FDI in the United States, 2003-2011

Figure 2. Total FDI Employment in the United States, 2007-2011

60

State and federal leaders are acutely aware that foreign investment, distinct from interstate investment, is a major economic resource to be cultivated. They explicitly market to foreign
investors in the competitive scramble with other states to attract new enterprises (See US
Department of Commerce 2008, 7-8; Tennessee Department of Economic and Community
Development 2013, National Governors Association 2002). Moreover, economic development
programs openly cite federalist competition as one of the advantages of the U.S. market when
advertising to international investors. Consider this excerpt from an “Invest in America”
information bulletin, published by the US Department of Commerce in 2008:
“The United States is unique within the global investment community with regard to the
number, scope, and lead role that states play in attracting foreign direct investment.
Individual states compete (often against each other) for investments on a global scale
employing highly skilled investment officials and, in some cases, by maintaining field
offices in major financial centers worldwide… considering the diversity and size of the
U. S. economy, sub-national investment promotion agencies are in a unique position to
offer tailored services that meet the needs of international investors….This decentralized
system has successfully operated for decades and has yielded billions of dollars in
international investment throughout the United States.” (italics mine)
Given the growth of FDI in the U.S. national economy, the sizable number of workers
employed by foreign-firms in the United States, and the active efforts of state policy makers to
attract FDI to the states, it is critical to account for inward foreign investment when analyzing
variation in labor union power across the country. Does entry of FDI present a challenge or an
opportunity for the union movement? The purpose of the rest of the chapter is to present
evidence that at the very least it is not an impediment to unionization, and as we shall see, it
could benefit unions.
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Foreign Direct Investment and the International Economy
Most of the previous study in political science of how FDI impacts labor markets and
trade unionism comes from the international relations subfield. The research focuses on how
international openness and capital mobility influences national-level labor relations regimes. The
oft-debated neo-liberal “convergence” theory stresses how international openness has pushed
national economies to conform in regard to labor relations practices. Its adherents hold that
capital mobility has reconfigured the international economic system of the 20th century by
creating a borderless world with a single trans-national market supplanting national-level
economic and political organization as the key institutional instrument of control (Reich 1991,
Ohmae 1995). In order to compete with other firms companies will seek new locations for their
operations that offer a comparative advantage in terms of labor and regulatory compliance costs.
Countries will be compelled to slash their extant regulations on factors of production due to
competitive pressures from neighboring nation-states to attract business investment, which will
trigger a domino effect, as all countries adjust their policies to keep labor wages and regulations
low (Oman 2000; Collinsworth, Goold, and Harvey 1994 ). The consequence of this process will
be a bottom-ended convergence of countries’ policies related to worker rights, environmental
standards, and capital taxation. National-level governance structures will become less distinct in
an unfortunate “race to the bottom”.
One of the core assumptions of this argument is that capitalists across the globe view
unions in the same way – as an unwanted interference - and will necessarily seek to avoid them
to suppress labor costs and maintain control over personnel decisions (Freidman, Gerlowski, and
Selberman 1992, 411). Given that the United States consistently ranks as having the weakest
labor protections among the developed countries (Kucera 2007), and most FDI to the United
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States comes from developed countries in Europe and Asia (Harrod 2002, 175), some interpret
firm relocations to the U.S. as a means for capital to flee worker regulations in ‘strong labor’
countries. But there is a great deal of debate over what really motivates corporations to expand or
re-locate their operations overseas. First of all, when examining the global economy in
aggregate, foreign capital is more likely to flow into countries with superior worker rights
enforcement than into those that do not have core labor protections (Rodrick 1997, Kucera 2002;
Durham 2004). Most FDI is traded among the countries with advanced economies, which as a
group have higher labor standards than those in developing countries (Drezner 2001). As for how
firms evaluate the cost of labor, the relative productivity of the workforce, rather than unit labor
costs is likely a more important consideration, which would favor the high- labor standard
economies as an FDI destination (Harrod 2002, Krugman 1994). Perhaps most importantly, firm
preferences are driven largely by demand-side considerations, such as improved access to
lucrative consumer markets, rather than supply-side input costs (Whitley 1999, Spar and Yaffee
1999). As noted earlier, much of the FDI in the United States is not the result of strategic
location decisions at all, but rather the result of mergers and acquisitions of existing operations.
There is no consensus finding that union presence is significant to multinational firms in their
relocation decisions.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of neo-liberal convergence theory is that studies
from both comparative and international political economists reveal that major differences
endure across countries’ labor and capital policies, even after these countries have
internationalized (Drezner 2001, Garrett 1995, Thelen 2001, Whitley 1999). A “race to the
bottom” in terms of collective bargaining coverage is not happening, at least not with all
countries (European Commission 2008). Comparative political scientists of the historical
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institutional perspective contend that national governance and regulatory structures are necessary
conditions for the long-term evolution of markets, and these structures set the path of national
economies in persistent directions that are not easily diverted (Peirson and Skocpol 2002). Firms
and business interests are actors embedded within national economies, and their behavior is
constrained by the institutional arrangements and norms of the economy in which they arose.
The nature of the labor relations regime operating in a country is a product of the path dependent
development of the economy. Unique “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) can be found among the
world’s advanced economies, challenging the view that nations will converge in regard to worker
rights and employment policies (Hall and Soskice 2001, Streek and Thelen 2005, Jacoby 2005,
Whitley 1999). This does not only have significance at the international level of analysis.
Differences in the market economies of incoming foreign firms could impact unionization
outcomes at the domestic US-state level, especially compared with home-based firms, as shall be
discussed later in this chapter. While it is a comparative national politics invention, the Varieties
of Capitalism approach may also have application to the question of how FDI impacts subnational labor markets in an American, federalist context; thus a more detailed look at this body
of research is in order.
VoC offers an accessible typology which groups post-industrial countries according to
the “relational competencies” of their labor relations regimes (Hall and Soskice 2001, Chapter
1). Two major ‘ideal types’ of economies identified are the Liberal Market Economy (LME) and
the Coordinated Market Economy (CME). LME’s rely on market structures, pricing, and formal
contracting to resolve coordination problems in the national economy, and require flexibility in
their labor supply. Workers are encouraged to develop easily transferable, general skills which
adapt well to lay-off and re-employment cycles. The United States and the United Kingdom are
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the classic examples. On the other hand, the Coordinated Market Economy (CME) utilizes a
variety of non-market structures to coordinate work processes, using inside networks and
collaborative relationships to promote the core competencies of companies. Corporate strategies
are arranged around the long-term development of high-quality capital-intensive goods, requiring
a highly skilled workforce that must invest sizable resources in training specifically for the tasks
required by the firm’s production regimen. This entails that workers will expect long-term job
security with the companies that employ them. Sweden and Germany are two noteworthy
examples of countries classed as CME’s (Hall and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001,
Iverson 2005).
These varying systems suggest different paths of historical development for labor unions
and the roles they play in the different types of market economies. In LMEs unions are viewed as
an interference to firm operations, potentially distorting market wage-setting and limiting firms’
abilities to shed redundant workers or reskill workers to other production needs. Labor relations
dynamics between firms and unions are likely to be conflicting and contentious. In CMEs unions
evolved into essential tools for promoting firms’ labor needs due to their role in setting
standardized wage levels in return for job security for their members (Moene and Wallerstein
1993), thus protecting both worker and firm investments in skill development (Thelen 2004; Hall
and Soskice 2001). In CME’s unions have secured greater institutional recognition in statemediated, corporatist bargaining arrangements, rather than having to fight for legitimacy as is
often the case with unions in LMEs, where governments play a more limited role in the
mediation of private sector collective bargaining (Iverson and Cusack 2000). The recognition
that unions and businesses may develop synergistic, cooperative relationships in some market
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systems challenges the neo-liberalist assumption that all multi-national firms will necessarily
resist labor organizing attempts.
The VoC typology has empirical support. Unionization rates continue to be high in some
countries, such as the Nordic states which are classified as CMEs, whereas in LMEs such as the
US and United Kingdom union density has plummeted (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, Skruggs
2002). Moreover, we continue to see variation across post-industrial countries in the actual
practice and enforcement of core labor rights provisions and employment protections with the
United States and France ranking low, while Sweden, Finland, and Belgium - all classed as
CME’s - rank high (Kucera 2002, OECD 2004, OECD 1994). Union power in collective
bargaining and ability to set binding industry-wide wage rates is notably higher in CMEs than in
LMEs where union contracts are negotiated at individual company levels (Iverson and Cusack
2000, Frege and Kelly 2004). Moreover, in LMEs labor regulations and union power has eroded
more dramatically than in CMEs. Table 7 presents national union density rates for the advanced
economies of North America, Europe, and Asia. Note that the five countries with the highest
union density are all CMEs – mainly the Scandinavian economies. The English-speaking
countries that comprise the Liberal Market Economy group show middle-range to low rates of
unionization. The group averages listed demonstrate the noteworthy differences in CME (44%)
and LME (22%) union density among the market economy types. Also note that the United
States lags behind every other country in union membership levels, with the exception of France.
To summarize, the validity of the neo-liberal convergence theory from an international
relations perspective is questionable for several reasons. First of all, it does not adequately
account for firm preferences in the international economy. The assumption that firms will
necessarily resist unions and re-locate to avoid labor power is disputable. Secondly, advanced
66

Table 7. Trade Union Density, 2005 for Advanced Economies

Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Norway
Belgium
Ireland
Italy
Austria
United Kingdom
Canada
Australia
Germany
New Zealand
Netherlands
Switzerland
Japan
Spain
United States
France
LME Average Density
CME Average Density

76.52
72.43
70.67
54.89
52.87
33.96
33.59
33.33
28.42
27.73
22.29
21.68
20.85
20.56
19.31
18.80
14.70
11.96
7.67
22.35
44.10

CME
CME
CME
CME
CME
LME
LME*
CME
LME
LME
LME
CME
LME
CME
CME
CME
LME*
LME
LME*

* Hall and Soskice contend these economies have aspects of both CME and
LMEs. However, they contend that their labor relations characteristics
resemble LMEs. (Hall and Soskice 2000, 21).
data extracted on 02 Aug 2014 18:09 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.

67

economies have not unanimously cut worker rights, nor has union membership declined sharply
in all advanced countries. Different varieties of capitalism have been identified, with CME
countries maintaining strong trade union movements, while in LME countries unions enjoy less
recognized legitimacy and labor regulations are weaker. Thus, the assumed outcome of policy
convergence is not fully corroborated by empirical evidence when viewing this question from a
comparative-countries perspective.

Neo-liberal convergence theory applied to the study of American states
While it is often discussed in an international relations context, the “race to the bottom”
argument is just as provocative when applied to the study of unionization in the federalist context
of the American states. First of all it raises the question of how state-level unionization levels
might impact the amount of FDI that states receive. Investors are aware of the variations in state
regulatory and economic development strategies as a result of America’s federalist structure,
largely due to the marketing efforts of states to lure them to invest, and use these differences to
their advantage (Brace 2000). Union membership levels and labor and environmental
regulations, alongside differences in capital taxation are routinely advertised by state officials to
make their state appear as a more attractive relocation target than another (See South Carolina
Department of Commerce 2014 for just one state’s example). But similar to the debates among
international relations scholars, researchers of the American states disagree about the extent to
which foreign firms make their relocation decisions based on union avoidance strategies.
Overseas companies seek location targets in states where union reach is limited according to
some state-level scholars (Lipit 1997, Brady and Wallace 2000). Nonetheless, there is a fairly
consistent finding that FDI flows more freely into higher wage, higher-union density states than
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into their lower-wage peers (Perrucci 1994, Hansen 2001). The degree to which the state
economy is internationalized via inward FDI, import competition, and exporting has been found
to be unrelated to differences in labor costs across the American states (Hansen 2006). Most
foreign firms pay higher average wages than domestic firms, (U.S. Department of Commerce
2011; Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall 2007), suggesting that maintaining the cheapest possible
wage is not a salient concern to overseas companies. However, an alternate view could be that
foreign firms keep wages high specifically to avoid union agitation.
The neo-liberal perspective not only predicts that unionization impacts the attractiveness
of a state to investors, it also suggests that flows of foreign investment could negatively impact
unionization levels over time. In their “race to the bottom” states would be compelled to slash
labor standards and suppress labor power to remain competitive with other states to attract FDI
and out-of-state domestic investment. Unions could find their power base shrinking as the state
economy becomes more exposed to the international market.
Economists frame the historical decline of unions as a function of increased competition
among firms, rather than focusing on governmental policy-making to woo investment as do
political scientists, but the consequences predicted are similar. As foreign companies enter the
domestic economy corporate profit margins shrink with more competition for consumer demand.
Lower surplus returns to capital would hinder unions’ abilities to charge higher “rents” to
redirect corporate profits to labor in the form of increased wages, benefits and in particular,
union dues revenues (Acemaglu, Aghion, Valante 2001, 233). The unions’ loss of leverage in
wage bargaining could be most pronounced when there is direct product market competition
between inward foreign investors and domestic firms; in other words when the motivation for
investment is market access to consumer demand (Leahy and Montagna 2000). Firm
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competition would decrease union resources and impede union efforts to organize new workers
and maintain their existing membership base. 6
Some empirical findings of social scientists confirm this economics perspective when
analyzing the decline of unionization in the American states. Inward FDI was found to diminish
union success in recognition elections, union effort in number of attempted organizing drives,
and union density (percentage of unionized workforce) in comparative studies of the American
states (Brady and Wallace 2000, Slaughter 2007). But research in state labor factor costs show
that union declines over the last three decades are about the same for states with the highest
levels of FDI and those with the lowest levels of FDI (Hansen 2006, 65).
Drawing conclusions about the impact of FDI on unionization is further muddied when
considering that union coverage rates are actually higher in foreign-owned facilities than in
American-owned firms. Table 8 provides the latest governmental data on comparative
unionization rates of foreign firms and all U.S. businesses. In manufacturing, retail trade,
administration, support, and waste management and accommodation/food service categories,
union share of employment in foreign firms is notably higher than it is in all U.S. businesses,
while in wholesale trade and transport/warehousing, the rate is slightly lower. Overall, union
share of employment in foreign firms is over 12%, compared with 8% for the total population of
businesses. If inward FDI was really a critical factor in impeding union organizing, we might
expect to find that foreign firms demonstrate a smaller share of union members in their total
employment than businesses overall, but this is not the case.
6

However, Leahey and Montagna show that foreign firms would actually maximize utility by locating in centralized wage
bargaining environments versus decentralized ones because of the competitive edge it provides them over internal firms.
Centralized bargaining occurs in “strong labor” economies where unions enjoy greater institutional legitimacy. In the United
States there are few industries where centralized collective bargaining still occurs. Almost all of the union wage bargaining in the
American context occurs at a decentralized level.
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Table 8. Union Represented Employment in Foreign Firms in U.S., 2007

All Industries
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Transporting and
Warehouse
Admin, Support, and
Waste Management
Accommodation and
Food services
Other Industries

Union
Represented
Employment in
Foreign Firms
(Thousands)
685.2
341.2
31.9
96.5

Total
Foreign
Firm
Employment
(Thousands)
5,519.5
1,998.2
620.3
534.5

Percent
Foreign Firm
Employment
Represented
by Unions
12.4
17.1
5.1
18.1

Percent All
U.S. Business
Employment
Represented
by Unions
8.2
12.0
5.7
5.7

47.2

243.4

19.4

22.3

50.4

536.5

9.4

4.2

51.3
66.7

361.8
1,224.7

14.2
5.4

4.2
8.0

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, November 2009. "Operations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies.",
p. 54. http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2009/11%20November/1109_foreign.pdf
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The assumption of eventual convergence on labor relations policy as inward FDI
increases is also suspect when examining the cross-sectional variation in state laws in our
federalist system. The American political-economic system is actually a composite regime,
according to one researcher, that can not be fully classed as a Liberal Market Economy, given
sub-national differences in employment and labor development policies. Program innovation
characterizes state economic development strategies, contributing to the diverse array of
unionization levels, worker rights, and workforce development policies found across
jurisdictions (Amberg 2008). As with countries in the global economy, previous research
suggests that the American states do not show convergence in regard to labor power or
employment policies, even given the high level of interstate competition for investment (Hansen
2006). While some studies indicate that states cut labor standards in an attempt to compete with
their contiguous neighboring states (Saiz 2001b), nation-wide the states continue to operate with
varied approaches. Divergence in state unionization levels persists, following regional divides
and historical “right to work” status, and the marked contrast in the labor relations regimes of
union-shop and open-shop states have endured for decades. With the exception of Oklahoma,
Texas, and Idaho no states adopted new “right to work” statutes for years in my study. (See
Kelly, Witko, Young 2013).7
Finally, the lack of labor standards convergence from an international perspective could
create opportunities for unions to organize workers at a domestic level. Firms headquartered
abroad, especially in CMEs, operate in national economies with less contentious management-

7

The examples of Michigan and Indiana, outside my years of study, do demonstrate some recent movement to
prohibit union shops and cut worker rights, but whether or not inward FDI is the cause is questionable. Changes in
the party in power in the states, resulting in shifts in the states’ policy agendas, appear to be the critical factors,
rather than competitive impulses caused by inward investment.
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labor relations dynamics than are seen in the US, and this may affect the employment practices
they bring to their subsidiaries hosted in the US domestic economy. As discussed, international
firms may not make decisions on site locations based on union avoidance. Furthermore, the
Varieties of Capitalism approach suggests that some foreign firms may actually be unionfriendly, viewing unionization of their workforce as an essential ingredient of their business
model due to the legitimacy that unions enjoy in their originating economies. The recent
Volkswagen union election in Chattanooga is a well-publicized example of this, with the German
automaker openly expressing its desire to set up a works council structure that if successfully
implemented, will recognize the United Auto Workers union as the official representing agent of
its workers (Chambers 2014).
Admittedly, VoC chiefly emphasizes the differences that endure between companies
operating within their domestic, home market environments. It does less to predict whether or
not foreign firms will carry labor relations approaches developed in their home country to the
United States upon relocation. However, applied industrial relations scholars have tackled this
question. “Forward diffusion” occurs as foreign firms utilize distinct personnel approaches upon
relocation, traceable to their nation-of-origin (Ferner 1997, Edwards 1998, 2000, Guest and
Haque 1996). For instance, American-owned firms display lower unionization in their European
operations than do German and Swedish firms located outside their domestic economies, which
tend to tolerate unions as an “employee voice” mechanism for their workers (Marginson 2008).
In the United States, this indicates that firms lured from CME countries may be less combative
toward unions, even as their American peers wage active resistance. Foreign LME firms might
behave more like U.S. corporations and oppose unionization attempts in their American
operations, as they share features of similar types of market economies.
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But there is also a strong argument for American exceptionalism regarding the degree of
union hostility exhibited in the U.S. economy. When compared to the United Kingdom, Canada
and Australia, which are also classed as LMEs, the U.S. has historically had notably lower levels
of union density than any of these countries (Visser 1996 in Hall and Soskice 2001).
Comparative research tracking the erosion of union membership levels over the past three
decades indicates substantial differences between the U.S and Canada, which is arguably
America’s most comparable peer country. By the end of the millennium Canadian union density
still managed to hold at approximately 33%, compared to levels lower than 10% in the U.S.
private sector (Riddell and Riddell 2004).
These paltry union density rates are the consequence of fierce counter-campaigns that
American businesses wage in reaction to unionization attempts. America offers an exceptionally
hostile union environment (Kelly, Witko, Young 2013). The “union avoidance” industry, which
utilizes a host of sophisticated legal and human resources strategies to thwart labor organizing, is
a unique American creation (Bronfenbrenner 2000). Over the past decades expensive media
campaigns, “captive audience meetings”, and utilization of union-busting consultants have
become standard tactics employed by U.S. management in response to labor organizing
(Bronfenbrenner 2009, 2004; Martin 2008). This is the product of the particularly weak
regulatory structure that U.S. labor statutes provide to safeguard workers’ rights to join unions,
as reviewed in Chapter 1. Research in comparative labor economics reveals that the United
States rates lower than any other advanced country in regard to enforcement and practice of labor
rights standards (Kucera 2002). Moreover, the U.S. business sector’s hostility to unions is not
limited to domestic operations. American companies display significantly higher levels of union
avoidance in their overseas facilities than do subsidiaries with parents from Ireland, Canada, or
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the U.K. (Marginson 2008). Comparatively, even those firms from foreign LMEs may be more
tolerant to unionization than home-based firms in the U.S.
Ultimately, variation in labor relations among the world’s advanced economies could
have two important influences on American unionization. First, it suggests that foreign firms
overall may operate with a more union-friendly approach than U.S. firms, and that unions have a
better chance in organizing in their facilities as a result. Secondly, it suggests that firms from
CME countries may be the most favorable to union organizing among the group of foreignowned firms, due to the particularly strong legitimacy that unions enjoy in these firm’s home
countries.

Foreign firms and union outcomes in the U.S: A first analysis
In this section I conduct a simple bi-varate analysis to offer empirical support for the nonnegative impact that foreign nationality of firms has on American unionization outcomes. I
highlight two ways to analyze quantitative data in regard to this hypothesis. First of all, at the
macro level, one can examine the association between aggregate amounts of foreign direct
investment and state level union density levels. This approach, using states as the unit of
analysis, considers how overall totals in investment relate to union membership share in the state
workforce overall. The macro-level perspective also allows us to better consider questions
related to convergence. Do states with higher levels of FDI show similar low unionization
levels? Also, do states with the highest relative amounts of FDI show a consistent tendency to
lose union members?
Macro-level FDI to states has already been considered as a factor impacting union density
(Hansen 2006). However, FDI can be measured in different ways. The U.S. Bureau of Economic
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Analysis tracks inward FDI in various forms. The value of FDI stocks, which measures the
amount of assets attributable to foreign majority-owned affiliates in the United State is one
metric most commonly used. Another approach to quantifying inward FDI is to measure the
number of jobs in the U.S. economy offered by foreign-owned affiliates. I use the latter variant
throughout my analysis because the jobs figure relates more directly to the dependent variable of
union density, which is itself a percentage of the state workforce. Moreover, to account for the
variation in the overall size of the state labor force, I use the percentage of private sector jobs in
foreign-owned subsidiaries, as supplied by Brady and Wallace 2000, updated for recent years.
As a preliminary analysis of whether or not FDI is associated with macro-level state union
density I offer Table 9. The first ten states listed on the table are those in the top quintile (the
“Top 10”) of percentage of FDI jobs in the state labor force for 2004, the most recent year in my
macro-level dataset. (I also supply data for Tennessee, for interest.) I have calculated the top
quintile mean, as well as the mean for the rest of the states for FDI, total and private sector union
density, and change in total and private sector union density between 2004 and 2005. The Top 10
comparison to the remainder of states shows that in both measures of union density, the mean
union density is higher in high FDI states than in the remainder of states. Moreover, in both
private sector and total union density, the Top 10 states showed a mean gain, while the remainder
of states show a mean loss in density. I also conducted t tests to evaluate whether the difference
between the Top 10 and the remainder of states was significant on these measures. In all tests, I
could not reject the null hypothesis that there was not a significant difference between groups.
These early findings suggest that foreign direct investment is not related to lower union density
levels; in fact the numbers reveal that higher levels of FDI jobs in the state labor force coincide
with higher levels of union density. However, given the failed t-tests between group means, I fall
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Table 9. Top Quintile of US States in FDI Jobs, 2004

State

FDI Jobs as
% of
Employment

Private
Union
Density
(2004)

Private
Density
Change
(2004-05)

Total
Union
Density
(2004)

Total
Density
Change
(2004-05)

South Carolina
New
Hampshire
Connecticut
Delaware
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Hawaii
Rhode Island
North Carolina
Maine
Top Quintile
Mean
Remainder of
States Mean

6.64

2.60%

1.50

3.10%

-0.80

6.53
6.22
6.16
5.72
5.49
5.42
5.34
5.16
4.74

4.80%
7.30%
7.70%
7.70%
11.60%
16.20%
8.80%
1.60%
5.90%

-0.80
0.30
-0.70
-0.30
0.20
0.70
-0.40
0.20
-0.30

9.90%
15.30%
12.40%
13.50%
19.80%
23.50%
16.40%
2.80%
11.30%

0.50
0.70
-0.50
0.40
0.70
2.40
-0.40
0.20
0.60

5.74

7.42%

0.04

12.80%

0.38

3.16

6.98%

-0.03

10.99%

-0.03

Tennessee

4.69

4.9%

-1.60

6.7%

-1.30

*FDI Jobs data from Brady and Wallace 2000 and updates.
**Union Density data from Hirsch and MacPherson 2001 and updates, www.unionstats.com.
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short of demonstrating that FDI has a statistically significant impact in either direction on state
level union density. In any case, the “race to the bottom” premise - convergence toward lower
state unionization as FDI rises- receives no support. Of course, a full multivariate analysis is
warranted to provide stronger support for the validity of these findings, and this will be presented
in Chapter 4.
A second way to analyze quantitatively the question of how foreign firm ownership
impacts union outcomes in the U.S. is to use the individual union recognition elections as the
unit of analysis. This approach looks for the association between the nationality of the business
where a unionization attempt occurs and whether the union won or lost the recognition election.
There are a handful of studies of micro-level union election data from previous decades, but their
findings present a puzzle. One concluded that that foreign firm nationality has no significant
impact on unionization election outcome, (Sanyal 1990), another that foreign firms elections
have lower pro-union vote share than American firms (Greer and Sherarer 1981), and another
that foreign firms are less likely to result in union victories than American firms (Bronfenbrenner
2000). But due to the data noted earlier, that average union membership levels in foreign firms is
higher than in American firms, these findings should be not be taken as the final word.8
One of the unique contributions of this dissertation is my construction of an original data
set, tracing union recognition election outcomes for recent years (2005, 2007, and 2009). These
elections are reported and posted on the National Labor Relations Board’s website monthly, and
are available for at least the most recent two decades. The fifth chapter of this dissertation

Moreover, there has been little analysis to account for differential impacts of firms from foreign countries, either
individually or in groups. Most of the research has simply looked at the “foreigness” of the business, rather than
clusters or classes of foreign firms, such as the LME/CME distinction.
8
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presents a detailed multivariate regression analysis of this data set, along with a detailed
description of the case selection methods utilized to construct it. For now, I wish to introduce
some preliminary descriptive statistics from this data set, to shed light on how firm nationality
relates to frequency of pro-union votes. In addition, I present data on union vote share in the
elections. Please note that in Table 10 that follows only union elections with 50 or more eligible
employees have been included.
Table 10 breaks down union elections by three categories of firm nationality – FMNC
(Foreign Multi-national Company), USMNC (American Multi-national Company) and Domestic
(companies with operations solely based inside the United States). The multi-national and
domestic distinction is important because multi-national operations by definition are more
capital-mobile. These firms can present a more credible threat to offshore existing operations as
a response to unionization drives than can domestic firms, which lack existing overseas facilities.
Threat of closure is a major scare tactic used by union-avoiding firms (Bronfenbrenner 1997).
Unions have even at times shifted to public sector and service industry organizing to sidestep the
“exit” threat often wielded by U.S. owned multi-nationals (Gapasin and Bonacich 2002, 182).
My presentation of the data accounts for the possible impact of capital mobility threat by listing
win rates for union elections according to separate ownership categories. FMNCs actually posted
the highest win rates, with almost 60% resulting in union wins, even given their capital-mobile
operations. USMNCs show the lowest rate with about 37% of elections in this category resulting
in success for the union; while Domestics, as expected, posted a higher share of union wins
(about 47% of elections) than multi-national American firms. Still, FMNC is the only category
with union victories in the majority of cases. The vote share data parallels the statistics on
election outcomes, indicating that FMNCs had the highest mean percentage of the three groups
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Table 10. NLRB Union Election Outcomes, Years 2005, 2007, 2009

Frequency of Election Outcomes

Foreign Multinationals
U.S. Multinationals
Domestic
All Firms

Win

Loss

Total

% Wins per
Category

128
92
245
465

86
157
272
515

214
249
517
980

59.8%
36.9%
47.4%
47.4%

Mean Union Vote Share*

Foreign Multinationals

58.2%

All American Firms
U.S. Multinationals
U.S. Domestics

50.5%
45.7%
52.8%

All Firms

52.2%

Total N

980

* F= 19.38 (p<.00) for foreign firms compared to all American firm. ANOVA analysis confirms that means for the
Foreign and All American groups are significantly different.
F= 18.18 (P< .00) for the three way comparison of FMNC, USMNC, and Domestic categories. ANOVA analysis
confirms that the group means for vote share are not all equal. Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak multiple comparison
tests each provide support that the difference between means are significant for all three groups (p<.05).

Source: NLRB Election Reports
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at 58%. Moreover, a variety of multiple-comparison means tests confirm that the FMNC average
vote share is significantly higher than the average vote share for both USMNCs and Domestics.
A multivariate analysis is needed to draw more accurate conclusions about the impact of
corporate nationality on union organizing success in the U.S., but these descriptive numbers
reveal initial support for the argument that foreign-owned firms present an opportunity for union
organizing, as opposed to an obstacle.
The models I present in the next three chapters will allow for firm nationality and FDI to
be analyzed alongside state economic development strategy and for possible interactive effects of
these variables. In this chapter, I offer a brief comparison of descriptive statistics from three
example states as an introduction of how foreign ownership operates in a federalist framework to
influence state unionization outcomes.
Table 11 repeats the data on the percentage of union elections won by unions, the total
number of potential new union members eligible to vote in unionization elections, and the
number of new workers successfully unionized for years 2005, 07, and 09 for three illustrative
states, as was provided in Chapter 2.9 It adds numbers specific to elections held among the subset
of foreign-owned firms for comparison. Important labor force characteristics are also listed for
each state to provide context for interpreting the unionization data. Results indicate that in
Missouri foreign firms account for thousands of attempted and successfully unionized
workers, while in both South Carolina and Tennessee, attempted new and won union members
total only in the hundreds. Tennessee, notably, has a labor force size roughly equivalent to
Missouri’s, with a much smaller number of newly unionized workers. South Carolina has a
smaller state labor force size, but the latest numbers indicate that it has a larger number of
9

These numbers are inclusive of elections with less than 50 eligible employees.

81

Table 11. NLRB Union Election Outcomes for Selected States (2005, 07, 09)

All Firms
Win Rate

Missouri

South Carolina

Tennessee

(Entrepreneurial Focus)

(Locational Focus)

(Dual Focus)

57% of 147
elections

71% of 21
elections

56% of 48
elections

Employees eligible to vote
for unionization

8808

1209

3492

New members unionized

6088

957

2633

70% of 27 elections

100% of 6
elections

66% of 9 elections

Employees eligible to vote
for unionization

2839

574

760

New members unionized

2165

574

391

LME firms- 13 wins LME firms -6 wins
CME firms - 6 wins
CME firms- 0
wins
State Labor Force Characteristics

LME firms - 2
wins CME firms 4 wins

Foreign Firms
Win Rate

Market Economy Impact

Size of state labor force*
Union density **

3,042,539

2,119,888

3,018,429

10.8%

3.6%

5.5%

88,300

114,100

123,900

3.90%

7.50%

5.40%

Foreign-owned firm jobs,
2011***
Foreign-owned firm share
of state labor force,
2011***

* Bureau of Labor Statistics. Average of monthly labor force totals for Jan 2005- Dec 2009.
** Macpherson, et. al, www.unionfacts.com. Average of annual union density percentages for 2005-2009.
*** Taken from Organization for International Investment on-line database. This is the best available data. Jobs
numbers are based on the latest publicly available data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Accessed 7.18.2014
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employees working for foreign-owned firms than does Missouri. Thus, the difference in
Missouri’s higher numbers of newly unionized workers does not appear to be related simply to
the size of its labor force. To the extent that unions do organize in South Carolina, foreign-owned
firms have a higher union win rate than American firms do. In fact, all of the FMNC union drives
in South Carolina produced pro-union outcomes, even though there are few of them. In
Tennessee, like the other states, the majority of elections at foreign-owned firms are successful
for unions, although they are few in number.
These descriptive statistics introduce two hypotheses that I will test in the next two
chapters regarding the relationship of firm nationality to unionization outcomes. 1. State
economic development policies have impact on the ability of unions to organize successfully in
both foreign and American firms, with locational strategies having a negative impact, and
entrepreneurial strategies having a positive impact. These descriptive statistics reveal that the
states engaging heavily in locational development may demonstrate less new member growth
and union organizing activity than in states with an entrepreneurial development approach. 2.
Foreign firms, regardless of the state economic development strategy policy used, will have
higher unionization success than domestic and multi-national American firms. This is consistent
with the higher success rates observed in the subset of foreign firm elections in all three states.
I also supplied some descriptive information in the table regarding the impact of market
economy of origin of foreign multi-national firms with union elections. The Varieties of
Capitalism approach suggests that U.S firms, embedded in our Liberal Market Economy, are
likely to display more hostility than firms that originate in other advanced countries (since the
market economy of at least some of these countries is the union-friendly Coordinated Market
Economy). This is supported by the comparison of win rates of US and Foreign firms. However,
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VoC also suggests that the foreign-owned firms that would contribute the most union victories
would be those originating from CMEs. The descriptive profiles here indicate that in two of the
states, LME-originating firms contribute more victories than do CME-originating ones.
Tennessee is an exception with four CME firm wins. Of course, the number of observations
shown is are too small to draw solid conclusions about market economy origination as a
predictor of union election outcome. A more complete multivariate analysis, as conducted in
Chapter 5, will examine market economy impact in greater detail. These numbers do paint a
picture of the U.S. as an exceptional case in terms of unionization. U.S. firms appear to be less
advantageous organizing environments than even those foreign firms headquartered in other
LME countries.

Chapter Summary
Foreign investment and firm nationality are key factors that must be considered in the
examination of the how opportunities to unionize vary between the U.S. states. Since foreign
investment is such a significant part of our domestic economy and our labor market in particular,
it could have a substantial influence on state labor union outcomes. This chapter has reviewed
some of the perspectives commonly-held by scholars on how foreign investment may impact
unionization outcomes in a competitive federalism framework. My findings here indicate that
FDI does not appear to be driving the American states in a common direction of declining
unionization. While most states have lost union density over the past decade, there is not
sufficient evidence to show that inward FDI is the force behind that decline. States continue to
show variation in their labor relations approaches and union density rates, often revealing that
states with the higher levels of FDI are the more unionized ones. This chapter also considered
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how ownership nationality of a firm impacted the relative chances of a union drive resulting in a
win for labor. Early analysis shows that union victories occur more, not less frequently in
foreign-owned subsidiaries than in American-owned firms, both those with multi-national and
wholly domestic operations. Moreover, the variation in labor-management relations that
countries display suggests that foreign firms may operate with less resistance than American
firms due to higher levels of legitimacy and collaboration that unions experience in other market
economies. Though it is still to be analyzed more thoroughly, the data in this chapter illustrates
that American-owned firms offer less opportunity for union victory than do the foreign-owned
firms from fellow Liberal Market Economies.
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Chapter 4: A “Macro” Model of Unionization

Unionization as the factor of interest in this dissertation has multiple dimensions. One
way to think about unionization outcomes is how “widespread” union membership is throughout
the labor force. This is a “macro perspective” that considers the degree to which unions have
been successful in recruiting a substantial share of workers in the economic system overall.
Another way to assess the success of union outcomes is to consider unions’ ability to achieve
official recognition as the agent of employees in the individual workplaces that they attempt to
organize. This perspective understands unionization as an activity that recruits new members
workplace by workplace. In this “micro” approach union outcomes are not evaluated according
to their impact on the mass labor force, but rather their ability to successfully achieve their
intended purpose – new organizing – on a case by case level.
At the outset it should be acknowledged that the factors that influence union outcomes
from a macro-perspective may not necessarily be the same ones that impact union outcomes at a
micro level; or factors that influence the former in one way may conceivably affect the latter
differently. For this reason I offer a coupled approach to examine the impact of economic
development policy and foreign ownership on unionization outcomes. The dual examination will
present a fuller picture of how these critical factors influence state unionization levels.
In this chapter I will empirically test for the macro level impact of economic development
policy and foreign investment on the union density (share of unionized workers) of the state
workforce. A state’s orientation toward economic development policy has ramifications on the
long-term evolution of its economy’s industry composition, which could in turn create more or
less opportunity for unions to grow their labor force share. Additionally, aggregate levels of FDI
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may create more competition in the overall economy between firms which could impact
opportunity for unions to increase the percentage of union workers.
Thus, state union density levels will vary both cross-sectionally (across states), and
annually (for each state), with case-year as the unit of analysis. The set of individual cases for
each year is consistent; that is, each panel is composed of the 50 American states. This
examination of macro union density outcomes requires a methodological approach that is
appropriate for analyzing longitudinal, panel data. It must also control for the impacts of other
critical variables, such as right-to-work status, party in power, and degree of state policy
liberalism, that theoretically affect labor union strength.

Methods
OLS (ordinary least squares) regression is the standard approach for statistically
analyzing data to assess the individual independent impact of multiple independent variables on
an outcome of interest when that outcome is measured with interval-level data. Union density, in
particular the change in union density, generally qualifies as interval level data. The change in
union density, since it is expressed as a percentage point increase or decrease, may vary
continuously from -100 to 100%. Prior examinations of the change in union density as the
dependent variable handle it as an interval-level measure (Kelly and Witko 2012).10
However, the efficacy of standard OLS regression results rests on assumptions about the
underlying data being analyzed, which can be problematic for its application to the analysis of
Some researchers claim that a quasi-MLE Bernoulli model (see Papke and Wooldridge 1996) or a “beta” MLE
model (see Mullahy 1990 in Papke and Wooldridge) is necessary for examining dependent variables that are
fractional or percentage-based, because such variables are only capable of ranging from 0 to 1. However, my
analysis uses the annual change in union density as the dependent variable, which can be positive or negative and
thus is not constrained to the range of 0-1.
10

87

longitudinal panel data. One serious issue in using OLS with times series data is the problem of
‘serial correlation’ – that is, the error of an observation at one point in time is correlated to the
errors of historical observations of that same case in the past. What this means in the context of
yearly state union density percentages is that, for example, the error of an observation for
Tennessee in year 2003 is associated with the errors of observations for Tennessee in the years
prior to 2003. When serial correlation is present and the assumption of independent errors is
violated, use of OLS regression can result in “inefficient” standard errors of the coefficient
estimates, which make significance testing less accurate (Box and Tiao 1975). In particular, use
of OLS on time series data may lead to flawed models that report significant relationships
between variables, when in fact the relationships are NOT significant (Berman 2002). Model
estimations with inefficient standard errors could also result in significance tests that fail, when
in fact a statistical relationship does exist between variables.
There are a number of ways to deal with serial correlation in time series data to make the
application of regression analysis feasible. One approach, regarded as the “old fashioned”
method by some analysts, corrects the regression model of serial correlation by using modified
standard errors, with subsequent testing for the presence of any remaining serial correlation
(Beck 2001, Box and Jenkins 1970). Another approach is to directly capture the actual dynamics
of the change relationship over time, which will be discussed shortly.
An additional concern about the independence of observations assumption in longitudinal
panel data is that correlation is also present due to multiple observations from the same unit. In
the case of my data set, unit effects may be present due to multiple yearly observations from each
of the fifty states. If only one set (year) of cross-sectional data for the states was present the
correlation between cases from the same state would obviously not be a factor, but with time88

series panel data this is a problem. Error correction modeling, which I will use, may include
adjustments in standard error estimates to correct for unit-related correlation. I will utilize panel
corrected standard errors in my models to address the dual problem of serial and panel-related
correlation.
Perhaps the most serious problem that crops up in time series data is the threat of
“spurious regression” results, related to regressing one non-stationary series on another (Granger
and Newbold 1974). Non-stationary time series are those which do not have a tendency to revert
to an equilibrium mean over time. In some cases of non-stationarity, the series’ variance is
variable and dependent on time; while in other cases the variance is constant. The most
pernicious problem involves the former situation. In such a case two unrelated, non-stationary
series analyzed through OLS may generate models which erroneously report a significant causal
relationship, when there is not one in reality. Regression of such unrelated series upon one
another is a flat violation of OLS regression and should be avoided.
However, in the latter case a slightly different problem arises. These series include a
deterministic trend that is constant and independent of time, so there is in fact a tendency for
both series to return to an equilibrium when disturbed. However, the equilibrium for the outcome
variable is a moving target that is dependent on the value of the explanatory variable. In this
situation, where data series are “co-integrated,” models that account for causal effects on an
outcome variable by including lagged values of the explanatory and outcome variables are
inconclusive. In the presence of two or more co-integrated series, standard lagged dependent
variable (LDV) models are likely to find no significant relationship between variables, when in
fact there is one (Engle and Granger 1987, Freeman 1983). Thus, searching for causal
relationships between two non-stationary and also co-integrated series is not a violation of time
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series regression analysis, but the activity requires special modeling strategies beyond standard
LDV inclusion to arrive at accurate results about significance.
In the case of both spurious regression threats and co-integration challenges, tests are
needed to detect variables comprised of non-stationary data. Moreover, upon identification of
non-stationary data, analysis is needed to determine if the data is co-integrated, which requires
adjustments to the method of analysis, or non-related, which makes it inappropriate for analysis
in the same model.
I use an error correction model (ECM) strategy to address the problems of serial
correlation, unit effects, and non-stationarity. Such models are based on a theoretical
interpretation that an observation at a given moment is actually a dynamic function of
observations at previous moments (Keele and Kelly 2006, Beck 1985). ECMs are widely
regarded as an appropriate model for fitting data with co-integrated series (Ostrom and Smith
1992, De Boef and Keele 2008). Error correction is a necessary condition of co-integrated data
since both the outcome and explanatory variable do tend to revert back to an equilibrium when
disturbed, in contrast to non-stationary random series which do not exhibit an error correction
process. Moreover, the estimation of an ECM reveals whether or not an error correction process
is significant, which helps to distinguish non-stationary co-integrated series from non-stationary
random series. One additional benefit of ECMs is their flexibility. Although they are capable of
modeling co-integrated data accurately, their use is also appropriate with stationary data that has
no co-integration (DeBoef and Keele 2008). Since they assist in the detection of “prohibited”
non-stationary series and can adequately accommodate co-integrated or stationary series, they
are a good fit for almost all time series data analyses.
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The ECM equation estimates the change in the dependent variable (∆Y) caused by a
change in X, rather than the actual value of Y given a value of X. Thus, my model’s dependent
variable is the annual change in state private union density. ECMs estimate two coefficients for
each independent variable – a differenced value and a lagged value. The coefficient on the
differenced value of X (the annual change in the X variable), applies to the initial impact of the
change in X to the change in Y, which occurs entirely at one point in time (Kelly and Witko
2012). But as pointed out earlier, this approach also models the dynamic nature of the change
relationship, accounting for how it endures and eventually decays over time (Keele and Kelly
2006). The coefficient on the lagged value of X applies to the impact of X on the change in Y
that is felt over this longer time span. In my model if the value of a differenced or lagged
independent variable coefficient estimate is negative, the variable has an independent effect of
decreasing the annual state private union density. If the value of an independent variable
coefficient estimate is positive, the variable has an independent effect of increasing the annual
state private union density.
Finally, the ECM model also includes a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory
variable (that is, on the right side of the equation). Its coefficient gives the “error correction
rate”, which quantifies how the change in X impact on Y decays over its duration. A failure to
obtain significance on the lagged dependent variable suggests that an error correction process is
not occurring, which is a clue that data is non-stationary and not co-integrated. The ratio of the
coefficient of the lagged independent variable to the error correction rate provides the long run
multiplier (LRM), which is the total long-term impact that a change in X has on Y. Thus an
examination of the coefficients on both the lagged dependent and lagged independent variables
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sheds light on the dynamics of the change relationship. Error correction modeling reveals that
change is a process that unfolds over time, as well as a discrete event.

Data and Measures
The data set for my macro-level analysis is derived from Nathan Kelly and Christopher
Witko’s time series regression of state income inequality (2012). Kelly and Witko used total
state union density as an independent variable in this study, with additional “power resource”
indicators such as state policy liberalism, partisan composition of Congress, and President’s
party also tapped. In my examination, I use Kelly and Witko’s governmental power resource
independent variables, as well as several control variables used in their dataset. However, I add a
number of independent variables which are central to my study that were not included in their
analysis; namely, economic development policy activism and foreign direct investment jobs. For
my dependent variable, I use state union density in the private sector, rather than total union
density. 11
The source of the state private sector union density data is from Hirsch, Macpherson, and
Vroman 2001 (and updates). The researchers derive their union density percentages from Current
Population Survey and Bureau of Labor Statistics data tracked since 1964. The Hirsch et al data
sets include percentages for national-level union density, as well as disaggregated figures for
each of the fifty states, in addition to industry and occupational grouping. Moreover, they also
develop separate state level measures of both private and public sector unionization. The Hirsh et
al data program is one of the most comprehensive sources of longitudinal union density data

11

Thank you greatly to both Nathan Kelly and Christopher Witko for use of their data set.
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available for social science researchers and has been made accessible for a wide audience on the
website unionstats.com.
The years of study for my analysis are 1983 to 2004. I use these years because they
correspond to the same range of years in which my dependent variable and key independent
variables, entrepreneurial policy activism and locational policy activism, are available. The intervallevel measures of economic development policy come from the two separate indices for
locational and entrepreneurial policy developed by Martin Saiz, discussed at length in chapter 2.
Saiz’s coding was based off the attributes of economic development incentive programs as
cataloged in the NASDA State Incentives Guide, a comprehensive list of incentive programs
published periodically in years 1983, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 to 2006. Since the catalog
was not published every year, Saiz’s indices are only available periodically, in the years the
NASDA guide was also available. Clearly, this creates a problem of missing data for all years in
between. I do not wish to lose data for those years, since the state union density figures and other
key independent variable measures are readily available. Thus, I use interpolated data for the
missing years on both indices. The interpolations are based on a linear estimation approach.12

12

The Saiz indices are well-respected in social science and economic development literatures as measures for
tracking temporal change in development policy, despite their intermittent availability (Hanley and Douglass 2014,
Gray and Hanson 2012, Saiz 2001a, 2001b, Hart 2008). A recent examination called the Saiz measures “a
particularly rigorous” typology (Hanley and Douglass 2014), while also acknowledging some drawbacks. However,
previous use of these measures have been mostly for descriptive purposes. Saiz does use them in regression
analyses, as measures of both independent (2001a) and dependent (2001b) variables. While Saiz refers to these
analyses as “pooled time-series models”, he does not include corrections for serial correlation and does not model
the dynamics of the causal relationship. Instead he simply controls for “unit effects” by including dummy variables
for each year of observations. My project attempts to offer an examination of the dynamic change relationship
between development policy and union density. While I do use interpolated values for some years due to the lack of
available annual values, my use of error correction modelling offers a more complete time-series analysis than is
possible without the inclusion of annual interpolations.
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My other critical independent variable is inward foreign direct investment for each state.
As discussed in Chapter 3, FDI is measured in various ways. The U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis tracks the number of jobs in the U.S. economy offered by foreign-owned affiliates, as
well as the amount of assets (including inventory, facilities, machinery, and revenues on hand)
owned by foreign-owned affiliates. I use the jobs figure because it complements the key
dependent variable of private sector union density, which is derived from the number of jobs that
are unionized. Of course, the size of the state labor force is going to impact the number of FDI
jobs possible in a workforce. (In other words, low-population states will necessarily have low
numbers of FDI jobs.) To correct for this, I use the percentage of state labor force jobs
attributable to foreign-owned subsidiaries, as calculated by Brady and Wallace 2000 and updated
for recent years. Like the union density measure, this percentage-based indicator accounts for the
share of the workforce associated with the factor of interest, as opposed to a flat count of
workforce jobs.
An important control variable to test for the impact of left governments as a power
resource to increase unionization is state government liberalism. This was the key explanatory
variable in Kelly, Witko, and Young’s analysis of variations in state union density (2013). The
liberalism variable measures left power in state governments by accounting for ideology and
policy liberalism of the state’s national level legislators, weighted by partisan control of the state
legislature (Berry el al 1998 with updates). Researchers recognize that using Democrat party
control of state legislatures alone is a poor proxy for the collective ideological orientation of the
state legislature, since many Democrat leaders, especially in the South, have historically been
rather conservative and not necessarily pro-labor (Kelly, Witko, and Young 2013). Higher levels
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of state government liberalism are predicted to be positively associated with the annual change in
union density.
I do include partisan variables for national government to control for Democratic
President and percent Democrats in Congress, to account for the historical shifts in nationallevel party in power over time. Given the federalist structure of the United States political
system, both national-level governments and state level governments impact the conditions that
unions must organize within. Unlike legislatures at the state level, partisanship of Congress at the
national level is a fair indication of ideological orientation; national-level party platforms do
support the identification of Republicans as a center-right, pro-business party and Democrats as a
center-left pro-labor party (Kelly and Witko 2012). Higher values of both of these variables are
associated with greater Democratic control and are predicted to be positively related to
unionization.
Indicators to account for general economic conditions that could impact unionization
levels are included. State unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics) is anticipated to be
negatively related to the change in union density, as labor surplus is sometimes a confounding
factor in organizing unions. The alternate view is that increased concerns among workers about
job certainty could actually motivate more interest among them to join unions. Still, in times of
high unemployment unions could lose existing members or face decreases in the number of
potential new members, so I predict that unemployment will have a negative impact on
unionization. High levels of the state economic growth rate (Bureau of Economic Analysis) is
expected to increase unionization, because a growing economy likely creates new jobs, which
could grow the ranks of labor.
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I include a variable to account for the size of the state manufacturing sector (Bureau of
Economic Analysis 2014), expecting to find that positive changes in the manufacturing share of
the state economy will result in higher union growth rates, as union recruitment and wage
bargaining efforts historically have been most successful in the manufacturing sector. This
variable also controls for union loss as a result of de-industrialization in states that originally had
high levels of manufacturing. These states potentially have more union jobs to lose, given the
legacy effect of heightened union recruitment in the manufacturing sector during the more
successful years of the labor movement. Related to this, I also included a variable for the original
private sector union density of the state in 1983, the lag of the first case-year of my study. High
unionization in the past may entail a positive legacy effect on current levels of unionization, and
if so, this variable will control for it.
I include two variables related to demographic characteristics of the state population as
controls. The variable for the proportion of non-whites in the state population (US Census) is
provided to account for the past finding that people of color, particularly blacks, are more likely
to be union members, than are whites. I also add a logged variable for the total state population.
Since we know from research that unions have struggled to obtain membership gains overall (see
Chapter 2), we would expect that the higher the growth rate of the state population, the lower the
total share of unionization in the labor force. While population increases may actually have the
effect of increasing the number of union members, unions are less likely to maintain their
percentage share of total workers in states which are growing population-wise.
Finally, I include a dummy variable indicating the presence (coded 1) of a right-to-work
law to control for the impact of state labor relations policies on union membership levels
(Department of Labor. Also see National Right to Work Committee, www.nrtwc.org.) If the
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typical argument is correct, the presence of such a law will be significantly related to losses in
union members. In the case of the time-series error correction model being estimated, the
independent variables are expressed as the impact of the change of the independent variable (the
differenced form of the predictor variable) on the impact of the change of the dependent variable
(the differenced form of the dependent variable). Thus a positive change in “right-to-work”
status means a change from having no such law to adopting one. The adoption of a RTW statute
is expected to result in a negative change in union density.
Table 12 on the following page is provided for reference, listing the basic form of the
variables used to estimate the model, along with the measure specification and the data sources
for each. Again note, ECMs estimate coefficients for both the differenced and a lagged version
of each variable. Differenced versions of the variables will represent the annual change in the
variable from the previous year. Lagged versions of the variables will use the value of the
variable in the previous year.

Analysis and Results
Since this analysis is conducted on time series data, it can be assumed that
autocorrelation is an issue. Still, I conducted tests for detecting autocorrelation in panel data to
confirm. Wooldridge tests for autocorrelation on the key variables in the model – Private union
density, the two economic development policy variables, and Inward FDI - each indicated the
presence of autocorrelation. Clearly, a modeling strategy that accounts for serial correlation is in
order. Due to concerns over co-integrated data I conducted Levin-Lin-Chu tests on the key
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Table 12. Basic Form of the Differenced and Lagged Independent Variables Used in the Macro Model
Variable

Measure Specification

Data Source

Workers who are members of unions
as a percentage of the state private
sector workforce.

Method of calculation and
estimation is presented in Hirsch et
al 2001. Years 1983-2004.
Downloaded from
www.unionstats.com.

Interval level index based on coding
of state economic development
program attributes ranging from
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent
years.
Missing years interpolated.

Methodology for constructing the
index is presented in Saiz 2001.

Interval level index based on coding
of state economic development
program attributes ranging from
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent
years.

Methodology for constructing the
index is presented in Saiz 2001.

Dependent Variable
State Private Sector Union Density

Key Independent Variables
Entrepreneurial Policy Intensity

Locational Policy Intensity

Missing years interpolated.

Inward Foreign Direct Investment

Private sector jobs in foreign-owned
affiliates as a percentage of the state
private sector workforce. Varies
from 1-100.
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Attributes coding based on data
gathered by the National Association
of State Development Agencies in
1983, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
and Miles Friedman and Partners
LLC in 2006.

Attributes coding based on data
gathered by the National Association
of State Development Agencies in
1983, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
and Miles Friedman and Partners
LLC in 2006.
Calculations provided courtesy of
Brady and Wallace 2000 and
updates.
Based on data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Years 19832004.

Table 12 Continued
Variable

Measure Specification

Data Source

State that prohibits union shops
either by state constitutional
amendment or “right-to-work”
statute. “Right to work”= 1. No
prohibition of union shops = 0.

Department of Labor, National Right
to Work Committee. Years 19832004.

Interval measure based on
ideological scores of state’s
Congressional representatives,
weighted by partisan control of the
state legislature. High levels of this
measure indicate “Left” state
governments.
Partisanship of President during the
case-year. 1= Democrat. 0=
Republican.
Percentage of Democrats in both
houses of Congress during the caseyear.
Annual average state unemployment
rate, as a share of the workforce.
Ranges 0-1.
Annual percentage growth rate in
gross state product.
Manufacturing sector share of gross
state product. Ranges 0-1.
Share of non-whites in state
population. Ranges 0-1.

Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years
1983-2004.

Control Variables
“Right-to-Work” State

State Government Liberalism

Democrat President

Democrats in Congress

State Unemployment Rate

State Economic Growth Rate
Manufacturing Sector
Non-white Population

State Population

Log of the total state population.

Original Private Sector Union
Density

Workers who are members of unions
as a percentage of the state private
sector workforce for year 1983 (first
year of study).

*Note: this variable had variation in
only three years for three states.

Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004.
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Years
1983-2004.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Years
1983-2004.
Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004
Based on U.S. Census data.
Provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004.
Based on U.S. Census data.
Provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004.
Method of calculation and
estimation is presented in Hirsch et
al 2001. Year 1983 only.
Downloaded from
www.unionstats.com.
*This variable was not differenced
or lagged in the models due to lack
of variation.
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variables as well as the critical control variable “Right to work.” The LLC test looks for the
presence of a unit root in a variable’s data across all panels. A rejection of the LLC null
hypothesis means that some or all of the panels have stationary data. Each variable tested
rejected the null, except the “Right-to-work” variable. Therefore, at least some of the panel data
for the dependent and key independent variables are stationary. A subsequent Hadri test for each
variable, with a null hypothesis that all panel series are stationary, was also rejected. This
suggests that co-integration of data for the major variables may be present for some, but not all
panels. In any case, the error correction model strategy is appropriate for analyzing both cointegrated and stationary panel data. This feature of flexibility supports the ECM use with the
given data.
The results of the ECM regression analysis appear in Table 13. The negative lagged
dependent variable with p<.001 indicates that the error correction process is significant,
suggesting that autocorrelation has been properly mitigated by the LDV inclusion. The LDV
coefficient estimate suggests that the remaining deviation from equilibrium in the time lags that
follow the immediate shock to the variables will correct at a rate of about 16% in each lag (Best
2008). I also predicted residuals from the ECM and tested them for presence of a unit root. A
Levin-Lin-Chu test rejected the null that all panels have unit roots. This provides indication that
the residuals are in fact stationary. Residuals with a unit root are an indication of the spurious
regression problem, while stationary residuals from a model indicate either stationary or cointegrated data. While I did not run a diagnostic fixed effects model, the use of the LDV and
panel corrected standard errors is regarded an acceptable fix for the “unit effects” problem
(Keele and Kelly 2006). Therefore, I conclude that utilizing the ECM has addressed most of the
major problems associated with using time series data in regression models.
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Table 13. ECM Results for Annual Change in State Union Density (1984-2004)
Variables

Coefficient Estimates

Lag Private Density

-0.158***
(0.0250)
-0.334
(0.397)
-0.202
(0.139)
0.0463
(0.303)
-0.184**
(0.0901)
0.124
(0.198)
0.145
(0.119)
-0.122
(0.0886)
0.106
(0.0716)
0.0296***
(0.00933)
0.0278***
(0.00784)
1.740
(4.123)
0.386
(2.593)
1.194*
(0.665)
1.707*
(0.946)
0.225***
(0.0684)
0.00928
(0.0206)
-2.840
(13.11)
0.453
(0.332)
1.690
(2.105)
0.0878
(0.428)
-2.761
(3.292)
-0.0774**
(0.0373)
1.464***
(0.457)
-0.0638
(0.0639)
0.0979***
(0.0196)
-0.292
(0.726)
1,050
0.155

D. Locational Policy Activism
Lag Locational Policy Activism
D. Entrepreneurial Policy Activism
Lag Entrepreneurial Policy Activism
D. State Policy Liberalism
Lag State Policy Liberalism
D. Democratic President
Lag Democratic President
D. Percent Democrats in Congress
Lag Percent Democrats in Congress
D. State Unemployment Rate
Lag State Unemployment Rate
D. Gross State Product Growth
Lag Gross State Product Growth
D. Inward FDI
Lag Inward FDI
D. Nonwhite Population
Lag Nonwhite Population
D. Manufacturing Share of GSP
Lag Manufacturing Share of GSP
D. State Population (log)
Lag State Population (log)
D. “Right-to-Work” State
Lag “Right-to-Work” State
Initial Private Union Density (1983)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parenthesis. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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As for hypothesis testing, the model reveals some interesting findings about economic
development and its impact on unionization. I hypothesized that locational development
strategies would most likely have a negative impact on union density. However, the model
provides little indication that locational policy activism has either a short term or long term
impact, either positive or negative, on the annual change in state union density. As for
entrepreneurial policy activism, I tentatively hypothesized that it would have a positive impact
on union density due to its “quality jobs” focus. However, this hypothesis came with some
reservations due to the existence of competing theories.
The model results indicate that higher levels of entrepreneurial policy actually have a
negative long-term impact on union density - that is, it causes union density to fall, given the
negative coefficient and p< .05 on the lagged independent variable. Yet entrepreneurial policy
appears to have no short-term impact on union density due to the finding of no significance on
the differenced form of the entrepreneurial policy variable. This lack of impact in the short-term
is not an unreasonable finding, as economic development policy tends to address economic
processes as a long-term strategy. Nonetheless, the negative sign on the lag suggests that
entrepreneurial strategies to build “quality” jobs may in fact fail to produce union jobs. The
innovation economy promoted by entrepreneurial development appears to either 1. lower overall
demand for unionization due to better pay and working conditions, or 2. produce workers who
are less inclined to join unions as a matter of individual preference.
Moving to Inward FDI, I find support for Susan Hansen’s argument that international
capital mobility does not necessarily impede worker standards. At a short term basis, FDIcreated jobs appear to have a positive impact on union growth, given the significance level of the
differenced coefficient. It is important to remember that this variable was measured as the share
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of FDI employment in the total workforce, not the flat amount of FDI jobs. Given this
specification, the results suggest that foreign ownership itself, not simply the creation of
additional jobs by foreign companies, initially creates opportunities for union growth, at least in
the short term. I will explore this possibility at greater length in the next chapter. At the very
least, I find little support that inward FDI is the main culprit for the longer-term erosion of
unions, which has been argued by proponents of the neo-liberal convergence perspective.
Interestingly, “right-to-work” is found to be unrelated to long-term unionization levels,
given the lack of significance on the lagged value. However, the differenced term yields a
somewhat puzzling positive and significant finding. Again, the differenced value captures a
change in the RTW status of a state. As addressed in the first chapter, there are only three states
in my data set that adopted a RTW law during the period under analysis, and there were no states
with a RTW law that moved to abolish it. Upon examination of each of these three cases, in the
year the state adopted RTW, union density did in fact increase. However, in two of these cases –
Texas and Oklahoma - union density fell in the following year. In Idaho, union density continued
to grow in the year following the RTW law adoption.
These few cases appear to be idiosyncratic. It is difficult to theorize a general argument
for how adoption of a RTW law would produce a short-term positive effect on private sector
union density. However, it may be that in these particular cases adoption of RTW initially
provoked greater worker demand for unions and subsequent labor mobilization to confront the
heightened management and government attacks on employment protections and labor rights. In
any case, given the results on the lagged RTW variable, in the long-term the independent
statistical impact of RTW adoption appears to be insignificant, concurring with findings of at
least one previous study (Moore 1998). My results here suggest that other economic and
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employment-related policies, such as development strategies, have been more important
indicators of long-run union growth potential during the late 20th century than have been “rightto-work” statutes.
As for the governmental partisanship and ideology variables, there are a few conclusive
findings. Percent of Democrats in Congress, a national-level variable, does reveal the expected
positive relationship to unionization, both in the short and long-term; while Democrat President
appears to have no impact. Higher levels of state government liberalism do not appear to have a
statistically significant influence on unionization. My findings come from a dataset including
years that both pre-date and post-date significant policy devolution to the states in 1994 (See
Kelly and Witko 2012 for more on this). My inclusion of “pre-discretion” years may explain why
the general policy liberalism of state legislatures is not significant in my model. In those years
where the national government retained control over more aspects of economic policy, which is
about half of the years included in my dataset, the policy-ideology of state legislators appears to
have exerted limited influence on economic outcomes.
Looking at the economic and demographic controls, only growth in state gross product
and state population yield significant findings. Growth of the state economy (GSP) is positively
related to union growth in both the long and short-term as expected, but it is only statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level. Unemployment appears to have no significant impact,
nor does manufacturing percentage of GSP. This is somewhat surprising, since the
manufacturing sector has been a primary arena of unionization in the past. However, the variable
is expressed as manufacturing’s share of the entire GSP, rather than the rate of growth or decline
of the GSP for the sector- which may be more meaningful to union success. The size of the state
population is related to negative union density growth in the long term, as expected. Non-white
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proportion of the workforce was not found to be significant. Finally, the original value of union
density in the first year under examination was associated with union density growth, indicating
that net of other factors, union density levels in the past are associated with ability of unions to
successfully organize workers in future years.
As mentioned earlier, in an error correction model the overall long term impact on the
dependent variable (the enduring causal relationship that lasts over more than one time period) is
actually a function of both the coefficient of the lagged independent variable and the error
correction rate, which is given by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The ratio of
these two coefficients is the long run multiplier (LRM)- which is the total impact the
independent variable has on the dependent variable over all time periods in which it endures. If
both the lagged independent variable and the lagged dependent variable are highly significant,
generally the LRM is as well. Table 14 provides the LRMs of lagged independent variables
with p<.05 in the model, as well as the coefficients of significant differenced variables. Since this
is not a standard OLS linear regression model, the lagged dependent variable coefficients can not
be interpreted as producing a simple unit-for-unit linear change effect, but the total long-term
impact can be evaluated by calculation of the LRM. In the table I report the substantive impact of
a one unit increase of X on Y. If the variable has a significant lagged dependent variable the long
run multiplier effect on Y is given. If only the differenced independent variable is significant
only the immediate impact of a change in X on Y is listed. Note that the coefficient on the
differenced independent variable does have a unit-for-unit impact. A change in X of 1 unit
produces an initial shock to Y equal to the coefficient of the differenced variable.
The long-term impact of entrepreneurial policy is perhaps modest, but still statistically
significant. A one unit annual increase in the entrepreneurial activism index would result in a
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Table 14. Effect of Significant Independent Variables in the ECM (p<0.5)
Variable

Short Term Impact of One Unit
Change in X on Y

Long Range Multiplier
Impact on Y

Entrepreneurial Policy Activism

Not sig

-1.164

Percent Democrats in Congress

.0296

.1759

Inward FDI

0.225

Not sig

Log State Population

Not sig

-.4899

Right-to-Work

1.464

Not sig

long-term multiplier effect of a little over a percentage point decline in union density, occurring
in portions over multiple time periods. Saiz’s index ranges from 0-3. A change of one unit on
Saiz’s entrepreneurial index would be analogous to a state moving from the lowest level of
entrepreneurial policy use to a slightly-below-average level of use relative to the other states.

Discussion
The finding that entrepreneurial policy has a significant negative long-term impact on
state private sector unionization suggests that strategies which promote job growth in higherskilled and innovation sectors do not necessarily complement labor union mobilization. A simple
explanation for this is that labor mobilization is best characterized as a mostly reactive process
that occurs when workers demand higher wages and working conditions because management
refuses to grant them. However, when companies voluntarily supply higher wages to attract
scarce workers – those with special skills and higher productivity potential - the need for union
representation is reduced. Collective action generally occurs only when the benefits of solidarity
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outweigh the costs of solidarity (Olson 1965). Highly-skilled workers, as suggested by the
“skills-biased technical change” argument, may see no need for collective action to enhance their
own wage potential because they exert sufficient leverage in wage bargaining individually.
Companies need them, see them as assets, and are happy to accommodate their wage demands. If
this is the perspective of companies promoted through entrepreneurial development strategies,
unionization may simply be unnecessary to satiate higher-skilled workers in entrepreneurialactive states.
Furthermore the fact that unions could actually compress the wage spectrum between the
highest and lowest paid workers may lead some higher-skilled workers to believe their wage
potential actually drops if unions have power (Pontusson et al 2000, Hornstein et al 2005). They
may find “working union” to be of little utility, since their work is widely regarded as valuable in
today’s knowledge economy. My results suggest that the “quality jobs” that entrepreneurial
policy attempts to produce are not analogous to the solid blue-collar manufacturing jobs of
yesteryear. Today’s “quality jobs” may better be described as elite jobs that cultivate a particular
way of thinking in the employees that work them. Entrepreneurial employees are likely to be
more comfortable operating individually, rather than in unity with other workers to advance their
interests. In addition to lowering the perceived need for unions, entrepreneurial policy may
actually produce a different breed of workers whose individual value systems are incompatible
with principles such as solidarity-building and collective mobilization, which are necessary for
union growth.
On the other hand, locational policy adoption, independently, does not appear to lead to a
“race to the bottom” in terms of union power. This may be because in states that pursue the
lower-wage strategies characteristic of locational incentive programs, private sector unionization
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was already “at the bottom” by 1984, so there was little additional loss to be experienced. The
economics-based argument that increased competition from newly relocated businesses could
tighten profit margins and decrease opportunity for union rent-seeking was not confirmed by the
findings. Nor was there evidence to suggest that locational policies increase demand from
workers for unionization due to cuts in wage and working conditions. Though there is
convincing evidence that locational approaches do lower wages and erode public revenues (see
Chapter 2), apparently, union growth and decline rates are affected more significantly by other
factors.
FDI was shown to have no impact on long-term union decline, confirming the findings of
the preliminary bivariate analysis I conducted in Chapter 3. Susan Hansen (2006) has argued that
international openness is not necessarily a threat to wages and working conditions, as is often
suspected. State policy choices, she contends, are what really matters. My results here
complement her findings, at least in part. Granted, my measure of international economic
openness is specific to inward investment, and it does not address the competitive pressures from
foreign trade or outward FDI. Moreover, my dependent variable is unionization, whereas Hansen
was largely concerned with globalization’s potential impact on wage rates. Still, my findings
here do indicate that state choices about economic development strategy have more impact on
union decline than does increased competition due to heightened levels of foreign investment.
Moreover, the significant positive short-term shock that increased shares of FDIgenerated employment has on unionization casts additional doubt on the economics-based
argument that increased competition limits union rent-seeking potential. Apparently, increases in
employment share by foreign-owned subsidiaries exert some positive effects on union
membership. This may be related to the fact that in many cases FDI shares increase due to
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foreign acquisition of existing businesses. Some labor relations research suggests that a union’s
likelihood to successfully organize a facility increases when there is a change in operations or
ownership (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004).
The positive short-term impact of FDI to unionization may also occur because foreignowned companies are in fact more amenable to unionization than are U.S. companies.
Volkswagen once again provides an interesting example. When VW moved to Chattanooga in
2008, it immediately began plans to form a “work council” structure, similar to the one operating
in its home-country facilities. This cooperative management-labor approach was regarded by the
company as a successful and proven business strategy. Prominent Tennessee politicians, many of
them noted business leaders, were less enthusiastic about VW’s tolerant union position. As noted
in Chapter 2, the union election in Chattanooga was lost, despite VW and union efforts, but a
subsequent “card check” agreement has cleared the way to union representation, in any case (See
Chapter 2 for reference).
This however is just a single example of how foreign nationality of firms may provide
opportunity for unions to grow. Moreover, it is an exceptionally nuanced case, with idiosyncratic
features that may not be generalizable over the entire population of attempted union campaigns.
In the following chapter I will present a “micro-level” multivariate statistical analysis of
individual union election contests for recent years in order to better examine the causal
relationship that foreign ownership has on the ability of unions to organize worksites.
I will also analyze the impact that economic development strategy has at the micro level. The
findings in this chapter suggest that only entrepreneurial policy significantly relates to union
decline at the macro-level. Does this negative effect also hold when looking specifically at newly

109

attempted union organizing drives? The following chapter will address union outcomes from this
perspective.
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Chapter 5: A “Micro” Model of Unionization
In the previous chapters I analyzed the impact that economic development policy and
foreign direct investment has on state level unionization outcomes from a “bigger picture”
macro-economic perspective. This approach emphasized over-time change occurring in the share
of unionized workers in the private sector workforce of each state. Overall, I found that while all
states lost private sector union density in the long-term, cross-sectional variation existed when
examining annual change in union density and basic level of union density. I found, somewhat
surprisingly, that increases in entrepreneurial development policy played a role in the long term
decline of unions. I also found that “right-to-work” status had no significant long term impact on
unionization during the years of study. Moreover, growth in foreign direct investment had a
positive impact on the annual change in macro-unionization.
Clearly much of the macro-story emphasizes the longer-term erosion of unionization that
occurred from previous decades, while the marginal annual growth in unionization that occurred
in some states is secondary. Yet it is critical to point out that despite the decline in unionization
from a macro-perspective, attempts to organize unions in individual workplaces continue to
occur even in a day and age unfavorable to labor activism. Thousands of union elections are
conducted each year in the private sector labor force, with many others occurring in public sector
worksites. In fiscal year 2009, 1,339 union elections occurred in private sector worksites
throughout the country, and 915 of these were union victories. This added about 36,000 new
union workers nationally after accounting for member losses due to union decertifications
(NLRB 2009a). Clearly, when digging into the more granular-level data unionization is not just
“yesterday’s” story.
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Despite the gains that union organizing makes each year, union member loss from plant
closures and downsizing of existing unionized facilities also occurs, meaning that nationally,
union membership hardly ever experiences net annual growth (Farber and Western 2001)13. Thus
Labor is commonly depicted as a dysfunctional, aging dinosaur when viewed from the “big
picture” perspective. Nevertheless, when unionization is conceptualized as an ongoing activity
(that is, labor organizing), rather than a status (membership shares secured in the labor force), it
is harder to discount the relevance of unions. Labor organizing continues to be a frequent,
important social and political activity.
To put this in perspective: the number of worksites with successful union elections in
2009 was approximately equivalent to the average number of new churches organized yearly in
the last decade of the 20th century (915 for unions versus about 1,000 for churches) (U.S Census
referenced by Francis Schaeffer Institute 201514). Prominent scholars have shown that church
participation is not as widespread as it was in the early 20th century (Putnam 2000), but
nonetheless, social scientists do not deny the important role that church-going continues to have
in shaping American political outcomes from the micro-level. State leaders evaluate the efficacy
of economic development activities similarly - from an individual-level perspective. Most
political assessment of the benefits of economic development occurs at a case-by-case level.
Elected leaders frequently laud one more new factory recruited in-state or one more new
innovation business launched. As discussed in Chapter 2, state leaders are hard-pressed to

13

Year 1999 was an exception. It actually experienced a net growth of 265,000 union members nationally
(Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2005). However, even with the growth in the number of members, union density –
members as a percentage of the workforce still slipped (Hirsch and MacPherson 2001).
14

I used 1990-2000 numbers for church membership due to availability of data.
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quantify the macro-economic benefits of economic development activities over the long-term,
but they continue to engage in them anyway. Because of this continued engagement both
politicians and political scientists alike consider economic development policy an important
political factor to study.
The same is true when evaluating union outcomes. Micro-analysis is important to this
study because despite union density declines in recent decades, I must account for the fact that
unions continue to attempt to organize workers, and workers continue to both embrace and reject
their attempts. Proper analysis of unionization outcomes requires an investigation of the
dynamics of labor mobilization at the “ground-level.” What factors impact whether or not an
individual unionization attempt will be successful, especially in a day and age in when broader
union density growth is so difficult?
In this chapter, I focus primarily on firm nationality as a factor impacting unionization
success. This is an individual-level variable, unique to each worksite. In Chapter 3 I offered
some preliminary analysis suggesting that foreign ownership of firms, in addition to macro-level
state FDI, presented favorable conditions for union organizing. I also discussed how the market
economy type of the country from which a firm originates may theoretically impact its
propensity to tolerate union organizing in its facilities abroad. In this chapter, I will conduct a
full regression analysis to address these research questions.
The before mentioned research questions are largely economic in nature. I also want to
account for macro-level factors in the state political system that impact unionization success at
the micro level. I will control for the influence of state development policy on likelihood of a
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union to successfully organize a worksite, along with state citizen and government political
ideology. “Right-to-work” status will also be included as a policy-related control variable.

Data and Methods
This chapter examines the results of individual union certification elections conducted by
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to recognize a union as the official representative of
employees. The union elections are drawn from three years - 2005, 2007, and 2009. These years
were tapped because first of all, at the time I began this study 2009 was the most current year
available. I added other years to increase N. Each additional case added to the set involved
considerable research in coding on some variables. After coding observations for these three
years the dataset included over a thousand cases, which provided sufficient N for accurate
statistical testing. These years of coding (2005, 2007, 2009) offer some variation in Presidential
administration (Bush versus Obama), as well as state of the national economy (years of growth
and recession).
The unit of analysis for my examination is union contest. (An election is conducted by
the NLRB allowing eligible employees to vote either for or against the union – hence, my use of
the term “contest”). There is no time series component to this examination. I pooled observations
from three years to increase the number of observations, not to evaluate the factor of interest
over repeated points in time. In fact, the observations only exist at one point in time- the year
when the worksite experienced the certification election. Under current U.S. law, labor unions do
not have to re-certify in an election once officially recognized unless there is a specific decertification election requested by covered workers, which does not often occur. As a result, the
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observations from each year in my data set involve an entirely different set of cases. This is not
longitudinal panel data.
I made several types of exclusions to the total list of NLRB elections. First of all, I
excluded the non-profit sector, because my key factor of interest is nationality of corporate
ownership, which is irrelevant to non-profit organizations. Many hospitals, charity agencies, and
educational/arts facilities are excluded. If I found evidence that a hospital or other association
was run for profit, the case was included. I also excluded any election contest which covered less
than 50 workers. This was a large number of elections- in fact the majority, because most
elections take place in very small bargaining units, though these elections do not necessarily
cover the largest share of workers. This is common practice from prior union election research.
The well-respected Bronfenbrenner study from 1999-2000, referenced in Chapter 3, utilized this
approach to make the project more feasible; thus I also adopted this exception for efficiency. I
also excluded multi-union elections, when several different unions were vying for representation
simultaneously, and union decertification elections. Such cases are only a small number of
elections, and they originate from qualitatively different circumstances than the majority of
elections, such as particular episodes of worker dissatisfaction or claims of fraudulent union
operations by management15. In this study, I wanted to capture the dynamics related specifically
to new organizing, so these idiosyncratic cases are not included. It is also critical to point out that
my dataset of election contests does not include public sector worksites. Government employees
are covered by entirely separate labor laws than are private sector employees. State and local
government employees are subject to individual state level labor relations laws which vary

15

See Dwarkin and Fain 1989 and Sandver and Ready 1998 for a discussion of multi-union election outcomes.

115

considerably (Sanes and Schmitt 2014, Valetta and Freeman 1988) rather than the NLRB
certification process, which is consistent across all states. Moreover, the data on state public
sector union elections is not as available as is the data from the NLRB, and my focus in this
dissertation is on private sector union organizing in any case.
OLS regression is not appropriate for this analysis, because the dependent variable, union
contest result, is a dichotomous nominal-level variable, expressed as either a union win or union
loss. All observations for y will be either 1 or 0, meaning that y does not vary continuously (no
values can be < 0 or >1 or even between 0 and 1). If one attempted to use OLS with this
dependent variable, errors would not be normally distributed and would be heteroskedastic,
which would render significance testing inaccurate. Moreover, OLS assumes that y is a linear
function of x, meaning that the regression coefficients generated are interpreted as producing a
linear unit-for-unit change. But OLS coefficient estimates that are interpreted linearly with a
dichotomous dependent variable can yield y values (the predicted probability of y=1) outside the
range of 0 to 1, which is in reality impossible (Williams 2015, based on Aldrich and Nelson).
Thus, OLS should not be used with a binary dependent variable.
My data requires a strategy that can produce coefficient estimates that express the
predicted probability of y=1 (that is, a union win) as a non-linear function of x, limited to a range
of 0 to 1 (0 to 100% probability). Bivariate logistic regression is a method that accomplishes this,
modeling the impact of x on the probability that y=1 as an S-shaped curve. Differences in the x
variables in the middle of the range of observations have more of an impact on the predicted
probability of a union win than do differences at either the higher or lower end of the range
(Williams 2015). This ensures that coefficient estimates will be less biased. It also shores up the
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efficiency of the standard error estimates to increase the validity of significance testing. I should
point out that my particular dataset requires additional fixes to ensure more accurate standard
error estimates beyond the use of standard logistic regression. This will be discussed shortly. For
now, I will move forward to describe the individual variables and measures used in the logistic
regression model.

Measures
As already noted the dependent variable is Union Win. The NLRB election report lists all
contests as a “Win” or “Loss” for the union. A win is defined as 50% plus 1 of eligible
employees casting a “For” vote for the union. Union Win is coded 1=Win and 0=Loss. Basic
descriptive statistics for this variable were provided in Chapter 3, Table 10, indicating that the
dependent variable demonstrates variation. There were 980 contests, with 465 union wins, 515
union losses, and an overall union win rate of 47.4%.
The key independent variable in the micro-level analysis is Foreign Multi-national
Company (FMNC). I am most interested in the difference between foreign-originating firms and
American-firms overall, in order to examine whether or not U.S. businesses are particularly
hostile to union organizing attempts, and foreign firms in general, are less so. Therefore the
baseline for comparing the FMNC variable is all U.S. firms. These include both wholly domestic
American firms and U.S.-owned multi-national firms with production facilities abroad. Chapter
3, Table 10 lists the descriptive statistics for each of these groups. FMNC worksites posted
higher rates of wins than did domestic firms, U.S. multinational firms, and all U.S. firms in
aggregate. I expect FMNC to be positively related to the likelihood of a union win.
117

The NLRB reports do not provide the nationality of the firms where union elections take
place. It only provides the name of the business site. Therefore, firm nationality had to be
researched and coded for all observations. Firm nationality is actually a rather complex
characteristic, and it can be a difficult to ascertain. First of all, larger firms are owned by multiple
shareholders, sometimes with a mix of foreign and domestic ownership. Moreover, companies
are often subsidiaries of other parent firms, and although they may do business under a
“domestic” firm name, they could in fact be owned wholly or partly by another U.S. or foreignbased multi-national entity. In order to determine ownership, I traced all election worksites to
level of the highest parent company. Additionally, most franchise situations were coded by the
parent firm nationality, if a parent could be traced by the name given on the NLRB election
reports.
Several sources were used interactively to make the most accurate determination
possible regarding firm ownership and nationality. First of all, I conducted an individual internet
search on every contest worksite name, which was listed by firm name on the NLRB reports.
Most firms identified and described their parent-firm owner, if they had one. I researched the
annual reports and corporate history information provided on the company websites to determine
the actual year the parent acquired the company, because firm ownership frequently changes
hands. For example, if I was coding firm nationality for a union election contest that occurred in
year 2005, I looked for an explicit reference on the firm website that it was in fact owned by the
listed parent firm in that year. Often, if the ownership changed hands in recent years, the name of
the previous controlling firm would be listed. Once I located a year-specific name of a parent
company I cross-referenced this name to the Uniworld Directory of Firms. Uniworld provides
two separate catalogs– one for multinational firms headquartered in the U.S that operate in
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foreign locations, and another for foreign firms operating in the U.S. I examined both catalogues
per appropriate year for a listing of the parent company name. If the parent was listed in the
American guide, I coded firm nationality as U.S. multinational; if in the foreign guide, I coded it
as a foreign multi-national and also recorded the specific country-of-origin. However, in most
cases the business name (or parent name, if applicable) was not located in either guide. I coded
these cases as U.S. domestics. Occasionally, I would attempt to code nationality for a company
that had no website or provided no ownership history on its website. The first case was often due
to the firm having gone out of business or having changed names. In each of these situations, I
conducted a broader internet search looking in the state and city papers where the worksite was
located for news stories that contained company expiration, acquisition, or creation details. In a
handful of cases, about 20 or so, I could not locate any information at all about the company, and
hence, I tossed these cases out of the dataset. In most cases, using the collaborative strategy of
firm website research, Uniworld directory cross-check, and occasional on-line media search, I
was able to make a reliable, year-specific assessment of firm nationality.
If a company self-described itself as a subsidiary of a parent firm, I assumed the parent as
primary–interest owner, under the rationale that if the firm openly acknowledges the parent-firm
identity, that parent firm likely had the controlling or majority interest. In the event that I was
able to also locate the parent firm name in the Uniworld guide, it was given that the parent firm
had a 50% plus ownership stake, as the Uniworld guide uses majority ownership as a criterion
for listing the firm. Once I had coded all union contest sites as FMNCs, US MNCs, or domestic
firm, I collapsed the US MNC and domestic categories together. This yielded a bivariate
independent variable coded 1=Foreign-owned firm and 0=American-owned firm.
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I also created dummy variables indicating the market economy of the country-of-origin of
all foreign firms to use in an alternate model. This was done to pursue the hypothesis that the
market economy type from which a firm originates, as developed in the Varieties of Capitalism
paradigm (Hall and Soskice 2001), impacts management attitudes toward unionization. Hall and
Soskice contend that firms in coordinated market economies (CMEs) have less contentious
relationships with unions than do firms in liberal market economies (LMEs) due to the specific
institutional capacities that market economies provide for unions.16 It is not entirely clear how
management labor relations approaches in a home-country will translate to subsidiaries located
abroad. Assuming that management adopts the same attitudes toward labor in its foreign
worksites, foreign firms from CMEs could be expected to engage in less resistance to U.S. union
organizing attempts than do foreign firms from LMEs. In my data set the CME Firm variable is
coded 1=CME. Firms headquartered in liberal market economies outside of the U.S. are coded 1
for the variable Foreign LME. The omitted group (U.S. firms) serves as the base group for
comparison.
I included the same Saiz indices that appeared in the macro-model as key variables
indicating entrepreneurial policy activism and locational policy activism to explore the impact
that economic development policy may have on micro-level union election results. Admittedly,
this variable is measured only at the state level. I used the indices values for the state in which
the contest worksite was located, listed on the NLRB reports, for year 2006. This is the most
recent year the indices values are available, and the closest year to observations tracked in the
micro-level data set. I begin by offering the same initial hypotheses about economic development

16

See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion.

120

policy as were offered in the macro-analysis. I expect locational policy in the state of the election
contest to be negatively associated with likelihood of a union win in that contest. Entrepreneurial
policy impact is harder to predict. The indication that entrepreneurial policy promotes firms that
views labor as an asset, not a cost, suggests that unionization attempts may have more likelihood
of success in entrepreneurial-activist states, because there may be less resistance from firms in
the event that the workers desire union representation. The macro-level model results from the
previous chapter revealed that entrepreneurial policy activism actually had a negative impact on
mass state union density numbers. However, the factors that explain macro union density may
differ in how they impact the probability that an individual worksite will vote pro-union. I
tentatively begin with the hypothesis that entrepreneurial policy will enhance likelihood of a
union win at the individual level of analysis.
I use other state-level control variables, some of them also used in the macro-level data
set. State government liberalism is provided as it was in the previous chapter to control for
leadership ideology of the state government. State unemployment rate appears to control for
economic circumstances, as the observations are taken from years both preceding and during the
Great Recession. I include the right-to-work status of the state where the contest occurs because
the prohibition against union shops in RTW states may impair unions’ ability to convince
workers that union membership will actually give them more power. I include state union density
in this model as an independent variable, because the ability of unions to secure members in the
greater state economy could also impact workers’ perceptions of the power of unions.
Additionally, I included industry union density (measured at the national level) for the NAIC
industry sector code of the worksite listed on the NLRB reports in the year of the union contest.
Union organizing may be more successful in industries such as utilities and transport/
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warehousing that have higher levels of unionization than other industry sectors, such as finance
and food service.
Ideally, I would include an individual level variable in this model that accounts for the
ideological attitudes of those workers directly eligible to vote about unionism. If workers making
a decision about representation are conservative and/or have a negative personal assessment of
the labor movement overall, they would be less likely to join unions. Though in this model I
emphasize the level of hostility of firm management toward unionization as the primary factor,
the individual ideology of workers themselves also must be accounted for. One can not assume
that if the firm refrains from union retaliation, all workers will individually prefer union
representation. Alas, there is no individual level data available indicating the personal opinions
that workers in contest worksites have toward labor unionism. I can however, provide a statelevel proxy for worker support for unionism by including Berry’s citizen ideology index in the
model. This measure was developed as a companion to the Berry et al government liberalism
scores used in the last chapter. The citizen liberalism measure assesses the level of citizen leftideology for each U.S. state by weighting Congressional ideology scores (partly based on labor
union policy coding) along with the partisan voting percentages of elections in that state. I use
this measure for the years 2005, 2007, and 2009 corresponding to the state where the contest
occurs to proxy for workers’ union sentiment.
I include two other control variables measured at the individual level: union power and
bargaining unit size. Union power is a measure of the level of resources available to the union
organization that is attempting to organize the worksite. Unions vary in resource levels, quality
of staffing, and their reputation of effectiveness. Small, independent unions unaffiliated with
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national and international unions are less likely to have the money, staff, and technical skills to
carry out a successful organizing attempts. Big international unions, such as the Teamsters or
Service Employee International Union have more assets available to conduct longer, more
strenuous organizing campaigns. Union power is measured as the total assets (in $ millions)
reported by the highest-level of the union (that is, at the international or national level) as listed
on the Office of Labor and Management (OLMS) report, a yearly publication of the U.S.
Department of Labor. All U.S. unions and labor associations of sufficient size are required to
report their financial assets each year to OLM. I use the international level of the union
organization to measure assets because much of the organizing activities of unions is directly
provided or heavily supplemented by the highest level of the union. Local union branches
affiliated with large international unions have access to the skills and resources that their
national-level unions offer. Union power is predicted to have a positive impact on unionization.
Finally, I included the log of the bargaining unit size, as listed on the NLRB election
reports, to account for the lower probability of success for unions in large worksites. The NLRB
pre-determines the number of employees eligible to vote in a union contest, known as a
bargaining unit, prior to the election being held. It is likely more difficult to successfully
organize a large group of workers, rather than a relatively small one; thus as the bargaining unit
size increases I expect to find a negative association to union wins.
The accompanying Table 15 supplies a summary of all variables used in the model,
along with measure specification, and the data source.
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Table 15. Variables Used in the Logistic Regression Model

Variable

Measure Specification

Data Source

Binary variable indicating if union
won the NLRB certification election
contest. If > 50% of the employees
voting indicate “For”, union wins.
(Win=1; Loss=0).

National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) Monthly Election Reports
for 2005, 2007, 2009. Accessed at
https://www.nlrb.gov/electionreports

Interval level index based on coding
of state economic development
program attributes ranging from
approximately 0 to 3 for year 2006.
This is the closest available year
corresponding to the union election
contests analyzed.

Methodology for constructing the
index is presented in Saiz 2001.

Interval level index based on coding
of state economic development
program attributes ranging from
approximately 0 to 3 for year 2006.
This is the closest available year
corresponding to the union election
contests analyzed.

Methodology for constructing the
index is presented in Saiz 2001.

Binary variable indicating if union
election worksite was a subsidiary of
a foreign-owned corporation.
(1=Yes; 0=No. If 0 the worksite is
either a domestic U.S. firm or is
owned by a U.S multi-national firm.)
See Table in Appendix for full
description of how firm nationality
was determined.

NLRB Election Reports, individual
firm websites and Uni-world
Business Publications, Inc.
Directory of American Firms
Operating in Foreign Countries
Years 2005, 2007, 2009 (18th-20th
editions) and Directory of Foreign
Firms Operating in the United States
Years 2004, 2006, 2008 (12th-14th
editions).
Media stories on Internet for
selected cases.

RTW status of state where contest
worksite is located. “Right to work”
state= 1. Union shops allowed= 0.

Department of Labor, National Right
to Work Committee. Years 2005,
2007, 2009.

Dependent Variable
Union Win

Key Independent Variables
Entrepreneurial Policy Intensity

Locational Policy Intensity

Foreign Multi-national Firm

Attributes coding based on data
gathered by Miles Friedman and
Partners LLC in 2006.

Attributes coding based on data
gathered by Miles Friedman and
Partners LLC in 2006.

Control Variables

“Right-to-Work” State
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Table 15 Continued
Variable

Measure Specification

Data Source

State Citizen Liberalism

Interval index based on ideological
scores of state’s Congressional
representatives according to ratings
by AFL-CIO and Americans for
Democratic Action and vote
distribution of citizens in
Congressional races. High levels of
this measure indicate “left” citizen
ideology.
Ideological orientation of state
government in the state where
contest worksite is located. Interval
measure based on ideological scores
of state’s Congressional
representatives, weighted by partisan
control of the state legislature. High
levels of this measure indicate
“Left” state governments.
Annual average unemployment rate
in state where the contest worksite is
located. Expressed as a percent.
Annual average union density (all
sectors) in the state where the
contest worksite is located.
Expressed as a percent.
Annual average union density of the
industry sector corresponding to the
work performed in the contest
worksite. Expressed as a percent.
The total assets in millions of dollars
of the inter(national) union
attempting certification in the
election contest.

Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years
2005, 2007, 2009.

State Government Liberalism

State Unemployment Rate

State Union Density

Industry Union Density

Union Power

Bargaining Unit Size (Log)

Number of employees in the
bargaining unit experiencing the
election contest, logged. A
bargaining unit is defined by the
NLRB prior to the union election as
the total number of employees
eligible to vote in the election.
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Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years
2005, 2007, 2009.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. Years
2005, 2007, 2009.
Industry sector is listed on NLRB
reports (NAIC Code). Union density
numbers from Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Years 2005, 2007, 2009.
Industry sector is listed on NLRB
reports (NAIC Code). Union density
numbers from Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Years 2005, 2007, 2009.
The union name is identified on the
NLRB reports. Assets for union
(international level) comes from
Department of Labor’s Office of
Labor and Management Services
public disclosure site
(http://www.dol.gov/olms/). Years
2005, 2007, 2009.
NLRB Election Reports 2005, 2007,
2009.

Analysis and Results
By implementing a logistic regression estimation methodology I aim to address concerns
about the efficiency of the standard errors given the non-normal, heteroskedastic residuals as the
result of using a binary dependent variable. But the selection of cases in this dataset prompts
additional concerns about the independence of observations assumption. First of all, some of the
independent variables used in my model are state-level measures, such as the development policy
and liberalism variables, rather than individual-level. Therefore the errors of observations per
each state will be correlated, and the standard errors estimated could be inefficient. There is also
a concern due to the presence of multiple observations from the same companies. Under NLRB
organizing rules, the individual worksites of companies, rather than the entire workforce of the
company, are subject to certification. Unions typically organize bargaining units one work site at
a time rather than across the firm’s entire national workforce. This is certainly the case in my
dataset. One entity known as First Student, a school-bus contractor, experienced a very large,
nation-wide union campaign lead by multiple transport unions. First Student had about 90
individual worksites experiencing their own separate union elections. While First Student
appeared more often than any other firm in my data set, additional companies supplied multiple
union contest observations, including Durham School Services, First Transit, Waste
Management, and Wackenhut.17
A widely-used approach to deal with the violation of independence assumption that
occurs when there are multiple observations supplied from the same unit is to employ clustered
standard errors (Zorn 2006). This strategy simply estimates adjusted standard error calculations
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A complete list of companies experiencing election contests in the dataset can be found in Appendix 1.
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to mitigate Type 2 error. Hierarchical modeling strategies, handy for estimating models that have
variables measured at multiple levels of analysis, have also come into vogue recently (Gelman
and Hill 2006), but when used with logistic regression this is a tedious approach which
complicates coefficient interpretation. I choose to use the clustered standard error strategy in this
analysis due to ease and straight-forwardness.
I have two units –state and firm- that need to be accounted for in the estimation of the
robust (clustered) standard errors. In a nested situation, an analyst simply needs to cluster on the
highest common level where multiple observations occur. 18 However, the data situation here is
not nested. Clustering the standard errors on the state unit does nest within a common unit all
instances of multiple observations occurring in the economic policy variables, the right-to-work
variable, the government and citizen ideology variables, and the state union density variable.
However, the multiple observations from individual firms are not nested within each state. Some
of the bigger organizing drives listed in the dataset include union election worksites spread
throughout the nation. FirstGroup, for instance experienced union election contests in about 28
states.
To address the need for clustered standard errors on two units – state and firm – I use a
calculation methodology developed by economists Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006). Their
estimation strategy for non-nested multi-way clustering is applicable not only to OLS, but also
maximum-likelihood modeling such as logit and probit. I use Guan and Peterson’s logit2
program, an ado file developed for use with the STATA software package, to estimate the logit

18

For instance, if a data set contained multiple observations per state and per county, clustering would only be
necessary on the state unit, because all observations for a given county are “nested” within the same state.
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regression model. Guan and Peterson first applied their ado file to models which clustered on
time and firm units, but Cameron et al provide examples of how two-way clustering is
appropriate in a cross-sectional, non-longitudinal design (such as my own). The researchers
confirmed that use of more robust standard errors improved estimation in their models with a
Monte Carlo analysis (Cameron et al 2006).
I conducted an additional diagnostic to assist with model estimation. Since I use Berry’s
state government liberalism and citizen liberalism scores as independent variables in the same
model, I was moderately concerned that multicollinearity might present an issue. Berry et al. did
use similar, though not identical data to estimate these measures, and moreover, high correlation
between the ideological policy scores of legislators and the citizens that elect them seems
plausible, simply on its face. I estimate Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance scores
specific to logistic modeling strategies for all variables as a check. Scores generated did not
indicate a high degree of multicollinearity between variables. The VIF generally indicates how
much of the inflation of a variable’s standard error could be caused by collinearity. A base-line
of 1 indicates the complete absence of inflation due to collinearity. VIF readings produced were
less than 3 for all variables, with citizen liberalism and right-to-work showing the highest
readings. State government ideology had a VIF of only 1.74. Tolerance, which indicates how
much collinearity that a regression can tolerate, ranged from .34 and .38 for RTW and citizen
ideology, respectively, to .97 for union power. UCLA’s Institute for Digital Research and
Education suggests that a tolerance <.1 and VIF>10 is the “red flag” threshold. Using this as a
guide, I conclude that multicollinearity does not pose a serious concern.
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The results of the logistic regression analysis are provided in Table 16. In the first
column I estimate my primary model, which emphasizes the impact of foreign firm nationality as
the key independent variable. In the second column I present a supplemental model that
considers the impact of the market economy type, as developed by Hall and Soskice, that
substitutes variables for CME Firm and Foreign LME Firm in place of Foreign Multi-national
firm.
Turning to the first model, Foreign Multi-national Firm is positive as expected,
indicating that foreign nationality is associated with greater likelihood of a union contest win.
Entrepreneurial policy activism is also positive, suggesting that at the individual level of
analysis, this economic development strategy is associated with favorable opportunities for labor
organization, in contrast to the results from the macro-model in the earlier chapter. However, in
the case of both foreign nationality and entrepreneurial policy the level of significance only
meets the 90% confidence level. This offers marginal support for my original hypotheses for
each variable. Locational policy is signed negative, as expected, but it is not significant at the
90% confidence level; thus it appears to have little impact on the likelihood that union contests
are wins for labor.
A number of control variables were associated with greater likelihood of union wins.
State unemployment rate had a positive association with union wins, which is perhaps counter to
the conventional wisdom that unemployment creates negative conditions for union organizing.
However, if workers experience greater workloads or wage and benefits cuts due to company
concerns over labor costs, which is often the case during times of layoff and lean staffing, this
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Table 16. Logistic Regression Results for Union Win

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Foreign Multinational Firm

0.5543*
(0.2943)

--

CME Firm

--

-0.1753
(0.3947)

Foreign LME Firm

--

.7701**
(0.3110)

Entrepreneurial Policy Activism

0.3441*
(0.2015)

0.3546*
(0.2068)

Locational Policy Activism

-0.0035
(0.3131)

0.0246
(0.3214)

“Right-to-Work” State

-0.0769
(0.3617)

-0.0804
(0.3740)

State Union Density

-0.0246
(0.0184)

-.0.0259
(0.0186)

0.0955***
(0.0295)

0.0883***
(0.0274)

Industry Union Density

0.0068
(0.0119)

0.0022
(0.0116)

Citizen Liberalism

0.0198*
(0.0102)

0.0186*
(0.0101)

State Government Liberalism

-0.0068*
(0.0036)

-0.0062*
(0.0037)

Union Power

0.0004*
(0.0002)

0.0004**
(0.0002)

Bargaining Unit Size (Log)

-0.180**
(0.0888)

-0.1771*
(0.0909)

-1.211
(0.778)

-1.131
(0.789)

980
33.32***

980
39.88***

State Unemployment Rate

Constant

Observations
Wald chi2

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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may prompt more demand for workers to organize. Some research shows that unionization is
higher in regions that experience the most unemployment, because workers view union
membership as a form of insurance against arbitrary job loss in particularly tight labor markets
(Booth 1984, Blanchflower et. al. 1990). The result may also be an indication of a more general,
endogenous association of unionism with higher sustained levels of unemployment. Economists
argue that unionization increases unemployment because rents extracted by labor unions allow
less surplus available to firms for expansion of their labor force, and there are few individual
incentives for laid-off union workers to shift to new employment in a non-unionized
environment (Alvarez and Shimer 2014, Nickel and Layard 1999, Summers 1986).
Citizen left ideology is associated in the model with positive impact on union wins,
which is expected, though at only the 90% confidence. The association between left ideology
among citizens (a proxy for direct worker attitudes toward unionism in principle) has a
straightforward impact on worker preferences to personally support organization of their own
workplaces. Union power is also positively associated with likelihood of a union win, indicating
that union organizations with more assets and resources are better equipped to wage successful
union organizing campaigns.
State government liberalism appeared to have a negative association to the likelihood of
union wins, which appears counter-intuitive. It is sensible to predict that union election contests
in states with left-leaning government leadership would offer more favorable political conditions
for labor organization, assuming that liberal leaders are more sympathetic to Labor. Still, many
of the indicators associated more directly with pro-labor sentiment in elected officials were
already controlled for in the model through the citizen ideology, right-to-work, and economic
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development variables. Additional “left” policy preferences of elected leaders captured by the
state government liberalism variable include leaders’ support for environmentalism, proimmigration, and civil liberties policies which do not always clearly align with pro-unionism.
This may explain the negative impact of heightened liberalism of government leaders. One other
variable, bargaining unit size, showed a negative relationship to likelihood of a union victory.
This was predicted since larger groups of employees face increased barriers to collective action
(more “free-riding”, more coordination and solidarity-building challenges) than do small groups
(Olson 1965).
Neither density variable – state union density or industry union density- had significant
impact in the model. Nor did “right-to-work”. Apparently, the individual assessments that
workers make to join a union are not determined heavily by their evaluation of the success of
unions more broadly in the overall labor force. Worker decision-preferences are more focused on
the potential that unionism has to improve their individual workplaces, rather than its power
status in the greater macro-economy or political environment.
It was noted earlier that logistic regression coefficients can not be interpreted as a
straightforward linear change in y as a result of a change in x. The coefficient on each
independent variable in a logistic model indicates that a one unit increase in x produces a
coefficient unit increase in the log-odds of y, which is difficult to conceptualize. The standard
approach to interpreting the substantive impact of logistic regression coefficients is to compute
the predicted probability of y=1 (a union win) at different values of an independent variable,
holding the other variables constant at their means (Long and Freeze 2005). Table 17 shows
predicted probabilities for the FMNC and Entrepreneurial Policy variables generated using Scott
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Table 17. Predicted Probability of Union Win for Key Independent Variables (Model 1)

Variable at Different Values

Predicted Probability

Foreign Multi-national Firm
American Firm (FMNC=0)

.444

Foreign Firm (FMNC=1)

.581

Entrepreneurial Policy Activism
At minimum value (.67)

.370

At mean value (1.9)

.473

At max value (3.0)

.567

* Predicted probabilities were generated using the spost13.ado program for STATA. See Long, J.
Scott and Jeremy Freese 2005.
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Long’s spost13 program for Stata. The probability of a union win in a foreign firm is 58%,
versus only 44% in an American-owned firm, holding the other variables at their means. The
probability of a union win increases from about 37% at the lowest value generated for
entrepreneurialism, to about 47% at the average value, to about 57% at the maximum value,
when holding the other variables at their means.
Returning to Table 16, in the second model I focus on the impact of the market economy
from which foreign firms’ originate, rather than foreign nationality more generally. The CME
variable indicates a negatively signed, but insignificant coefficient estimate, offering no support
for the prediction that foreign firms headquartered in countries with coordinated market
economies (such as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark) offer more favorable unionization targets.
Though I highlighted the Chattanooga Volkswagen organizing drive several times in this
dissertation as an illustration of a CME firm tolerant to unionization, this does not hold generally
for the CME firms in my dataset. The organizing attempt at VW is probably best analyzed as a
special case, not generalizable to the wider population of union elections. Interestingly, the
Foreign LME variable in my model does have a significant positive impact on likelihood of
unionization. It is important to remember that this variable is being compared against a baseline
of U.S.- owned firms, which was the omitted group variable. The significant result on Foreign
LME is likely due to the high rate of success in the British-owned FirstGroup school bus
organizing drive. This drive supplied nearly 100 observations in the data set, therefore the U.K.
as a country-of-origin is heavily represented. However, these results do not provide clear
evidence that LME market economy type of a firm favorably impacts likelihood of a union win,
because the U.S. is also a liberal market economy, and I found in Model One that union victories
are less probable in U.S. owned firms.
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Discussion
The results of the regression analysis suggest that foreign-ownership of a company
worksite experiencing a union election increases likelihood of a union victory. It is interesting
that among foreign firms, companies from liberal market economies, which generally have
combative labor relations approaches similar to the American system, demonstrated higher
likelihood of union victories. The failure to find support for the corresponding hypothesis - that
firms from “pro-union” coordinated market economies are more likely to unionize - casts some
doubt on the application of the varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) paradigm to the prediction of
unionization outcomes. Varieties of capitalism does illustrate how different national political
systems vary in their ability to view unions as constructive institutions within the overall
business environment. This is supported by my findings that American firms are significantly
less likely to unionize than are foreign firm. But VoC also emphasizes the similarities between
clusters of countries. Firms from foreign Liberal Market Economies, such as the United
Kingdom and Canada, would be expected to display contentious labor-management dynamics
similar to U.S. firms according to VoC. Yet my analysis suggests that U.S. firms show
heightened levels of union-avoidance when compared broadly to all foreign firms, especially
those originating from other liberal market economies.
My results support the view that union opposition is best attributed to American
exceptionalism and a U.S. business model that is particularly at odds with unionization (Kelly,
Witko, and Young 2013, Logan 2006). My individual level analysis indicates that increased
entry of foreign firms into the U.S. economy provides unions with more, rather than less
favorable targets for organizing. This is consistent with the earlier findings in the macro-level
time series regression showing that FDI shares of employment had a short-term positive impact
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on private union density growth. The confirmation of a positive relationship at both levels of
analysis provides considerable support that inward foreign investment does not run counter to
American labor movement goals.
A more puzzling finding is that entrepreneurial development policy had a positive impact
on unionization outcomes in my micro-level analysis, but a negative impact on long-term
unionization at the macro-level. Entrepreneurial policy seems to affect overall demand for
unionization among workers differently than it affects company behavior in response to
individual unionization attempts. Growth of a “wealth economy” where workers enjoy higher
wages and better benefits is likely to reduce the perceived need for unions because the most
important functions of unions involve the protection of worker wages, working conditions, and
job security (Bennett and Kaufman 2011). Entrepreneurial policy attempts to produce an
economy where the market itself generates higher wage potential and job quality, essentially
offering a substitute for the organizational advocacy provided by unions.
Still, at the same time entrepreneurial policy encourages creation of firms that value labor
as an asset, which is important in the particular cases when workers do desire collective
representation. The population of labor organizing campaigns manifests a certain “selection out”
effect prior to a union election actually being conducted. Union organizing will actively occur in
those worksites where conditions for unionization success is best. The most successful unions are
strategic in the campaigns they choose to pursue (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004), and unions
are averse to taking on a campaign if there is little indication that it can succeed (Farber 2001,
referenced in Farber and Western 2001). Therefore, NLRB election contests are more likely to
materialize in situations where there is both a unique desire among the employees for organizing
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(micro-level demand for unionization) AND the overall legal and business environment presents
favorable conditions for victory. In the relatively improbable event that workers actually demand
unionization, unions will succeed when the policy environment presents them with the best odds
of success. Entrepreneurial development lures and promotes firms that are more likely to
accommodate employee demands. When employees in an entrepreneurial state do demand
unionization, they are less likely to encounter push-back from management and could benefit
from a more favorable legal environment for organizing.
Understanding that entrepreneurial policy impacts unionization at the macro and micro
levels differently helps to explain some of the anecdotal evidence discussed in Chapter 2 that
suggests entrepreneurial policy and unionization are compatible, both in principle and at times in
practice. Though entrepreneurialism does not apparently incite mass demand for unions in the
labor force, it does promote more cooperative relationships between labor and management.
Since entrepreneurial development programs sometimes condition eligibility on firms
recognizing worker protections and collaborating with unions (see the Labor Relations
Provisions table in Chapter 2), it discourages the “union-busting” activities typical of most U.S.owned companies during episodes of labor organizing. All of this indicates that entrepreneurism
is associated with higher odds of successful unionization, when analyzed at the individual level
of analysis.
“Right-to-work” status showed no significant impact in these micro-level models, similar
to the finding in the macro-model regarding its impact on long-term union density. This may be
because the motivation to vote in support of union representation is not equivalent to a
willingness to pay union dues. A worker could vote for union representation, and then
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subsequently “free-ride” and opt out of dues payment once a union is recognized by the NLRB.
Such a scenario is plausible and even predictable as a means of individual utility maximization.
It increases benefits to an individual worker due to protections s/he will receive under a union
contract, while avoiding the dues-extraction costs of union membership. RTW’s impact at the
micro level is probably most salient in its reduction of the number of attempted union elections.
Open shop environments offer less potential returns to labor unions even in the event of winning
a union election. Previous research has shown that union organizing effort is reduced in states
that prohibit union security clauses (Ellwood and Fine 1987). The descriptive comparison in
Chapter 2 and 3 also showed that organizing attempts were fewer in RTW states such as
Tennessee and South Carolina than in union-shop Missouri. Nonetheless, my findings in Model
2 indicate that likelihood of union success in the election contests that do occur is not
significantly impacted by state RTW status, concurring with the findings of at least one other
individual-level analysis (Martin 2008).

Conclusion
This chapter reaffirms the discoveries of the previous chapter that the impact of right-towork as a policy determinate of unionization is overemphasized. Entrepreneurial economic
development strategy has a more notable impact on changes in state union density as well as
union election results, though its impact on each is qualitatively different. Entrepreneurial policy
depresses the union share of the private sector workforce over time, but it actually enhances
chances of union victory in an NLRB election. Locational economic development strategies do
not appear to influence either the union density of a state or the likelihood that union organizing
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attempts will succeed. Foreign investment and firm ownership had a consistent positive impact
on unionization at both the macro and micro levels, indicating that at least one aspect of
international economic openness – increased entry of foreign companies into the country - does
not hinder labor movement power.
The next chapter will offer an analysis of how economic development policy and
unionization impacts the quality and equity of state economies. I will shift focus from
unionization as the dependent variable to examine how it impacts state level income inequality. I
will also consider economic development policy as a factor affecting inequality directly, as well
as how it conditions the relationship between unionization and inequality. This will push my
research toward an assessment of both the empirical and normative implications of development
policy and its impact on labor movement goals.
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Chapter 6: Unionization, Income Inequality, and State Economic Development Strategy
Please note: a version of this chapter is currently being reviewed for publication in
State and Local Government Review. Some sections of text in this chapter bear close
resemblance to the manuscript sent to SLGR.

Previous chapters have noted how policy devolution to state governments in a federalist
system, coupled with the growing openness of the U.S. economy has peeked scholarly interest in
state programs to promote economic development. I discussed the body of research that analyzes
state economic development impact on job growth and inward investment (Brace 1993, Atkinson
and Andes 2010, Saiz 2001a) and the lack of conclusive evidence that development policies
deliver net employment gains. Chapter 2 noted the relationship of development strategy to
public sector spending, indicating that locational strategy activism adversely impacted the
availability of revenues for education and social programs (Burkdull and Tuman 1999, Hansen
2001). I highlighted the “race to the bottom” premise, and the evidence showing that
development policy may encourage competitive bidding for investment among rival states at the
expense of regulatory protections (Saiz 2001b, Hanson 1993, Peters and Fisher 2004). Most of
the original empirical analysis in this dissertation focuses on the effect of economic development
and foreign inward investment on unionization outcomes in the private sector, revealing that
entrepreneurial policy reduces union density but increases likelihood of union victory in
certification elections, while foreign investment benefits both union density growth and union
contest wins. In this chapter, I shift focus away from unionization as the outcome variable to
consider how it, along with economic development programs, influence income distribution in
the state economies.
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Even though scholarship on economic development is prolific, there is less attention
given to the distributional consequences of these policies. Laura Langer’s 2001 article is one of
the few economic development studies that analyzes income inequality as the dependent
variable. She finds that demand-oriented strategies aimed at producing higher skilled jobs and
emerging industry sectors decrease income inequality, while more traditional supply-side
strategies that attract outside investment by cutting factor costs increase inequality. She also
finds higher overall levels of economic policy activism to be associated with increased
inequality.
There are several reasons to revisit her findings. First, Langer’s study was a policyintensive investigation, but it did not include other political variables such as ideological or
partisan composition of government, nor did it include unionization as a key control. The
inclusion of these classic “power resources” variables is essential to estimate a fuller model of
the factors that influence income distribution. Secondly, since Langer’s pioneering study new
measures have been developed to more comprehensively track variation in economic
development strategy (Saiz 2001a) and market-based inequality (Kelly and Witko 2012), which
can help refine model estimation. Third, Langer’s dataset ended in the early nineties, just before
the Republican take-over of Congress in 1994. The period following 1994 is generally regarded
as the time when the federal government accelerated the delegation of traditional policy roles to
the states, which also included critical aspects of economic development. State development
policies were likely to have even more impact on economic outcomes post-1994 (Kelly and
Witko 2012); thus including data from these years in an updated examination is advantageous.
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An important way to analyze the state-level variation in income inequality levels is to
consider how political resources of social classes –that is, partisanship and ideology in
government and unionization in the labor force - may impact redistributive outcomes. Recent
research on this subject emphasizes political and governmental institutional factors, such as
union density and left liberalism of state legislators, as drivers of distributional consequences
(Kelly & Witko 2012). However, policy variables are still important to the examination, as
specific economic development programs are likely to be the mechanisms through which
politicians affect economic outcomes. Policy features are also likely to be influenced by the level
of participation of key organized interests, such as labor unions, who could lobby allies in
government to create policy that secures benefits for their members. Including unionization and
state government ideology along-side important policy factors will produce a more
comprehensive model to explain distributional differences across states.
This chapter works from the premise that both development policy and power resources
matter. First, it revisits Langer’s original research question: do various types of economic
development policies increase or decrease inequality? My results indicate that contrary to
Langer’s findings, entrepreneurial strategies to development increase inequality after controlling
for unionization and left governments, while locational strategies have no significant impact. I
suggest that this is due to a “skills premium” effect that is exacerbated by entrepreneurial
development approaches. I find a significant independent effect that private sector unionization
has in the long-term and left government has in the short-term in decreasing inequality.
Secondly, I consider how entrepreneurial development policy conditions the ability of
unionization to effectively abate inequality. I have already shown how entrepreneurialism
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decreases macro-level private union density over time, a finding which matters to proponents of
unionization in particular. But even for scholars disinterested in the decline of labor unions as
organizations, there is a bigger associated issue regarding the role of unions in the economic
system. Does development policy confound unions’ abilities to deliver an economy of widelyshared wealth? I find that entrepreneurialism interacts with unionization to hinder its equityinducing capacity. Entrepreneurialism undermines unions as a power resource for lower-income
and working-class citizens.

Economic Development Policy Variation and Distributional Consequences
Langer’s study of state level inequality levels operationalized its major independent
variables in multiple ways. First, it questioned if overall economic policy activism in a state was
associated with rising or declining income equity. Over the last three decades states have proactively pursued business relocations and new capital growth through a wide variety of
government-sponsored programs, ranging from tax incentives to job training to public- private
venture capital firms (Brace 2002, Gray and Lowery 1990, Eisinger 1990, Peterson 1995). The
priority that state governments placed on implementing development policy pre-dated the age of
devolution as competitive pressures between states to lure businesses accelerated during the
eighties, and it continued to increase at a fast clip after the Republican “contract with America”
in 1994 (Saiz and Clarke 2012). However, some states have been more active in strategic
development of their economies than others. Langer found that higher levels of economic policy
activism were associated with rising levels of income inequality in her analysis. This suggests
that over all, state development efforts place low priority on the equity outcomes of job growth
and increased investment and focus more on sheer number of jobs or investment dollars secured.
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Even though she concluded that economic development activism in general is related to
higher inequality levels, Langer’s main research question addressed the difference in outcomes
from use of various types of development policy. Recognizing that economic development
policy tools are abundant (NASDA 2002, Friedman and Associates 2006), and that states engage
in a wide and varied mix of these programs, she contended that type of development strategy
utilized could result in divergent distributional consequences. A number of scholars have
compiled economic development typologies, categorizing strategies according to their approach
to labor relations, capital accumulation, regulatory enforcement, and degree of state
interventionism (Gray and Lowry 1990, Leicht and Jenkins 1994, Grant et. al. 1995, Saiz 2001,
Langer 2001). Langer’s approach to classifying development policy draws mostly on Peter
Eisinger’s contrast of supply-side and demand-side strategies during the early to late eighties
(1989), as do the Saiz measures used in previous chapters.
To review, supply-side policies advocate maintaining a low cost business environment,
usually by promoting a base of cheap, available labor with reduced tax burdens (Eisenger 1989).
Job credit tax exemptions, subsidized worker training, state sponsored loan guarantees for
construction, and accelerated depreciation of industrial machinery are examples of incentives
provided according to this low-cost, “business friendly” strategy (Schweke, Rose, and Damson
1994). On the other hand, demand-side policies prioritize new capital growth, rather than capital
relocation as the key to economic development. These strategies focus on creating a wealthgenerating economy often by state support of high tech, finance, “green” energy, or
communications industries. Public-private venture capital funding, business incubation through
state higher education institutes, and research and development partnerships are features used in
the entrepreneurial, demand-oriented approach (Langer 2001).
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Langer hypothesized that the quality jobs focus of the entrepreneurial approach, with its
goal of overall wealth accumulation in the economy to fuel demand, would have a negative
impact on inequality levels (that is, it would lower inequality). Conversely, she predicted that
supply-side programs would increase inequality, due to their promotion of lower wages for
workers and the subsequent reduction of public revenues available for education and social
programs. The results of her time-series, cross sectional regression analysis supported these
hypotheses, causing her to conclude that the propensity of a state to use demand-side strategies
(entrepreneurial) over supply-side strategies (locational) was associated with reduced inequality
over the years 1976-1994.
Since Langer’s emphasis was on the policy impact of development strategy to determine
distributional outcomes, she did not include other standard political variables in her analysis,
namely ideology or partisanship of state government leaders. While she did include some
national policy-related variables, such as spending on social programs, Langer opted to leave out
national government partisanship and ideology variables. Nor did she include unionization levels
in her analysis. Her examination is to date one of the few to explicitly examine reasons for
variation in state levels of inequality with a development policy-centric focus.

Power Resources Theory, Unionization, and Inequality
While American politics researchers, including those interested in federalism and statelevel government, often emphasize policy impacts when formulating research questions about
socio-economic outcomes, literature from the comparative politics sub-field frequently utilizes
sociological perspectives. Scholars of the “power resources” school view economic outcomes
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from a class-analytic perspective, contending that they are a function of the access that different
social classes have to mobilize for political and economic change. Left governments, voted in by
working and middle class citizens, are the key political factor that lower classes access for
reducing economic inequality. Moreover, unions, which organize workers into a cohesive
political force, are needed for strong Left governments to be elected. Unions also give workers a
direct route to influencing economic conditions in the market through wage and benefits
bargaining. Thus, unions and left-leaning parties are essential factors to consider in
understanding variation in wage inequality (Korpi 1989, Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993;
Miles and Quadogno 2002).
This examination focuses primarily on the role of unionization in influencing state levels
of inequality, while also controlling for left governments. Beyond the general association that the
power resources theory (PRT) draws between unionization and income equality, a more detailed
discussion of the mechanics of this relationship is in order. Unions’ impact on the income
distribution can be conceptualized through two distinct processes – the political route and the
labor market route. First of all, as PRT emphasizes, unions politically lobby for social and
economic policy that has broad impact on inequality levels in state macro-labor markets. Unions
are sometimes disparaged as “monopolistic” and “special interest” organizations (Brugiavini et
al 2001), but history reveals that the policy agenda pushed by unions has wide effects throughout
the entire labor force. Unions have been the major organizational interests lobbying for national
and state minimum wage floors (Freeman and Medoff 1984), Davis-Bacon prevailing wage
requirements (Whittaker 2007), and over-time pay protections (AFL-CIO 2015). Such laws help
union members, but more importantly they push up the wage floor for workers in general,
regardless of union membership. Through their lobbying efforts, unions essentially pay the
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collective action costs needed to accomplish economy-wide pay increases for the low-wage
workforce, which is mostly non-union and politically unorganized (Olsen 1965). Unions and the
left parties they politically support are also key actors in passing non-transfer economic policies
that provide for industrial safety regulations and public education producing healthier, betterinformed workers. Such programs arguably have the effect of raising the wage-earning potential
of lower-income citizens (Kelly 2005). American unions pushed for the passage of direct
redistributive policies, such as Social Security, the Affordable Health Care Act, and welfare
programs, which provide resources to union and non-union workers, as well as people outside
the labor force. Analysts acknowledge the tension apparent in the broader social “welfareenhancing” functions of unions and the more narrow “rent-seeking activities” of their members
(Brugiavini et al 2001). Nonetheless, Labor’s political mobilization is understood to be an
essential condition for the growth of welfare states and broadly redistributive policies (Huber,
Ragin, and Stephens 1993). Unions work to decrease inequality in the overall labor force through
their political efforts.
The other route by which unions decrease inequality is directly through the market. It is
generally accepted that an important effect of collective bargaining is the compression of the
wage spectrum observed in the labor force. Numerous studies empirically support this view
finding that historically, union contract bargaining benefits the wage position of lower-skilled,
lower-educated workers more than higher-skilled workers. Since unions historically raise the
wages of workers near the bottom of the income distribution into the middle-income strata,
researchers conclude that unionization mitigates wage inequalities (Card 2001, DiNardo and
Fortin et al 1997, Hirsch and Schumacher 1998). Unionization does cause differences in average
wage rates between union and non-union workers in comparable occupations because union jobs
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generally pay premium wages over non-union ones. However, positive spill-over effects also
elevate non-union wage rates when institutional protections for unions are strong (OECD 2012).
Mishel (2012) found that non-union employers in industries with substantial union densities
often pay employees higher wage rates than they would absent the presence of unions, both to
stave off the threat of organizing drives and to offer competitive wages to attract workers.
Another study found that the upward pressures exerted by unions on total non-union wages were
“almost as large as their impact on total union wages,” even though union workers still enjoy a
wage premium over non-union workers (Walters and Mishel 2003). Moreover, multiple studies
trace the rise in male wage-earner inequality during the Reagan years to the decline of
unionization (Card 2001, DiNardo and Fortin et al 1997, Freeman 1993).
Unionization also has significant compression effects on the wage spectrum within firms,
with union firms displaying less dispersion between the highest and lowest paid occupations than
is observed in non-union firms (Card 2001). Unions likely promote wage compression between
different occupations as a tool for solidarity-building, as well as a utilitarian strategy of meeting
the wage demands of the maximum number of members (Freeman 1982). Analysts have even
found that higher rates of unionization are associated with lower levels of executive pay within
firms and that unionized companies tend to employ fewer managers (DiNardo, Hallock et al
1997).
Even given the evidence for union wage compression, arguments abound that unions do
not operate out of a mission to promote broad equality. This view depicts unions as selfinterested entities existing mainly to advance their members’ interests and regards any positive
externalities generated by union advocacy as un-intended consequences. From an empirical
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frame of reference this is an artificial distinction, because real-world effects, not organizational
intent, are the primary factors of interest in empirical studies. Using a normative frame of
reference, the contention that unions do not act out of a desire to foster greater social equality is
more noteworthy. However, unions do express that their mission is to achieve an economy of
shared prosperity, claiming to coordinate and organize as a labor movement, not just a union
movement. Consider these words posted on the national website of the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a major political coalition of U.S. labor
unions:
“No matter what type of job workers are in, by building power in unions, they can speak
out for fairness for all working people in their communities and create better standards
and a strong middle class across the country (AFL-CIO 2015).”
Taking this vision statement on face value, the goal of unions is to build an economy of widelyshared wealth. Pay fairness and broader income equality across both the union and non-union
sectors of the labor force is the expressed objective of American unions.
The application of power resources theory to explain levels of inequality in the
economies of the American states is the important theoretical contribution offered by Kelly and
Witko’s recent 2012 analysis. Unionization and left-leaning state governments are associated
with lower levels of state economic inequality, not only after taking state and national
redistributive spending into account, but also on pre-transfer, or “market conditioned” income
inequality (2012). However, their exploration of the policy routes which allow unions and
governmental actors to impact market inequality needs further development. While the authors
find some limited evidence that state minimum wage laws negatively impact pre-transfer
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inequality following “devolution” in 1994, they do not account for the role of economic
development strategy as a policy variable which could influence market-conditioned inequality.
Kelly and Witko base their study on the assumption that unionization influences
inequality by acting as a working class power resource. Its upward pressure on wages is
expected to occur mainly for workers in the lower levels of the income distribution, thus
reducing overall levels of wage inequality. As already noted, this view has been confirmed by
studies looking at industry-level and national-level labor force inequality prior to the 1990’s
(Pontusson, Rueda and Way 2002, Card 2001, 1998, Dinardo and Fortin et al 1997, Freeman
1993). However, given the severe erosion of union density across the American states in the past
two decades, mostly in industrial sectors (Hirsch, MacPherson et al. 2012), there is cause to
question the effectiveness of unions as articulators of lower-class interests more recently.
Evidence in Figure 3 suggests that through the 1990’s union membership growth (in terms of net
number of members) occurs in the professional-skills sector, and even in management positions
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Meanwhile, we see only a modest increase in union
membership in the fast-growing service sector, where a large number of America’s lower-paid
workers are concentrated, and a precipitous erosion of representation in the declining
manufacturing sector (referred to as “operators, fabricators, and laborers” and “precision
production” in the graph), which was once the anchor of the working-class trade unionism. The
assumption that American unions provide a power resource to lower-skilled or “blue collar”
workers, at least in the recent years following deindustrialization, demands rethinking.
State economic development policy could also factor significantly into the fortunes of
workers in the lower tiers of the income distribution. States only have partial authority in re150
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distributive and labor relations policy making (Kelly and Witko 2012, Peterson 1995, Witko and
Newmark 2010), while economic development policy is largely within their discretion. As
Eisinger and Langer contend, different economic development strategies have the potential to
grow different skill and income classes of workers. This could threaten the ability of unions to
act as a power resource to the lower-skilled working class, as certain development policies may
erode the unionized share of lower-income workers in the overall workforce.

Interaction of Unionization and Development Policy in Impacting Wage Inequality
Theoretically, entrepreneurial policies will not necessarily equalize distributional
outcomes, even though they may generate wealth in the overall economy. While Langer
emphasized that these policies prioritize production of “quality” high-paying jobs, this could
actually serve to exacerbate inequality levels between workers at different skills-levels, as
professional and high-tech workers could command a “skills wage premium”, especially if there
is no sufficient countervailing force to place upward pressure on lower-skilled employees wage
rates (Greenspan 1996, Berman and Bound 1996). While quality jobs may increase productivity
and surplus for governments to use for redistributive purposes, they may also disperse wage rates
paid across the labor market skills spectrum. Moreover, professional and “knowledge economy”
employees may be more assertive and individualistic in their approach to wage bargaining,
demanding premium wages above those made by their peers, while lower-skilled workers are
more likely to accept the wage rates that prevail, without demanding individual premiums
(Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002).
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Thus, the equalizing impact of entrepreneurial policy as posited by Langer depends on
the power of strong working-class labor unions to maintain higher wage rates for lower-skilled
workers and to ensure that such workers are beneficiaries of the emerging sectors nurtured by
entrepreneurialism. If industrial or lower-paid service sector unions have an active political voice
in entrepreneurial policy development, they may be able to lobby for projects which include a
role for “blue-collar” labor. But if unions are weak and locked out of entrepreneurial strategies,
economic development efforts to produce high-paying jobs are likely to magnify the income
differences between low and high-skilled workers. We have already seen that entrepreneurial
policy has a negative impact on unionization as the dependent variable, suggesting that overall
unions are not active players in entrepreneurial policy-making. The erosion of labor union
strength from such policies probably weakens the capacity of unions to safeguard income
equality in the state economy.
So far, I have failed to find a significant impact of locational policy on unionization, but
what about its effect on income inequality? On first glance, locational policy does seem likely to
increase inequality because it attempts to lure already developed industries, usually
manufacturing-based, by suppressing wages for the lowest-skilled workers. Cutting wages at the
bottom end of the income distribution would seemingly increase inequality. However, if
locational approaches lure jobs to places where few employment opportunities exist for lowerskilled workers, which is also an aim of these strategies, they may have an equalizing impact on
distributional outcomes, even while maintaining stingy wage rates. Low wages provide more
opportunity than no wages, adherents of this approach would claim.
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In summary, this paper concurs with Langer that placing economic development policy
front-and-center is important to understanding variation in state level inequality. However, it also
contends that power resources variables are necessary to include for two reasons. First,
unionization and left governments need to be accounted for as key control variables, given the
independent effect they may have on inequality outcomes. Secondly, unionization should be
considered in light of how development policy, especially entrepreneurialism, interacts with it to
affect distributional outcomes. Langer’s examination was straight-forward in characterizing
entrepreneurial policy as more equalizing, and locational policy as less so. I contend that the
distributional impact of these strategies also interacts with the presence of unions as a key power
resource.

Methods
I will first test hypotheses which consider economic development variables along with
inclusion of power resources variables to specify a fuller model explaining variation in state level
income inequality. I re-visit Langer’s original hypotheses using updated data and variable
measures to reconsider the direction and the significance of the independent effect of the two
types of economic development policies, while controlling for the impact of unionization and
left-leaning state governments.
H1: Greater use of locational policy will be associated with higher inequality.
H2: Greater use of entrepreneurial policy will be associated with lower inequality.

If entrepreneurial policy does in fact exacerbate the “skills premium” paid to higher SES
workers, Langer’s original findings about the equalizing effect of demand-side strategies will not
154

be supported. If I find support that either of these economic development strategies has a
significant impact on income inequality, I will then explore the conditioning effect that these
strategies have on unionization in impacting income inequality.
Of course that means that I am also testing for the independent effect of private sector
unionization and left governments on inequality. Private sector unionization has declined greatly,
and there is reason to question whether or not it still has any power to promote economic
equality. While my main focus is on the equalizing capacity of unionization, I also test for the
impact of ideological left governments as a second power resource factor.
H3: Increases in private sector union density will be associated with lower inequality.
H4: Increases in left state government liberalism will be associated with lower
inequality.

The model estimation method for this study follows the same one used by both Langer
and Kelly & Witko. Given that the data for the model is both cross-sectional (different states)
and time series (different years), the model must adjust for autocorrelation so as not to violate the
assumption of independent observations, critical to OLS regression. Use of panel corrected
standard errors along with a lagged dependent variable is recognized to be an appropriate method
for estimating over time change (Kelly and Witko 2010, De Boef and Keele 2008, Beck 2001). I
employ the same error correction model (ECM) strategy as used in Chapter 4. To review, ECM
equations compute the change in the dependent variable (∆Y) between time points, rather than
the actual value of the Y given a value of X. ECMs estimate two coefficients for each
independent variable – a differenced value and a lagged value. The coefficient on the
differenced value applies to the initial impact of the change in X to the change in Y, which
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occurs entirely at one point in time. The coefficient on the lagged value applies to the impact of
X on the change in Y that is felt over a longer time span. It requires division by the coefficient of
the lag of Y (the error correction rate), also included as a right-side variable in an error correction
model, to assess the total long term impact of the change in X on the change in Y. As Kelly and
Witko contend (2012), if either the differenced or lagged value of the independent variable is
significant, then one can conclude that variable impacts the dependent variable.

Variables and Data
The data for this study also comes largely from Kelly and Witko’s 2012 examination.
This study utilizes their measure of household pre-transfer market-conditioned inequality as the
dependent variable, for years 1983-2004. This is a Gini coefficient (ranging from 0-1) calculated
from income figures of private earnings collected from the Census Bureau Annual Social and
Economic Supplement. It leaves out any income earned through government programs such as
Social Security, welfare, or disability. I am most interested here in examining state policy and
unionization impact on market-based inequality, and states have limited influence in many
national level transfer programs (TANF is an exception). Therefore, the use of the pre-transfer
Gini, which measures the amount of market-based inequality existing in the state economy prior
to the redistributive effects of national transfer programs, is more appropriate. Langer’s approach
used a post-transfer Gini as the dependent variable, so employing Kelly and Witko’s measure is a
new contribution I offer to the study of development policy consequences.
The key explanatory variables are state private sector union density (Hirsch et al 2001),
entrepreneurial policy intensity and locational policy intensity. The economic development
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variables are again measured with the Saiz’ interval indices used in Chapter 4 and 5, each
ranging continuously from 0-3. These take into account a wider range of programs used by states
in their development efforts than did Langer’s measures, which focused on a more limited range
of 16 policy tools. Indices values span years from 1983- 2004, thus my examination includes
observations from before and after devolution in 1994. I also include the state policy liberalism
variable to measure left power in state governments, which accounts for ideology and policy
liberalism of state legislatures, rather than simple partisan control (Berry el al 1998 with
updates). This is provided, as was private sector union density, as a critical “power resource”
control variable.
As did Kelly & Witko, I include national level governmental variables to control for
Presidential Party and percent Democrats in Congress. Given the federalist structure of the
United States political system, the partisanship of national leaders could impact state-level
inequality outcomes. Even economic inequality that exists at a pre-transfer level is impacted by
the federal government due to its capacity to fund and promote infrastructure, education, and
other non-transfer programs, as well as to regulate industries and financial markets (Kelly 2005).
Higher values of both of these variables are associated with greater Democratic control and are
predicted to be negatively related to inequality.
Outside of power resources, economic development policy, and national level
government indicators there are some additional state policy factors that I anticipate to impact
inequality levels. Although this examination focuses on market-based inequality, rather than
post-redistribution inequality, I do include a measure of welfare share, the fraction of state
expenditures devoted to means-tested transfers, as a control variable. This is to consider the
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conservative view that higher levels of social assistance could lead to more inequality in the
market itself through less labor force participation. Right-to-work is also included to account for
the common belief that adoption of RTW could lower wages for workers due to reduced
unionization. Still, I found in Chapter 4 that only three states adopted RTW in my data set, and
all of those actually saw a short-term increase in unionization. Thus, the results regarding RTW’s
impact on inequality could be idiosyncratic to these few observations. State minimum wage
level, as tracked by Kelly & Witko (2012), is also included as a control variable, because many
states require a wage higher than the base floor established by the federal government, which
could help to compress the wage spectrum in those states by exerting an upward push on
incomes at the lower end of the distribution.
Finally, I control for general state economic and demographic conditions that could be
associated with inequality. State unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics) is anticipated
to be positively related to inequality, and growth in gross state product is expected to decrease
overall inequality. Proportion non-white workforce is expected to lead to more inequality.
Minority workers tend to make lower average wages than whites potentially creating conditions
for greater pre-transfer inequality. I also include variables to account for manufacturing share of
GSP, as well as government sector share of employment (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012) to
proxy for share of workers in government employment. Higher values of government share are
anticipated to be related to less inequality as governments may have a more compressed pay
spectrum with higher average wages than are observed in the private service sector. Higher
values of manufacturing share could be related to less inequality because the manufacturing
sector may pay better wages for lower-skilled workers than do service-sectors such as food
service and hospitality.
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Neither Langer nor Kelly and Witko accounted for international economic openness and
its potential impact on inequality levels. The conventional argument is that globalization could
lead to increased income disparities, since more mobile capital may exit if workers refuse to
accept low wage rates and labor protections (Reich 1991); while Hansen’s research found that
international openness did not lower wages (Hansen 2006). While data on outward foreign
direct investment (FDI) would be ideal to test this argument, only inward FDI jobs data is
readily available at the state level (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Brady and Wallace 2000,
updated). Thus I include percentage of total state employment attributable to inward FDI, as used
previously in Chapter 4, to control for globalization impacts. If the common argument is correct,
higher values of FDI jobs will be positively related to inequality. Table 18 summarizes all
variables, measure specification, and data sources.

Model and Results for Impact of Economic Policy Strategies on Inequality
The first model in Table 19 tests H1, H2, H3, and H4 regarding the independent effect of
the two economic development strategies and power resources on state inequality. The results
do not confirm Langer’s original findings that locational policy activism leads to more
inequality, while entrepreneurial policy activism leads to less. My model, which contains power
resource variables as key controls, indicate that locational policy has no significant impact on
inequality, and that entrepreneurial policy has a positive impact on inequality in the long-term,
given the significance level on the lag. Moreover, the independent effects of the power resources
of private union density and left government liberalism have significant impact. Despite the
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Table 18. Basic Form of the Differenced and Lagged Independent Variables Used in the Inequality Error
Correction Model
Variable

Measure Specification

Data Source

Gini coefficient (0-1) measuring
average income inequality existent in
the state economy before transfers
from redistributive programs (Social
Security and TANF, for example).

Method of calculation and estimation
developed by Kelly 2005 using Census
Bureau Annual Social and Economic
Supplement data. Years 1983-2004.
Provided courtesy of Nathan Kelly.

Interval level index based on coding
of state economic development
program attributes ranging from
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent
years.

Methodology for constructing the index is
presented in Saiz 2001.

Dependent Variable
State MarketConditioned Income
Inequality

Key Independent
Variables
Entrepreneurial Policy
Activism

Missing years interpolated.

Locational Policy
Activism

Interval level index based on coding
of state economic development
program attributes ranging from
approximately 0 to 3 for intermittent
years.
Missing years interpolated.

Attributes coding based on data gathered
by the National Association of State
Development Agencies in 1983, 1986,
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 and Miles
Friedman and Partners LLC in 2006.
Methodology for constructing the index is
presented in Saiz 2001.
Attributes coding based on data gathered
by the National Association of State
Development Agencies in 1983, 1986,
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 and Miles
Friedman and Partners LLC in 2006.

State Private Sector
Union Density

Workers who are members of unions
as a percentage of the state private
sector workforce.

Method of calculation and estimation is
presented in Hirsch et al 2001. Years
1984-2004. Downloaded from
www.unionstats.com.

Private Union Density*
Entrepreneurial Policy
(Used in second model)

Factor term of Entrepreneurial Policy
and Private Sector Union Density.

Used to test H5 regarding the
conditioning effect of entrepreneurial
policy (z) on the impact of private union
density(x) on inequality (y).

State Government
Liberalism

Interval measure based on
ideological scores of state’s
Congressional representatives,
weighted by partisan control of the
state legislature. High levels of this
measure indicate “Left”governments.

Berry et al 1998, and updates. Years
1984-2004.
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Table 18 (con’d)
Control Variable

Measure Specification

Data Source

Democrat President

Partisanship of President during the
case-year. 1= Democrat. 0=
Republican.

Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1984-2004.

Democrats in Congress

Percentage of Democrats in both
houses of Congress during the caseyear.

Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004

Welfare Share

Fraction of state government
expenditures due to means-tested
transfers.

Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004.

“Right-to-Work” State

State that prohibits union shops
either by state constitutional
amendment or “right-to-work”
statute. “Right to work”= 1. No
prohibition of union shops = 0.

Department of Labor, National Right to
Work Committee. Years 1984-2004.

State Minimum Wage

The minimum wage rate required for
the majority of the labor force per
state statute (different from the
federal minimum wage). In states
with no state minimum wage statute
using the prevailing fed minimum
wage, the value is 0.

Department of Labor, Wage and Hour
Division. Years 1983-2004.

State Unemployment
Rate

Annual average state unemployment
rate, as a share of the labor force.
Ranges 0-1.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. Years 19832004.

State GSP Growth

Annual percentage growth rate in
gross state product.

Bureau of Economic Analysis. Years
1984-2004.

Manufacturing Sector

Manufacturing sector share of gross
state product. (Ranges 0-1)

Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004

Government Sector

Government employee share of
employment in the entire state labor
force.(Ranges 0-1)

Data provided courtesy of Kelly and
Witko 2012. Years 1983-2004.

Non-white Population

Share of non-whites in state
population. Ranges from 0-1.

Based on U.S. Census data. Provided
courtesy of Kelly and Witko 2012. Years
1984-2004.

Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) Jobs

Private sector jobs in foreign-owned
affiliates as a percentage of the state
private sector workforce. Varies from
1-100.

Calculations provided courtesy of Brady
and Wallace 2000 and updates.
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*Note: this variable had variation in only
three years for three states.

Based on data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Years 1983-2004.

Table 19. ECM Results for Annual Change in State Market Income Inequality

VARIABLES
Lag Market Inequality

(1)
Base Model

(2)
Model with Conditional Effects

-0.239***
(0.0360)

-0.242***
(0.0362)

0.0101
(0.00829)
0.00298
(0.00233)
0.00646
(0.00577)
0.00342**
(0.00166)
-5.84e-05
(0.000626)
-0.000272**
(0.000137)
--

0.00992
(0.00827)
0.00303
(0.00234)
0.00636
(0.00577)
0.00104
(0.00220)
-6.36e-05
(0.000626)
-0.000554**
(0.000238)
0.000268

--0.00843*
(0.00431)
0.00773***
(0.00258)

(0.000163)
-0.00814*
(0.00431)
0.00799***
(0.00256)

0.00761***
(0.00242)
0.00401**
(0.00198)
-0.00187***
(0.000277)
-0.000903***
(0.000225)

0.00740***
(0.00241)
0.00371*
(0.00199)
-0.00189***
(0.000277)
-0.000929***
(0.000227)

-0.0455*
(0.0276)
-0.0214**
(0.0109)
-0.0171**
(0.00702)
1.51e-05
(0.00180)
0.00323**
(0.00150)
-0.00115***
(0.000437)

-0.0446
(0.0276)
-0.0200*
(0.0110)
-0.0169**
(0.00701)
0.000435
(0.00181)
0.00316**
(0.00150)
-0.00114***
(0.000436)

Key Independent Variables:
D. Locational Policy Activism
Lag Locational Policy Activism
D. Entrepreneurial Policy Activism
Lag Entrepreneurial Policy Activism
D. Private Union Density
Lag Private Union Density
Lag Entrepreneurial Policy * Private
Density
D. State Policy Liberalism
Lag State Policy Liberalism
National Politics Controls:
D. Presidential Party
Lag Presidential Party
D. Democrats in Congress
Lag Democrats in Congress
Additional State Policy Controls:
D. Welfare Share
Lag Welfare Share
D. “Right-to-Work”
Lag “Right-to-Work”
D. State Minimum Wage
Lag State Minimum Wage
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Table 19 (Con’d):
(1)
Base Model

VARIABLES (Continued)

(2)
Model with Conditional Effects

State Economic and Demographic
Controls:
D. Unemployment Rate
Lag Unemployment Rate
D.GSP Growth
Lag GSP Growth
D. FDI Jobs
Lag FDI Jobs
D. Non White Population
Lag Non White Population
D. Manufacturing Share of GSP
Lag Manufacturing Share of GSP
D. Government Share of Employment
Lag Government Share of Employment

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of statefip

0.135
(0.0826)
0.108***
(0.0402)
-0.0488***
(0.0147)
-0.104***
(0.0206)
-0.000476
(0.00123)
-0.000262
(0.000361)
0.426**
(0.177)
0.00979
(0.00676)
0.0666
(0.0436)
0.0236***
(0.00849)
-0.156
(0.229)
-0.0351**
(0.0160)

0.128
(0.0828)
0.112***
(0.0403)
-0.0480***
(0.0147)
-0.102***
(0.0207)
-0.000383
(0.00123)
-0.000211
(0.000364)
0.428**
(0.176)
0.00985
(0.00674)
0.0666
(0.0434)
0.0237***
(0.00847)
-0.153
(0.229)
-0.0337**
(0.0160)

0.160***
(0.0261)

0.164***
(0.0264)

1,049
0.264
50

1,049
0.265
50

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  p=.101

163

severe erosion of the labor movement in the private sector, annual growth in private union
density has a significant relationship to lower inequality levels, but only in the long term. The
equity-generating role of unions is still relevant in a day of declining membership. State
government liberalism appears to have a negative initial impact on inequality, but over time
higher levels of Left-government strength increase inequality, according to this model. Kelly and
Witko’s original analysis found that left government liberalism was negatively related to
inequality only after 1994 and only in the short term. My examination, with observations from
before and after devolution, suggests that the cumulative long-term impact of state government
liberalism does not necessarily lead to more equitable income distributions. Left state
governments are not a particularly potent power resource for working class interests.
This finding flies in the face of expectations about how left policy liberalism should
impact distributional consequences at the state level. It may indicate a recent shift among U.S.
liberals toward the emphasis of cultural and social issue platforms over economic policies. Some
political commentators claim that many aspects of economic growth entail a tradeoff between
cultural enrichment and changing genders roles, which are supported by liberal policy positions,
and the marginalization of the traditional family structure essential to working-class prosperity
(Muller 2013). My findings may also be connected to recent trends in most post-industrial
countries indicating that left parties have shifted to the center on economic policy, especially in
the long-term as income inequality rises (Barth, Finseraas, and Moen 2014). The lack of
response from state left politicians to enact redistributive policies during an era of rising income
inequality may further wealth disparities in the market. Even when left party actives do demand
redistributive policies, liberal politicians generally do not respond with economic programs
unless the wider electorate also mobilizes around such demands (Pontusson and Rueda 2010).
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This combination of conditions may not exist in most American states, especially in the longterm, resulting in state governments controlled by liberal leaders who fail to enact enduring left
economic platforms, even while inequality continues to increase.
The national level control variables indicate that Democratic Congresses do decrease
state level inequality overall, but a Democratic President, counter to expectations, has a positive
impact on state level inequality in both the lagged and differenced terms. This is interesting, but
in my data set only one Democratic President, Clinton, is represented, so there may not be
sufficient variation to account for this finding.
Turning to the additional state policy factors, contrary to some claims from the Right,
welfare generosity appears to reduce, rather than intensify market-inequality, although it is
important to note that in the mid-nineties essential changes were made to promote labor force
participation as a condition of receiving temporary means-tested assistance. In any case, states
with higher shares of welfare spending as a part of their overall expenditures appear to have
annual declines in pre-transfer inequality. Over the long-term RTW does not significantly impact
state income inequality, but adoption of a RTW law appears, surprisingly, to lower inequality in
the short term. Again, I attribute this mostly to the presence of only three idiosyncratic cases
where RTW laws changed. One could speculate that the adoption of RTW in these three states
(Idaho, Texas, and Oklahoma) equalized wage levels between union and non-union workers in
the short-term, perhaps reducing between-worker inequality, but the long-term impact of RTW is
nil. For most states RTW laws apparently had their critical impact on economic outcomes, both
unionization rates and inequality, in the years when they were first adopted, and for most states
that was over four decades ago. As for state minimum wage laws, I find that state minimum
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wage laws do not reduce inequality in the short-term. My results suggest that their initial
implementation actually raises inequality, but that over time they do have a significant impact in
decreasing inequality. The initial short term increase in inequality is counter-intuitive, but I
speculate that it could be the result of firms raising the wages of well-paid workers higher
relative to the increases they give to low-paid workers to compensate for the overall elevation of
the wage floor.
Some of the demographic and economic control variables conform with expectations.
Unemployment raises long-term inequality, as does higher percentage of non-white residents in
the short term; while higher rates of economic growth are linked to lower levels of inequality in
both the long and short term. Interestingly, higher percentages of manufacturing as a share of
GSP appear to be significantly related to increases in inequality. This was unexpected, as
manufacturing is generally thought to provide better pay for workers than many low-skilled
service sector jobs. Government employment shares were related to lower inequality in the longterm, suggesting that governments do compress the wage spectrum across different sectors of
workers.
Finally, increases in inward FDI jobs do not demonstrate a significant relationship to state
inequality levels, again confirming Hansen’s findings that domestic forces, rather than
international trade and investment, are at the heart of distributional outcomes in America. While
I have shown that foreign-firm employment shares aid union membership growth in the shortterm, this effect does not appear to matter when looking at changes in inequality.
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Modeling the Conditioning Effect of Entrepreneurial Policy on Unions as a Power Resource
Since I find that entrepreneurial policy does exert a significant impact on inequality, I
now move forward to test the hypothesis that it may also condition the equality-inducing effects
of private sector unionization. I did find that private sector unionization still exerts a negative
independent effect on inequality for the working classes. But in states with a heavy emphasis on
entrepreneurial policy, there is less activity to grow jobs in sectors for the lowest-skilled
employees, due to the promotion of positions for high-tech and professional workers. This could
produce a “skills premium” effect that exacerbates inequality among different classes of workers
and stymy union advocacy for lower-skilled employees in various ways. First, it could produce
more jobs in non-unionized “white-collar” sectors, decreasing union membership shares in the
workforce and lowering unions’ status to bargain for lower-skilled workers as a result. Second, it
could motivate employers to redirect more of their surplus profits to raising wage rates for
higher-skilled workers relative to lower-skilled ones or encourage them to downsize their lessskilled workforce. Third, it may even encourage unions to concentrate new organizing efforts in
the professional and skilled-classes, since that is where more job growth occurs, as hinted at in
Figure 3, and decrease advocacy for the working poor. As a result I offer the following
hypothesis regarding the conditioning effect of entrepreneurial policy on unionization:
H5: Private sector unionization will have a negative impact on inequality in states with
low use of entrepreneurialism, but not in states with high use of entrepreneurial policy.

The second model in Table 19 tests the interaction of unionization with entrepreneurial
policy. I created four pairs of interaction terms from these variables, composed of the lagged
values, the differenced values, and the combination of lagged and differenced values for the two
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variables. I list only the interaction term composed of the lagged values of both variables, as it
was the only term with a high p value. (None of the interaction term coefficients were significant
at 90% confidence, but the lag*lag term was nearly significant at p=.101.) It is necessary to take
caution when interpreting the coefficients and significance levels on the separate constitutive
terms making up the interaction term (Brambor et al 2006). For instance, in the second model the
coefficient on the lag of private union density (the x variable) refers to its impact on market
inequality (y) only when the lag of entrepreneurial policy (the z variable) is 0. The nearly
significant coefficient of the interaction term provides some indication that private density’s
impact on inequality is in fact conditioned by entrepreneurial policy. Private union density’s
significance is likely to apply on some, but not all values of entrepreneurial policy. A graph
charting x’s impact across the range of values for the z-variable is needed to adequately assess
the effect of entrepreneurial policy on inequality.
Figure 4 shows how the lagged value of union density impacts inequality at different
levels of the lag of entrepreneurial policy. Values above the x axis baseline of 0 indicate where
union density has positive effect on inequality, while values below the baseline of 0 indicate a
negative effect. Significance is indicated where confidence intervals do not include the base line
of 0. The line indicates that in the long-term unionization does have a significant effect in
reducing inequality when the value of entrepreneurial policy is below about 1.25. However, as
entrepreneurial policy use rises the impact of unionization on inequality becomes insignificant.
At the highest values of entrepreneurial policy (over about 2), the association of unionization
with inequality is actually positive, though insignificant. This finding suggests that
entrepreneurial development policy acts as a roadblock to private sector unionism in equalizing
distributional outcomes. Additionally, the histogram labeled Figure 5 shows that roughly over
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half of the observations in the data set have entrepreneurial policy values greater than about 1.25,
confirming that the significance of this conditional relationship holds for a substantial number of
cases in the model. Thus, H5 is supported and the interpretation of unions as an effective
working class power resource in states which prioritize use of entrepreneurial development is not
confirmed by these findings. Private sector unionization is rendered irrelevant as a force for
promoting an economy of shared wealth in the presence of entrepreneurialism.

Discussion
This paper shows that power resources are important variables to be considered in models
which attempt to explain variation in state income inequality. Overall, private union density
exerts a significant negative impact on inequality over the long term, and state government
liberalism appears to equalize income in the short term, though it increases inequality in the long
run. Even in the United States, where our “left” party tends to operate as a centrist one, and
union density levels are lower than almost anywhere else in the developed world, these power
resources make a difference to distributional outcomes.
When I included power resources indicators along with economic development policy
strategies as key independent variables, I did not find support for Langer’s findings. Namely, the
impact of entrepreneurial policy appears to increase disparities in income rather than equalize the
income distribution. Why are my findings about entrepreneurial policy counter to Langer’s? First
of all, Langer examines inequality levels beginning nearly a decade earlier than those I use, and
her series ends ten years prior to mine. These years pre-date the information revolution, the dotcom boom, and the expansion of investment and financial markets around the turn of the
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millennium. Perhaps entrepreneurial approaches during the period she researched were geared
toward growing new manufacturing and industrial sectors, areas where working class employees
may have been more direct beneficiaries of skill and wage advancement. If entrepreneurialism
generated more high paying working-class jobs during these years, it would likely have an
equalizing effect on the income spectrum. In contrast, my data set includes the years of the
information boom, when entrepreneurial approaches more likely supported the computing,
communications, and high finance industries. A different breed of workers, equipped with
specialized, technical skills in these emerging industries have been able to command a higher
premium for their labor than the manufacturing workers of first-wave entrepreneurial policies.
The results of my analysis suggests that the “skills premium” exacted by higher-skilled
professional workers, often the direct recipient of entrepreneurial development gains, may in fact
be driving income inequality among the different skill classes of workers. It is important to note
that while economics researchers endorse the view that skills-biased technical change among
“knowledge economy” workers effects distributional outcomes, there are also studies that
discount its role in increasing inequality (Lemieux 2006, Mishel and Bernstein 2003). While the
“skills premium” thesis has been highly debated, its application to the findings here help to
explain why entrepreneurial strategy aimed at producing “quality jobs” may be contributing to
rising inequality .
Another reason that entrepreneurialism may lead to more inequality in the years I cover is
that while it may create quality jobs, it may create less jobs due to productivity gains from better
technology and skills advantages. Some noted experts claim that productivity gains could result
in more joblessness for lower-skilled workers (Greenspan 1996). Unemployment is controlled
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for in this analysis, but joblessness due to dropping out of the workforce or under-employment
by working part time or temporary positions is not. My results here suggest that
entrepreneurialism may fail to provide good job opportunities for the lowest-skilled workers,
thus leading to more inequality.
An unexpected finding is that entrepreneurial strategies breed more income inequality in
the market, because the stated intent of the programs is to offer a “high-road” approach to
development (Eisenger 1989, Brace 2002). These programs concentrate on promotion of human
resources and core assets in communities to promote industries from within and seek to avoid the
worst consequences of inter-state competition for investment. Entrepreneurial policy advocates
claim that it transcends narrow “zero-sum-game” thinking and encourages “win-win” solutions
to development. However, its emphasis on generating more consumer demand could
unintendedly foster economies of elitism. Recent media examples of price and rent inflation in
the San Francisco Bay area, Boston, and other gentrifying centers show the frustration of lowerend consumers who are locked out of the wealth created by the Knowledge Economy. The recent
“Google bus” protests in Oakland erupted as rental rates in working-class neighborhoods
skyrocketed due to in-migration of affluent tech-workers (Berniker and Lipton 2014). Revenues
from entrepreneurial expansion often bypass public schools, public transit, and other important
services in the community, drive up the proximal costs of real estate, and increase inequality at
least in the early stages of growth (Isenberg 2015, Jones and Kim 2013). While academic
research on the association between entrepreneurialism and inequality is slim, effected citizens
and politicians have taken notice. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has been quoted as
depicting “Silicon” inequality as "bad for individuals, bad for our economy, bad for our
democracy" (Quoted in Isenberg 2015). My research findings confirm this unfortunate “dark
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side” to entrepreneurial development and indicate that more analysis is needed to fully
understand its impact on economies.
As for the lack of impact from locational policy, it may be that the increased job growth
in states that use these strategies does provide at least some sort of income opportunities to
lower-skilled workers who would otherwise have none. I do not find, however, that inequality
actually declines with greater use of locational policy, but apparently its use does not result in
more income dispersion in most states. This may be because locational approaches lower wages
for all workers, whether working or professional class, thus maintaining relatively low levels of
income inequality between workers, but resulting in declining incomes for everyone, overall.
The confirmation of the hypothesis H5 suggests that although private sector unions act to
decrease inequality in general, they may have lost their position as articulators of lower-class
interests in states that actively engage in entrepreneurial development. Higher levels of
entrepreneurialism appear to erase the equalizing effects that private sector unions have on
income distribution. If inequality is in fact related to the “skills premium,” union success in
representing lower income workers slips because of membership loss in sectors where unions
once thrived. Private sector unions may also be shifting their scarce resources to advocate in the
more premium-skills professional sectors. The union wage premium for organized workers
relative to non-union workers (Pontusson et al 2002) may actually reinforce and magnify the
skills wage premium in entrepreneurial-oriented states. In either case my results suggest that
entrepreneurialism presents a challenge to the American labor movement in advancing the
interests of the lower-skilled workers who need their advocacy the most. Unions need to retool
their efforts to develop effective strategies for addressing the plight of lower-class workers in the
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presence of an entrepreneurial policy environment, especially if they want to regain their
reputation as a force of social justice for more equitable economic outcomes.

Conclusion
This chapter endeavored to sort out how power resources, economic development policy,
and state level variation interact to impact income inequality in the United States. My findings in
regard to entrepreneurial policy suggest that labor unions in states that utilize this approach have
lost their ability to act as a power resource for the lowest-income citizens. A future direction of
research would be to directly test how variation in the relative unionization levels of different
occupational groups (varying among high-skilled and low-skilled) across the states impact
income inequality levels. This chapter did not offer a direct test of this relationship due to lack of
availability of data for each state on this variable at this time. However, the somewhat counterintuitive finding that entrepreneurialism, with its “quality job” focus, reduces union power to
abate income inequality indicates that unions have failed to effectively participate in this policy
strategy for the benefit of the traditional working class. Moreover, as with its impact on
unionization, I can not conclude that locational policy has a significant relationship to inequality
levels. While locational policies probably do suppress wages and incomes given findings of
previous scholarship (Hansen 2006), low-wage strategies do not appear to exacerbate inequality
between classes of workers. Finally, this chapter does reaffirm the general independent effect of
private sector unionization in reducing inequality, though this effect is significantly conditioned
by the presence of entrepreneurial activism. It also found that the independent effect of leftleaning governments was to decrease inequality in the short term, although in the long term they
appear to have a less equalizing effect.
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The major lesson from this research project is that entrepreneurial development does not
promote equality, and that the variables of unionism and state left government liberalism are
necessary to consider when making claims about the impact of these policies on distributional
outcomes. These socio-political factors need to be examined along-side important economic
policy variables to uncover the reasons for state-level variation in income inequality.
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Conclusion
Summary of Empirical Findings
In summary, the conclusions of this dissertation regarding its empirical research questions
are:


Entrepreneurial development strategies adopted by state governments do impact
unionization and labor movement goals. The long term impacts of such programs are
declining private sector union density and increasing income inequality. In spite of its
“high-road” approach to economic growth, entrepreneurialism does not lead to more
wealth generation or union advocacy for lower-income workers. However,
entrepreneurial strategies are associated with more likelihood of union election victories
in individual cases when labor organizing does occur, suggesting that entrepreneurial
policies are not directly oppositional to union mobilization.



Locational policies demonstrate no significant relationship to union decline or rising
inequality, empirically. However, this does not mean that they assist union growth or
equalize wealth in the economy. Nor does it mean that the principle underlying such
policies - that labor is a cost-factor for business, rather than an asset - runs parallel to the
mission of labor unions to advocate for lower-income workers.



Foreign investment into states has not depressed private sector union density in recent
decades or impeded union organizing. Increased FDI jobs as a share of the labor force
actually had an immediate positive “shock” effect on union density. Foreign firms are
more likely, not less, to contribute union wins in certification elections. International
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economic integration is not necessarily bad for unions, and it does not cause more income
inequality.


Right-to-work laws have limited ability to explain union outcomes in the recent
decades of this examination. Economic development policy and other variables better
explain long-term variation in unionization during the years of this study.

Normative Perspectives on this Research

Now, in these concluding pages I will address more normative questions. In Chapter 1 I
offered an alternate framing of my central research question, as follows: “Is there an economic
development strategy that actually aligns with the agenda of the union movement? Are some
development strategies compatible with unions and their efforts to nurture economies of shared
wealth?”
Given the results of my original analysis I conclude that currently there are few, if any,
state economic development strategies “in sync” with the labor movement. Outside of some
unique programs, unions are largely irrelevant to economic development agendas in the states.
There is some marginal evidence of Labor’s participation in a limited number of policies crafted
by states with historically high rates of unionization, as identified in Chapter 2. However, for
most states development policy-making ignores labor unions. A 1990 article by respected
researchers Virginia Gray and David Lowry predicted that this would happen over 20 years ago.
They found that among state “corporatist” policy-making institutions the higher education lobby
had largely replaced Labor’s seat at the table alongside business interests and government
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development agencies (Gray and Lowry 1990). My research findings confirm their prescient
insight. Economic development programing seeks little input from unions, and protection for
labor interests in state development strategies is spotty, at best.
Locational policy, defined as a strategy that seeks to lower factor-costs such as labor
wages to entice inward location of businesses, had no significant effect on unionization or
inequality in my models. Empirically, I found little association, either positive or negative,
between this strategy and union goals. However, there is no indication that locational policy
activism actually parallels labor movement goals in principle. A normative appraisal of this
policy strategy suggests that its values are in fact at odds with unionization.
The largely negative impact that entrepreneurial development approaches exerted on
unions and their goals is a somewhat surprising finding. I discovered that entrepreneurial
policy’s relationship to the fortunes of unions is rather nuanced. The underlying approach of
entrepreneurial development policy and unionization in regard to employee relations seems to
gel: labor is an asset, as well-off workers are thought to contribute more demand to the economy.
Therefore, both factors are based around the notion that workers should be amply compensated
as a means of economic growth. I find that pro-union election opportunities are enhanced in
entrepreneurial activist states. But more importantly, I demonstrated that the longer-term impact
of entrepreneurialism on the unionized share of the private sector labor force was negative. I
offered an explanation for this: entrepreneurial policy substitutes for union wage negotiations in
raising wage levels of workers. Entrepreneurialism decreases demand for union advocacy in the
labor force, because “high-skilled” workers who are the beneficiaries of this policy approach are
less inclined to need or want the collective action of unions overall.
178

Importantly, my models indicate that entrepreneurial policy use produces outcomes outof-line with the union goal of wealth dispersion. Entrepreneurialism had an independent effect of
exacerbating inequality levels, and it counteracted union abilities to mitigate inequality.
Entrepreneurialism rendered private sector unions irrelevant as a force for promoting equality.
The overall picture of entrepreneurial policy is that it is a hindrance to working-class
power, not because it offers direct opposition to the interests of lower-income workers, but
because it allows higher-income workers to eclipse their share and role in the economy. There
appears to be an unfortunate, counterintuitive trade-off between creation of higher-quality jobs
for skills-privileged workers and the fortunes of lower-income citizens. The skills-bias of
entrepreneurial policy promotes a situation where more “cream” can rise to the top, but it does
less to address the needs of those who slip through the cracks. Entrepreneurialism does not
appear to include unions as an articulator of lower-class interests in any serious way; but neither
does it directly promote “union-busting”. It may even offer unions some opportunities for
successful advocacy, if and when their efforts are channeled to advancing the interests of higherskilled professional and management workers. Still, entrepreneurial policy has not promoted
conditions for raising the fortunes of all workers in state job markets and the labor movement.
This view is a grim and negative appraisal of entrepreneurialism’s promise of wealth
generation. Yet from a normative perspective, it would probably be mistaken to conclude that
this strategy to development, one which avoids competitive bidding between states and values
skill-development, is bad for the workforce. While the unfortunate unintended consequences of
this approach do appear to be at odds with the labor movement’s mission to create an economy
of widely-shared wealth, the foundational principles of unionization and entrepreneurial growth
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strategies are not incompatible. If entrepreneurial policy can correct for some of its negative
consequences by including working-class voices and the needs of lower-skilled citizens in its
framework it may still be an instrument to nurture prosperity. Entrepreneurial policy strategies
should not only emphasize opportunities for the most educated, skills-savvy employees. They
must include solutions for dispersing the wealth that technical innovation generates in the
economic interests of all classes of workers.
As for my secondary focus on FDI, I consistently found, across various units of analysis,
that inward investment is not a roadblock to unionization. FDI jobs as a share of employment
relate to increases in union density, and foreign firms are more likely targets for union organizing
success than are American firms. The influx of management approaches from countries with less
combative labor relations approaches than our own, which is practically every other highlyindustrialized country, bodes well for union organizing in the private sector. Moreover, foreign
inward investment does not increase inequality. This does not mean that all aspects of
international economic integration benefit the U.S. labor force, as increased trade and outward
investment may endanger union jobs. However, entry of foreign capital into our domestic labor
market is a plus for union movement strength and does not hinder union goals regarding income
equality.
Finally, my focus on economic development shows that “right-to-work” laws alone are
insufficient for explaining unionization and inequality. My findings revealed no long-term
impact of these laws, perhaps because the impact of most union shop prohibitions have run their
course since their original enactment. I found positive associations between the initial shockeffect of RTW on both unionization and equality, which I conclude is idiosyncratic to the three
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cases in this data set. I must note that in the most recent years, increasing numbers of “rust-belt”
states have adopted these laws, and once data becomes available the effect of RTW should be
revisited. RTW does not aid wealth-sharing or union advocacy in any meaningful way, but other
economic policy statutes adopted by the states surpass these laws in generating significant
effects.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research
There are a number of directions to take for future research on this topic, both to shore up
the validity of the present findings and to expand understanding of the nature of the causal
connections between development policy, unionization, and economic inequality.
First of all, to address the research question using unionization as the dependent variable,
qualitative methods would enhance understanding of ways that entrepreneurialism can be
reinforcing, instead of at odds with unionization. Entrepreneurialism is not in conflict with
unionization in principle, as is the case with locational policy, but my analysis revealed that
entrepreneurialism is deleterious to union power in practice. This was even after finding some
anecdotal evidence of collaborative relationships between government development agencies and
labor associations as a part of entrepreneurial programming. Better understanding of interactive
relationships which condition the impact of entrepreneurial policy on unions is needed.
Qualitative case studies could uncover and analyze the unique situations where the two forces
actually reinforced one another. An emphasis on the exceptional cases that do not conform to the
norm would illuminate how and under what circumstances development policy works in tandem
with organizations representing the interests of lower-skilled workers. Qualitative research
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designs could also examine “typical cases” more deeply to unpack why and how the “innovation
industries” promoted by entrepreneurialism inhibit union growth.
There also needs to be more direct testing of the premise that skills-bias supplies the
causal link between entrepreneurial policy and union decline. Tapping skills-bias as a theory to
explain private sector unionization loss is reasonable on its face, but ideally one would test
directly for how more activist use of entrepreneurialism leads to erosion of union density
specifically in the “blue collar” industry sectors. Industry union density data is readily available
(Hirsch and Macpherson 2001), but unfortunately not at a state level. Developing a way to
directly test for how policy-induced skills-bias erodes the working-class in state economies
would shore up the validity of this dissertation’s findings.
Given the recent adoptions in four states of “right-to-work” laws (Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana, and Wisconsin), a new examination of the impact of these laws on unionization levels is
necessary in the future. Since the changes were as recent as five years ago, I was not able to
obtain accompanying economic development data and FDI jobs numbers to cover these years,
which is why these cases were not included in this analysis. Clearly, RTW adoption is an
important example of policy diffusion, however, and the effects of recent state adoptions need to
be analyzed.
A fundamental improvement for exploring this research question is to find new and better
measures to track locational and entrepreneurial policy activism. Given the periodic, everyfourth- year publishing schedule of the NASDA incentives guide on which the Saiz development
variables are based many years had to be interpolated, which is not desirable. A number of
scholars and think tanks have developed unique measures to track differing types of economic
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development policies, as explained in Chapter 2. The Saiz measures I used are the best, most
consistently available metrics. However, the last year available for coding was 2006, so even
these measures are now dated. Given new standards and conditions endorsed by many states in
recent years to their corporate incentive program (claw-back agreements, job quota guarantees,
requirement of health insurance with new jobs) an updated measure, separating locational
strategy types into two distinct classes - one for more conditional, strings-attached programs, the
other for more business-accommodating programs - would be ideal.
Finally, an interesting supplemental examination would be to consider how differing
economic approaches possibly impact public sector unionization. I focused on the private sector
in this dissertation, but there may be a public sector effect as well. The causal linkages to the
public sector are likely looser given that economic development policy aims to create new
businesses, primarily. However, entrepreneurial policy strategies offer an expanded role of
government agencies in engineering the industry-sector mix in the economy, which may have an
effect on membership growth in public sector unions.
There are also a number of improvements and areas of future research regarding the
relationship of economic development, unionization, and inequality. I posited that skills-biased
technical change is the force that causes entrepreneurial policy to lead to inequality and that
lowers unions’ abilities to negate inequality. However, as with the first research question, I was
not able to test for skills-bias directly as a factor leading to inequality through entrepreneurial
policy activism. Development of better measures to directly account for skills-bias are needed to
show that different policy types do in fact produce and exacerbate this bias, and that it has
consequences on the income distribution.
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Using more nuanced measures of inequality could be advantageous. I have used summary
Gini coefficients for pre-transfer inequality, which measure the overall inequality that exists
across the entire income distribution. Deeper examination of the inequality existing between
specific quartiles of the wage distribution may better assess the degree to which “betweenworker” inequality skews the income distribution. Also, in this project I left the impact on posttransfer inequality levels unexamined. Entrepreneurial policies may produce more market
inequality, but they may also offer compensation mechanisms for this negative consequence
through welfare redistribution, progressive tax structures, and re-training programs, which
ultimately result in lower post-transfer inequality. Qualitative research designs could help to
better establish the link between development policy strategies and accompanying social welfare
provisions, as well as which industries targeted for development produce greater wage-gains for
lower-income citizens. Certain types of entrepreneurial programming, like those aimed at “green
energy” development or health fields may increase the needs for production and service workers
as much as for professional-skills employees, and may benefit lower-income strata, in contrast to
the information-technology and finance sectors.
The findings here demand the attention of government leaders in the economic
development field and labor union officials, in particular. Governments and unions must
recognize the role that development policies, especially entrepreneurial ones, have on
distributional consequences and should be willing to work together collaboratively to promote
the best distributional outcomes.
First of all, state government leaders must be responsible and willing to evaluate these
policies’ broadly, according to their impact on all classes of citizens, rather than assuming that
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wealth dispersion will occur “naturally” on its own. State performance managers should monitor
the consequences of these programs on inequality, median household income, and poverty rates
as frequently as they assess their impacts on number of jobs created and FDI attracted.
Governments should vigorously pursue claw-back provisions and job standards in the
negotiation of locational incentives packages to ensure that the jobs created offer long-term
employment opportunities with middle-class earning potential. When funding incubator
businesses development officials would be wise to cultivate projects that have the potential to
provide employment opportunities for less-skilled workers through job training, internship, and
apprentice opportunities. Higher tech industries tend to be high-productivity enterprises that do
not require as much human labor as low-tech enterprises, but incubator financing should still be
targeted with the goal of skill-enhancement and employment for lower income workers in mind.
Unions must work to find a greater voice in the deliberation of economic development
strategies if they want to remain viable. More well-organized unions in the upper Midwest and
Northeast have had some success in appointing labor representatives to economic development
advisory boards, and unions in all regions should prioritize this activity. Unions, especially those
in the skilled-trades, should exploit their natural position as training providers, expanding
apprenticeship and industrial certification programs and demonstrating the usefulness of these
programs in entrepreneurial strategies. Unions must focus their lobbying and political action
efforts toward economic development policies, as much as they do toward labor relations
statutes. While unions should not ignore proposals to enact “right-to-work” and state collective
bargaining prohibitions, fighting these policies is reactionary. If unions already served a critical,
productive role in state development programs, it would be less politically advantageous for
elected opportunists to attack them.
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One additional prescription for unions suggested by this project is that they should target
their organizing activities toward foreign-owned firms. These companies appear to be more
willing to accept unions than are American-owned multi-national corporations. Building greater
trans-national ties to the union movements in these firm’s home companies also reinforces
opportunities for American unions to successfully organize in their U.S.-located subsidiaries.
Development policies are the products of state governments; therefore their consequences
should not be left to the whims of the market’s invisible hand. Governments and unions need to
be active, long-term stewards of these strategies to ensure an equitable and successful
distribution of their benefits.
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APPENDIX: Firms Experiencing Union Elections in the Micro-Model Dataset
MOST FREQUENTLY APPEARING FIRMS
Worksite Name

Parent Firm, if Any

First Student

FirstGroup

UK

90

Durham School Services

National Express Group PLC

UK

11

First Transit

FirstGroup

UK

7

Laidlaw Transit

Laidlaw International

US

7

Waste Management

US

7

Help at Home Inc.

US

5

US

5

US

5

UK

5

Firm
Nationality

Multiple Cases
Where Noted

Jacobs Technology

Jacobs Engineering Group Inc.

MV Transportation
Wackenhut Services, Inc.

G4S INTERNATIONAL (GROUP
4 SECURICOR)

Firm
Nationality

Number of Cases

ALL OTHERS
Worksite Name

Parent Firm, if Any

178 Lowell Street Operating
Company/ Lexington Health Care
Center
3-V Inc.

HealthBridge

Cedar Hill Healthcare Center

HealthBridge Management

US

3V Group Italia S.p.A.

Italy
US

A&A Electrical Company of
Beaumont, Inc.
A.T. Massey Coal Company Inc.

US

AAA Residential Services Inc.

US

ABC Professional Tree Service

US

US

Acme Engineering
ACPAC Packing (Acupac)

Canada
Outsourcing Services Group

Adame
ADT Security Services Inc.

US
US

Tyco International

US

Advanced Life Systems Inc

US

Advanced Student Transporation

US

Advent Heating & Cooling

US

AECOM Technology

US

AEG Facilities

Anschutz Entertainment Group

US

AFCO Steel, LLC of Arkansas

WW Steel

US

AGAR Supply Company

US

Ahern and Associates

US

AHTNA Government Services
Corp.

AHTNA, Alaska Native
Corporation
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US

Air System Components

Tomkins PLC

UK

Airgas
Airport Ramada Inn

US
Ramada Worldwide, subsid of
Wyndam Worldwide

Akal Security Inc.

US
US

The Glidden Company

Akzo-Nobel Paints

Alamo Car Rental

Vanguard Car Rental USA

Netherlands
US

2

Alan Ritchey Inc.

US

2

Albert Eaddy/ Recana Solutions

US

Albert Lea Select Foods

Hormel Foods

US

Albertson's Inc.
Howmet Castings

US
Alcoa Howmet

US

Alden Rehab

US

All City Transporation Incorporated

US

All Star Transportation

US

Allen Freight Systems Inc

P.A.M. Transportation

US

Allens

US

Allied Construction Services, Inc.

US

BFI/Allied Waste

US

Allina Health system

US

Alta Dena Certified Dairy, Inc.

US

Altamont Ambulance Service, Inc.

US

Alutiiq Professional Servics LLC

Afognak Native Corporation

US

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.

Operates TAPS, which is owned
by consortium of companies, BP
has largest share

US

Brighten Health

Brighten Health Group

US

AmCane Sugar LLC

US

American Ambulette and
Ambulance Service, Inc.
American Bottling Company

US
Dr Pepper Snapple Group

American Cooling Inc.

3

2

2

US
US

American Fuji Seal Inc.

Fuji Seal International

American Seafood Southern Pride

American Seafood Groups

US

American Sugar Refining Inc.

Subsid of Florida Crystals, subsid
of Flo-Sun

US

Japan

ResCare

US

Americold Logistics

US

Americsource Bergen

US

Ames/True Temper

2

Castle Harlan Inc.

Amicable Healthcare

US
US
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4

Angelica Textile Services

Angelica Corporation

US

Anixter

US

Apex Environmental

US

Appalachian Precision Hardwood
Flooring
Archer Daniel Midlands

US

Ash Grove Cement Company

US

Asplundh Tree

US

Associated Milk Producers, Inc.

US

Apple, LLC (Retail Stores)

US

Apple Inc

US

ATC Vancom

US

Atlantic Express

US

Automated Health Systems
Avalon Health Care of California

US
Avalon Health Care Group

US

Avante At Inverness

US

Aviall Services Inc.

US

B&L Freight

US

BAE Systems

BAE Systems, PLC

UK

Bagcraft Papercon II, LLC

Packaging Dynamics

US

Balfour Beatty Community

Balfour Beatty PLC

UK

Barton Protective

Allied Security LLC

US

Baumann and Sons

ABA Transportation

US

Baycrest Village

Farmington Centers

US

Bayshore Health Care Center

US

Beacon Information Technology &
Staffing Services
Bechtel BWXT, Idaho

US
McDermott International Inc

Benchmark Assisted Living LLC
Berry Plastics Corporation

Apollo Management and Graham
Partners

Grupo Bimbo

Blossom Health Care Center

Compassionate Health Care

US
US
US
Mexico
US

Blount International

US

Boars Head Provisions

US

Bobwell Productions

US

Boeing Company

US

Braden Sutphin Ink Company

US

Bonsal American

2

US

Beverly Healthcare-California
Inc/Beverly Manor
Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc.

Bredero Price Company Inc.

4

BrederoShaw, subsid of Shawcor
LTD
Oldcastle, arm of CRH plc

Bozzutos

Canada
Ireland
US
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2

2

BPAmoco Chemical

UK

Briarfield at Ashley Circle

Briarfield Health Centers

US

Kindred Nursing Centers West LLC

Kindred Healthcare

US

Bridgestone Firestone North
America Tire LLC
Brighten Health Group

Bridgestone Corporation

Japan
US

Brightside Academy, Inc.

US

Brinks Inc

US

Bristol Hospital EMS, LLC

US

Britthaven Nursing Center

US

Broadmeadow Healthcare LLC

Cadia Delaware Rehabilitation

Brody Mining
Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming,
Inc.
Bruister and Associates

US
US

RailCrew Xpress

US
US

Brunner International

US

Buckeye Technologies

US

Budget Rent a Car

Cendant Corp.

US

Buffalo Air Handling
Loomis Armored US, Inc.

US
Securitas AB

Sweden

Burritoville Systems Inc.

US

C & D Security

US

C. Martin Company, Inc.

US

Cable Tech Inc.

US

Cablevision Systems Corp.

US

Caesars Indiana

Caesars Entertainment

California Almond Growers
Cambridge Brands

2

US
Tootsie Roll Industries

US
US

Caraustar

US

Cardinal Health 200, Inc.

US
Progress Energy

US

Carson Trailers
Casa Chevrolet

2

US

Caption Colorado

Carolina Power & Light

2

US
General Motors

US

Case Farms of Ohio Inc.

US

Case Ready Meats Inc

Cargill Case Ready Meats,
Precepts Foods LLC

US

Casino Aztar Columbia
Entertainment
Catelli Brothers Inc

Columbia Sussex

US

CCL Custom Manufacturing

CCL Industrial

US
Canada

CDC Systems Inc

US
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3

Celanese Corporation

US

Centerpoint Medical Center

US

Central Maine Power Company

Energy East Corporation

Central Parking System Inc.

US
US

Cereamic Protction Corporation of
America
BPB America Inc

Protective Products of America

Cessna Aircraft Co.

Textron

US

Morrison Management Specialists

Compass Group plc

UK

Chenega Integrated Systems, LLC

Chenega Corporation

US

Saint Gobain

France

US

Chestertown Foods, Inc.

US
The Trans Group

Children's Home of Detroit
United Daily News Group

Christie's Inc.

Christie's International PLC

US
Taiwan
UK

Chugach McKinley Inc.

US

ChurchDwight

US

Cintas

US

City Centurion Security Services

US
Kroger Company

Clarin
Clarkston Specialty Healthcare

US

Fundamental

US
US

Classic Residence Management
Limited Partnership
Claymont Steel

Hyatt Hotels Corporation

Clearon Corp

Division of ICL Industrial
Products

2

US
US

Clinton Memorial Hospital

Israel
US
US

Coastal International Security

Integrative Health Care Holding
INC
Akal Security

Coastal Paper

Cellu Tissue

US

Coca-Cola North America

Coca-Cola Company

US

Cochran Electric, Inc.
Coinmach Corp.

2

US

Classic Party Rentals

Coastal Communities Hospital

2

US

Chinese Daily News

Fred Meyer Alaska, Inc.

2

US

Chesterfield Health Services
Chestnut Ridge Transportation

2

US

US
Coinmach Service Corp.

US

Cole Haan

US

Collins and Aikman

US

Colonial Park Care Center

US

Comcast

US

2

Community Education Centers Inc.

US

2
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Compak

J Baker Industries

US

Computer Sciences Corporation

US

Concept Packaging

US

Connecticut Water Company

Connecticut Water Services

US

Consolidated Container Corporation

US

Consolidated Storage

US

Continental Tire North America

Continental AG

Germany

Cooper Tire and Rubber

US

Coral Gables Hospital Inc.

US

Core-Mark International, Inc.

US

Coreslab Structures (Omaha) Inc.

Canada

Cornell Corrections of Texas

Cornell Companies Inc.

US

Costco Optical Lab 908

Costco Wholesale Corporation

US

Covenant Care Ohio Inc. d/b/a
Fairview Skilled Nursing and Rehab
Center
Covidien Health Care

Covenant Care

US

Covidien PLC

Ireland

CPC Logistics Inc.

US

Crash Rescue Equipment Service

US

Crest Transportation Services, Inc.

Assist Ambulance

US

Cristi Cleaning Service

US

Cruiselink II

US

CSC Applied Technology

US

Daffy's

US

Daiohs First Choice Services

First Choice

US

Dairy Farmers of America
Dakkota Integrated Systems

Daley's Medical Transportation Inc.

US
Joint venture of Rush Trucking
LLC (US) & Intier Automotive
Interiors, subsid of Magna
(Canada)
Bud's Ambulance Service

US

US

DANA Corp

US

Danard Electric

US

Dartmouth College - Hanover Inn

US

Day & Zimmermann Hawthorne
Corp.
Deco Inc.

US

DermaRite Industries LLC

US

Thomas Built Buses

US
Subsid of Freightliner, owned by
DaimlerChyrsler

Dillon’s Bus Service
Dimondale Nursing Care Center

2

Germany
US

NexCare Health System

DISH Network

US
US
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2

DITTO Express
DMI Industries

US
Otter Tail Corporation

Doll Distributing LLC

US

Dorman Products
DTM Walnut Creek, Inc.

US
US

Hilton Hotels Corporation

Duerr Tool & Die Co. Inc.

US
US

Dunkin Donuts Distribution Center

Bain, Carlysle Group

US

Durrett Shepphard Steel Co. Inc.

Reliance Steel and Aluminum Co.

US

Dutch Manor Nursing Home &
Rehabilitation
Dyncorp International

Capital Living and Rehab Centers

US

2

Veritas Capital, Dyncorp
International Inc.

US

4

Eby-Brown Company LLC

US

ECOLAB, Inc.

US

Ecology Services Inc

US

Eden West convalescent Hospital

Solnus Five

US

Edens Corporation/RTS
Edgewood Vista Senior Living Inc.

US
US

Educational Bus Inc.

Edgewood Management Group
LLC
Trans Group

US

2

Ohio Edison

FirstEnergy Corporation

US

2

El Paso Disposal
Elbar, Inc.

US
Pat Salmon & Sons

US

Elberta Crate & Box com

US

Emerald Correctional Management
LLC
Emerald Polymer Additives LLC

US
Emerald Performance Materials

US

Emergency Ambulance Inc.

US

Enersys Delaware Inc.

US

Engine Power Components

US

Entergy Nuclear Northeast

US

Entergy Operations Inc.

US

Epworth Villa

US

Equity Residential

US

Erie Interstate

US

Evergreen Health Care Center

Boulevard Health Consulting

US

Evergreen Healthcare Management
LLC
Evergreen Properties LLC of North
Carolina
Exel Logistics

EHC Management

US
US

Exel Global Logistics

Extendicare Health Facilities,
Richfield Health Center
Fairhaven Health Systems

UK
Canada
US
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Farner-Bocken Company

US

Federal Mogul

US

Felbro Inc.

US

Ferro Corporation

US

Fidelity Health Care

Premier Health Partners

US

Filtrona Extrusion USA Inc.

Filtrona PLC

UK

Firstline Transportation Security Inc

SMS Holdings

US

Fitzgerald's Casino & Hotel

Magestic Star Casino LLC,
ultimate parent is Barden
Development
L&R Group of Companies

US

US

2

Flight Safety Servies Corporation

FlightSafety Intl, a Berkshire
Hathaway Company

US

2

Florida Power & Light

NextEnergy

US

Five Star Parking

Fluor Industrial Services

US

2

Flying Food Group

US

2

Food Service of America

Services Group of America

Foothill Waste
FPL Energy

US
Nextera Energy

US

Freda Custom Foods
Fresh Direct UTF Trucking

US
Fresh Direct Holding

Freshko Produce Services
Pepsi Bottling Group

US

US
US

PepsiCo

US

Fuel Systems LLC

US

Fulton Precision Industries

US

G.E. Holman
Gainesville Rehab and Nursing
Center LLC
Garda CL, Atlantic, Inc.

Holman Distribution

US
US

Garda

Canada

GCA Service Group

US

General Cable Corp

US

Geo Group Inc.

US

Georgia-Pacific

US

Gibraltar Strip Steel, Inc.

US

Givaudan Flavors Corp.

Givaudan

Switzerland

Global Expertise Outsourcing

GEO group

US

Global Spectrum L.P.

Comcast

US

GMH

GMH Community Trust

US

Godin Grocery Inc.

US

Golden Krust Caribbean Bakery Inc

US

Golden Living Center

Golden Health Group

Golden Oriental Foods

US
US
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2

Goodyear Tire and Rubber

US

Grace Baking

US

2

Blackstone Group

US

2

Muscatine Foods Corporation

US

Graham Packaging Plastics
Products
Grain Processing Corporation
Gray Interplant Systems Inc.

US

GreenWaste of Palo Alto, GCP

US

Griffith Energy Services Inc.

CH Energy Group

Gross School Bus Service Inc
Gulf Chemical & Metalurgical

US
Eramet Group

France

Hampton Corporation

US

Hana Engineering

Korea

Hanard Machine, Inc.
Harborside Healthcare

US

US
Sun Healthcare Group

US

Harding and Hill Inc

US

Hargrove Electric Company

US

Bally's Park Place, Inc.

Harrah's Entertainment

Haven Health Center
Haverford Nursing and Rehab
Center
Hawthorne House

US
US

2

Platinum Health Care

US

2

First Atlantic Corporation

US

HealthSport

US

HearthstoneCarestone Assisted
Living
Heartland of Holly Glenn

Hearthstone Senior Services

US

HCR ManorCare

US

Heidelberg USA

Heidelberger Druckmaschinen
AG

Henderson Enterprises, Inc.

Germany
US

Hersey Meters

Mueller Company

US

HGI-Lakeside Inc.

Herbst Gaming Inc.

US

Highgate LTC Management, LLC

Northwoods Rehabilitation

US

Highlands at Brigton

University of Rochester affiliate

US

Hill's Pet Nutrition Inc.

Colgate-Palmolive

US

Hilo Hawaiian Hotel

Castle Hotels and Resorts

US

Hoboken Floors

HWF Holdings

US

Hollingsworth Management Srvc

Hollingsworth Logistics North
America

US

Holman Contract Warehousing
Holy Family Home

US
Catholic Sisters

US

HomeLife Inc.
Honeywell Technology Solutions

4

US
Honeywell International

US

Howard S. Wright Construction

US

HQM of Spencer County Inc.

US
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2

HFS North America

HAVI Group

US

HTH Corp
Hudson News Distributors LLC
Hydrochem Industrial Services Inc.

US
Hudson Group, subsid of Dufry
AG
Aquilex Company, subsid of
Harvest Partners

IAP Worldwide Services

Cerberus Capital Management LP

IKO Pacific Inc.

IKO

US
US
Canada

Imperial Parking
Imperial Sheet Metal

Switzerland

Canada
Imperial Manufacturing Group

Canada

Industrial Hard Chrome/Bar Tech/
Fludi Power Manufacturing

US

Industrial Specialists LLC

US

Indyne Inc.

US

Ingersoll Rand, Inc.

Ireland

Inner City Nursing Home, Inc.

US

Inter-con Security

US

Intercos America Inc.

Intercos S.p.A.

Italy

International Paper
Irby Construction

US
Quanta Services

Iron Mountain Record Storage
Ironwood Communications

Division of 180 Connect

Irwin Telescopic Seating Company
ITR Consession Company, LLC

US

3

US

2

Canada
US

Cintra Concesiones

Spain

J&M Precision Machining

US

J.B. Hunt Transport, inc.

US

J.F. Sobieski Mechanical Inc.

US

J.P. Mascaro & Sons

US

Jacaranda Manor Nursing Home

US

Jaco Transportation

US

JB Smith Manufacturing Co. Inc.

Anvil International, subsid of
Mueller Water Products

Jet Plastica Inc

US

US
Berkshire Hathaway

US

Johnson Controls World Services

US

Joint Venture The Ride

US

JP&D Digital Satellite Systems Inc.

US

Jupiter Aluminum Corporation

US

KABCO Pharmaceuticals Inc

US

Kardex Systems Inc

3

US

Jing Fong Restaurant Inc.
Johns Mansville

2

KRI Group

Switzerland
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2

KDH Defense Systems, Inc.

US

Kellogg Snack Division

US

Kelly Box Packaging company

US

Kerry Inc.

Kerry Group

Ireland

Kiessling Transit Inc.

US

Kings Aire, Incorporated

US

King's Country Shoppes Inc.

Kings Family Restaurants, Inc.

US

Koch Foods

US

Koenig & VITS

US

Kontos Food

US

KOR Hotel Group/ Sheraton
Delfina
Kozy Shack Enterprises

US

K-ply

US

Kroger Limited Partnership

US

Kronos Products, Inc.

US

L-3 Communications

L-3 Communications Holdings
Inc.

US

LaFarge S.A.

France
US

Jarden Corp

US

Lakewood Manor North S.N.F.

US

Lancaster Preferred Partners

US

Laurel Baye Health care of Lake
Lanier, LLC
Lehigh Press

US
Von Hoffman

US

LeJeune Support Services LLC

US

Lemont Nursing and Rehabiliation
Center LLC
Levitz Furniture

US

US
Life Care Centers of America

Lifestyle Support Services
Locating Inc.

US
US

Subsid of Dycom Industries, inc.

US

Lockheed Martin Services

US

Locust Grove Facility Operations

US

Los Angeles Times
Communications LLC
Lowe's HIW INC.

Tribune Company

US

Lowe's company

US

LP Sebring, LLC

Signature HealthCARE

US

LuckyCab
Lufthansa Technik Component

2

US

Lexmar Distribution /LDI Trucking
Life Care of Lawrenceville

3

US

Lakeside Transportation
Lakewood Engineering

2

US

La Casa del Pueblo
LaFarge North America

2

US
Deutsche Lufthansa AG
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Germany

2

Tulsa
M & B Services
M&M Restaurant Supply

US
Keystone Foods, owned by
Lindsay Goldberg LLC

Maac machinery
Maid Brigade

US
US

Franchised to Alexandria Business
Group

US

Main Motors Sales Company Inc.

US

Management & Training
Corporation
Manning Construction Company
Inc.
Marina District Development Corp

US

Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa

US

Marshalls Department Stores

TJX Companies

US

US

Massey Glass

US

MasTec North America Inc.

US

Master Foods/Cal Can Foods

Mars Inc.

Maui Coast Hotel

Coast Hotels

US
Canada

MBM Food Service

US

McCormick & Company

US

McDonald Wholesale Co.

US

McKenzie Drywall Finishers Corp.
MDV

US
Nash-Finch

US

Mecalux
Med Star- Medicar

Spain
Universal Transportation LI?

US

Medallion Foods

US

MedCorp Inc.

US

Medford Hamlet

US

Medical Express Ambulance
Service Inc.
MedicWest Ambulance, Inc.

US

Members Building Maintenance

US

Mesker Door

US

Metaldyne

US

Meteor Sealing Systems LLC

US

Meteor Gummiwerke K.H. Bädje
Gmbh & Co. Kg

Metro Disposal Inc.
Micro Gauge

Germany
US

Mueller Industries

US

Midstates Express

US

Midwest Metal Products Company

US

Millard Refrigeration

US

Millennium Rail, Inc.

4

Watco Company

US
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2

Motor Wheel Commercial Vehicle
Systems
Mountaineer Park, Inc.

Precision Partners Holdings

US

MTR Gaming

US

Moyer Packing Company

US

Myer's Investigative and Security
Services
Nash Finch

US

NCR Corporation

US
ATT

US

NeilMed Products
Nestle Waters North America

US
Nestle Waters

France

Netversant Solutions LLC

US

New Era Cap

US

New Page Duluth Mill

US

NewStar Fresh Foods, LLC
NGC Industries

2

US
National Gypsum Company

Norbord

US
Canada

North Miami Medical Center

RDC Healthway

US

Northern States Power

Xcel Energy

US

Northwest Florida Facilities
Management, Inc.
Northwoods Rehab

US

Norwalk Custom Furniture

US

Norwood Hospital

US

Nursing Unlimited Services Inc.

US

OfficeMax Inc.

US

2

US

Ohio Mattress Company Licensing
and Component group

Sealy Corporation

Oldcastle Retail Inc.

CRH PLC

US
Ireland

2

Olympic Steel Iowa, Inc.

US

2

Omnimold LLC

US

Oncor Electric Delivery Company

US

One Source Building Services, Inc.

ABM Industries Incorporated

OPTERA, Inc.

Magna International

ORCON Corporation

US
Canada
US

Ouhu Publications Inc.

Sound Publishing

US

PACON

VanHoff Companies

US

Pactiv Corp

US

Palm Terrace of Lakeland

Cypress Health Care Management

Pankl Aerospace

Pankl Racing Systems AG

US
Austria

Park B. Smith

US

Park 'N Go of Minnesota

US

Park Place Center- Genesis

Genesis Health Care
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2

US

2

Parking Concepts

US

Parkway Regional Medical Center

US

Parr Lumber Co

US

Partylite Worldwide

Blyth inc

US

Penske Logistics

Penske Corporation

US

Pepsi Northwest Beverages LLC

Pepsi Bottling Group

US

Petermann Ltd.
PHC-Elko Inc.

Life Point Hospitals Inc.

US

2

US

2

Philly Transportation

US

Pilgrim Rehabilitation and Skilled
Nursing Center
Pilgrim's Pride

US

Pivotal Staffing Services

US
Safer Foundation (Non-profit)

US

PKL Services

US

PM Beef Holdings LLC

US

Polyone Corporation

US

Pondera Medical Center

US

Ponderay Newsprint Company

The McClatchy Company

US

Portec Group International

PNC Equity Partners, subsid of
PNC Financial Services Group

US

Posterloid Corp.

Steelcase

US

PPG Industries, Inc.
PrattWhitney

US
United Technology Corp

Praxaire Distribution Inc.
Precoat Metals
Preferred Rubber Company

US
US

Sequa (US); owned by Carlyle
Group (US)
Watermill Group

Premeire Home Health Care

US
US
US

Prestige Home Attendant

US

Prime Care Health

Hunterton Care Center

US

Metropolitan Home Health Care

Premiere Health Care

US

Product Action

US

Product International Action

US

Progress Rail Services Corporation

Subsid of Caterpillar

US

Progress Transit Company

US

Publix Supermarkets

US

Quality Underground Services Inc.

Q3 Contracting

US

Quesos la Ricura

US

Quest Diagnostics

US

Quikrete Northern California Inc.

US

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco

US
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2

R.W. Painting of WNY, Inc.
Race Track Operators, Ltd.

US
Hazel Park Racetrack

US

Raley's

US

Rams Specialized Security Service
Corp.
RathGibson

US

RCN

US

US

REC Silicon

Orkla ASA

Norway

Recticel Interiors North America,
LLC
Red Mountain Entertainment

The Recticel Group

Belgium

Reliable Trucking

Conco Company

US
US

Republic Services Inc.

US

Republic Parking Inc.

US

Revelle Enterprises Inc

dba Pro Quo Books

Revera Health Systems

Revera

Rexnord Industries

RBS Global, Inc., Apollo
Management LLP is majority
equity holder

Canada
US

US

Ridgewood Manor

US

RIH Acquisitions NJ

Resorts International Holding,
affiliate of Colony Capital

Rinker South Central Concrete
Division
River Ranch Fresh Foods, LLC

Rinker Materials Corp, subsid of
CSR Limited

Rockspring Development

AlphaNatural

US
Australia
US
US

Roscoe Community Nursing Home

US

Rossi Concrete

US

Roundy's Inc.

US
TBEI Inc.

US

Rural/Metro Corporation

US

Russell Transport

US

Ryder System

US
Lone Star Electric

US

S&S Transit

US

S. Bertram Inc.

US

Sabra Blue & White Foods LLC

Strauss Group

Israel

Safeway Transportation

US

SAIA Motor Freight

US

Saint Francis Extended Care, Inc.

2

US

RichLee Vans

S& H Lone Star Electric

2

US

Remington Arms Company

Rugby Manufacturing Company

2

Vintage Estates

US
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Saint Vincent Hospital

Vanguard Health Systems

US

Saladino's Inc.

US

Saputo Cheese

Canada

Satellite Services Inc

SSI

SCA Tissure, North America LLC

Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget
SCA

US
Sweden

Sealed Air Corporation

US

Sears Roebuck

US

Secure Health LP

US

Security Consultants Group Inc

US

Sequoyah Electric, LLC

US

Shepard Exposition Services

US

Sherijan Broadcasting Company
Inc.
Sierra Pacific Industries

US

Silver Lining Interiors

US

Sioux-Preme Parking Co.

US

US

Small Tube Manufacturing Corp

Three Rivers Capital

US

Smart Pick Inc

Penny Transportation

US

Smarte Carte Inc.

US

SMG Saenger Theatre

US

Smith Frozen Food

US

Smithfield Packing Company

Smithfield Foods

US

Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort

Owned by Saginaw Chippewa

US

Sodexho

Sodexo Worldwide

Solutia

2

US

Solvay Chemicals
Somers Thin Strip

France

3

Belgium
US

2

Spartech Plastics

US

2

Special Touch Home Health Care
Services
Spirit Trucking Company

US

Southern Hills Medical Center LLC

US

Southern Nuclear

Olin Brass, under Global Brass
and Copper

US
Southern Company

US

Southern Ocean County Hospital

US

Springwood Nursing and Rehab
LLC
STA of Connecticut Inc

US
Student Transportation of
America/ Student Transportation
of Canada

Canada

Staff Source

US

Standard Register

US
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2

Staples

US

Stericycle

US

STS

Dycom

US

Student Transportation of America

US

2

Summit Cold Storage

US

2

US

2

Sunnyview Convalescent Hospital
Sunrise Assisted Living at
Fleetwood
Sunrise Convalescent Hospital

Longview Management
Corporation
Sunrise Senior Living INC

US
US

Sunrise Mountainview Hospital

US

Superior Asphalt Company, Inc.

US

Superior Farms

US

Superior Laundry Services

US

Supervalu Inc

US

Sutphen Towers

Sutphen

US

SVC Manufacturing

US

Sverdrup Technology, Inc; SRC and
ERC
Swan Pointe Facility Operations

US

Tasting Baking (Tasty Baking)

US

Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc.
Tecstar LLC, Dixie Staffing, Kinder
Staffing
Teeples IGA, Browning MT

2

US
Teck Cominco, now Teck

Canada
US

Teeples Markets

US

Tendercare Nursing Home

US

Terex Telelect Inc.

Terex

US

Tetra Pak Materials LP

Tetra Lavel International LA

Adelphia Communications Corp.

TimeWarner bought in April 2005

US

The Camp Recovery Centers, L.P.

CRC Health Group

US

The Children's Place

The Childrens Place Retail Stores
Inc.

US

The Corey Steel Company

Switzerland

US

The Dannon Company, Inc.

Groupe Danone

France

The Point at Poipu

Diamond Resorts International

US

The Waters of Three Rivers

US

Tilton Terrace

US

Timber Point Healthcare Center

US

Tin Inc/ Performance Sheets

Temple-Inland

US

TNI Partners

Tuscon Newspapers

US

Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation

Todd Shipyards Corporation

US

Toll Bros Inc.

US

Tolman Building maintenance Inc.

US
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Total Health Home Care Corp

US

Totem Electric of Tacoma, Inc.

US

Towne Bus LLC

We Transport

US

Townsend Inc.

US

ToysRUs

US

Tractor Supply Company

US

Trans Healthcare Inc.

US

Transportation Solutions, Inc.

US

Tree of Life Inc.

Royal Wessanen nv

Tree Top Inc.
Trend Western

Netherlands
US

Del-Jen, subsidiary of Fluor

US

Tri-County Industries, Inc.

US

Tri-Seal Holdings Inc.

US

Tropicana Casino & Resort

Tropicana Entertainment

US

TXI Cement Co.

US

Tyson Fresh Meats

US

Union Tribune Publishing Co.

US

UnionTools Inc.

US

United Natural Foods Inc.

US

Upper Cumberland Electric
Membership Corporation
USF-Dugan

US

UTi Integrated Logistics, Inc.
VAE Nortrak North America Inc.

Yellow Roadway Corporation

US

Uti Worldwide (British Virgin
Islands)
Voestalpine AG

UK
Austria

Valero Energy

US

Valley View Manor Nursing Home

US

Valmont Industries

US

Vantage Management Services LLC
Veolia Transportation

Vantage Building and
Management Services
Veolia Environment

2

2

US
France

Verizon

US

Veterans Transportation Services
Inc.
Vision of Elk River, Inc.

US

Visteon

US

Von Hoffmann Corp

2

4

US
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts

Vonachen Services Inc.

US
US

Vought Aircraft

Carlyle Group

US

2

VT Griffin

VT Group plc

UK

2

W.R. Meadows, Inc.

US

W.W. Grainger Inc.

US
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Wackenhut Corporation

Group 4 Falck A/S

Wagner Equipment Co.

Wagner formed a partnership with
Barloworld Equipment LTD to
service East Siberia

Denmark

2

US

Walgreens Distribution Center

US

Walker International Transportation

US

Walt Disney World Company

US

Ward Trucking

US

Warner Brothers Pictures

US

Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab

US

Wayne Bare Trucking

US

Wellsville Namor

US

Wenner Bread Products

US

West Hills Medical Center

US

2
2

West Liberty Foods

Iowa Turkey Growers Association

US

West Side Corporation

Elder Group

US

Western Refining Company
Whemco -Steelcasting Inc.

US
Whemco

US

White Engineering Surfaces
Corporation
Whittier Hospital Medical Center

US

Whole Foods Market

US

Wild Oats Markets Inc.

US
acquired by Whole Foods in Aug,
2007

US

Willow Crest Nursing Pavillion, Lt.

US

Wilson Trailer Company

US

Wilt's Emergency Services and
Transport, Inc.
Winco Foods

US

Woodman Food

US

World Yacht

US

US

Wynn Las Vegas, LLC

Wynn Resorts LTD

US

Yakima HMA Inc

Yakima Regional Cardiac Center

US

Yellow Enterprise System/Yellow
Ambulance
Yonkers Racing Corporation

Procarent

US

York Linings International

York Forter Australasia Pty
Limited (Austrialia), subsid of
Beroa (Germany)

US

Young Manufacturing Company

Germany

US

YUHSHIN USA LTD

U-Shin Group

Inland Northwest

Darigold

Japan
US

Aldworth Company, Inc. Dunkin

US
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Donuts
The Avenue Nursing and
Rehabilitation Centre
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company
Akzo Nobel Surface Chemicals

Capital Living and Rehab Centers

US

FirstEnergy

US

Akzo Nobel

Netherlands

National/Alamo Car Rental

Vanguard Car Rental USA

US

Alcoa - Excel Extrusions Inc.

Alcoa (in 2005)

US

Quaker Oats-Gatorade Division

PepsiCo

US

Cornell Abraxas Group Inc.

Run by the GEO Group

US

Dixie Consumer Products

US

GGNSC Glendale LLC

Georgia Pacific, subsid of Koch
Industries
Golden Living Centers

Boardwalk Regency Corporation

Harrah's Entertainment Inc.

US

Red & Tan Charters

Subsid of CoachUSA, subsid of
Stagecoach Group PLC

UK

2

US

Allied Waste and Urban Services of
America
Roswell Nursing & Rehab. Center

Cypress Health Care Management

US

Voorhees Center

Genesis Health Care

US

Priority Home Care

Premiere Health Care

US

Sonaca NMF America

Sonaca SA

Sony DADC

Sony

Sportsystems Gaming Management
at Buffalo Raceway LLC

Delaware North

US

U.S Foodservice

US

International Converter

Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and
Clayton, Dunbilier, and Rice
(equity firms)
Packaging Dynamics

Tower Hill Nursing, LLC

Kindred Healthcare

US

Pinkerton Government Services

Securitas AB

Sweden

Certainteed Corporation

Saint Gobain

France

City Market

Kroger company

Detroit Deisel Corporation Canton
Parts Distribution Center

Daimler AG

Hilton Philadelphia Airport

Hilton Hotels Corporation

US

The Crossing Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center
Edwards Electrical and Mechanical
Inc
Americanos USA, LLC

Capital Living and Rehab Centres

US

FirstEnergy Corporation

US

Greyhound, subsid of FirstGroup

UK

Vanguard Car Rental

Enterprise Rental Car

US

Harrah's Imperial Palace
Corporation

Harrah's Entertainment

US

2

US

Belgium
Japan

US

2

US
Germany
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Freightliner LLC

DaimlerChrysler

Germany

Cardinal Transportation

FirstGroup

UK

Home Care of Washington

ResCare

US

Securitas Security Services USA,
INC
Smith's Food

Securitas AB
Kroger Company

US

Greyhound Lines

FirstGroup

UK

Sweden
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Vita
Sarah Young has spent over a decade working on the three interwoven tracks of her
career: labor unions, academic research, and teaching. In 2000, she wrote her undergraduate
thesis on the British Coal Miners’ Strike of 1984, based on field research conducted in Swansea,
Wales. She then went on to land a position as a labor educator training union stewards at the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters in Washington, D.C., one of the most demanding and
rewarding jobs of her life. She returned to academia after a number of years, earning her Masters
in Public Administration at the University of Tennessee in 2008. Sarah continued for her
doctoral degree and taught political science courses as a Graduate Teaching Associate for three
years, concluding that she was actually pretty good at it. After detouring from her graduate
studies in 2012 to work semi-full time and raise her son Patrick, born in 2013, Sarah vowed to
complete her degree. She is joyous to be finishing the research she started four years ago. This
dissertation unifies what she has learned from her previous career paths.
Sarah would summarize her most valuable discoveries from graduate school as follows:
o Labor unions are critical institutions throughout the community of nations.
o Middle-class economies are built by labor unions and the governments that labor
unions support. Virtually every country that developed middle-class economies
did so as a result of labor mobilization.
o Governments are guardians of the market and creators of economic systems. It is
the duty of governments to make manifest a market that shares wealth to all.
She looks forward to continuing the exploration of these themes in the second wave of her
career.
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